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SUMMARY
This dissertation is motivated by the need, in today’s globalist world, for a precise way to en-
able governments, organisations and other regulatory bodies to evaluate the constraints they
place on themselves and others. An organisation’s modus operandi is enacting and fulfill-
ing contracts between itself and its participants. Yet, organisational contracts should respect
external laws, such as those setting out data privacy rights and liberties. Contracts can only
be enacted by following contract law processes, which often require bilateral agreement
and consideration. Governments need to legislate whilst understanding today’s context of
national and international governance hierarchy where law makers shun isolationism and
seek to influence one another. Governments should avoid punishment by respecting con-
straints from international treaties and human rights charters. Governments can only enact
legislation by following their own, pre-existing, law making procedures. In other words,
institutions, such as laws and contracts are designed and enacted under constraints.
The common thread shared by these examples is that institution designers, such as or-
ganisations and governments, are constrained in two senses. They are loosely tied in how
the institutions they enact should be designed and strongly tied in how and when they can
enact institutional changes. We can clearly see such constraints exist in written form, even
though we cannot physically see how the machinery that applies and tightens those con-
straints around the institutional designers works. It is consequently hard to grasp exactly
how institution designers need to operate under these constraints.
This dissertation addresses this issue by contributing a formal framework for analysing
institutional design and enactment governance. Through formalisation, the framework pro-
vides a mathematically rigorous account of constraints placed on institutional designs and
enacting institutional changes. Hence, the unseen constraints become seeable not as phys-
ical bindings, but as symbols on a page defining general institutional reasoning. From a
conceptualisation standpoint, the main benefit is that we are able to understand the institu-
tional constraints and identify any conceptual flaws. Or, in the words of Leibniz, “The only
way to rectify our reasonings is to make them as tangible as those of the Mathematicians,
so that we can find our error at a glance”.
There are three main practical benefits. Firstly, the formal reasoning is disseminated in
clear mathematical language. Institution designers and judiciaries apply exactly the same
reasoning, making judgements predictable, providing they share the same legal rule bases.
Moreover, citizens can have common knowledge of when regulatory changes are enacted by
applying the same institutional reasoning. Secondly, the framework facilitates automation
of otherwise cognitively difficult tasks in understanding the constraints placed on institution
designers. Thirdly, the framework deals with the pragmatics with applications to real world
case studies, in order to capture the meaning of institutional constraints as they are used.
In summary, this dissertation introduces the PARAGon framework for Practical Automated
Reasoning for Assessing Governance of institution design and change.
Central to the PARAGon framework is Searle’s well known institutional constitutive
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counts-as rules of the form “A counts-as B in context C”. For example, “a piece of pa-
per with certain European Union symbols counts-as money in the context of the European
Union”. These rules build a social reality from brute facts and regulate social reality change
when the brute facts change. PARAGon makes three main contributions founded on counts-
as rules.
PARAGon contributes formalised reasoning for a governance architecture called multi-
level governance where institutions operate at different governance levels. The lowest-level
institutions prescribe concrete regulations to govern societies (e.g. national legislation),
whilst higher-level level institutions impose abstract regulations on the concrete regulatory
outcomes of lower-level institutions (e.g. directives, human rights charters and suprana-
tional agreements). The PARAGon framework derives from counts-as rules whether con-
crete regulations at lower governance levels can be applied in social contexts such that they
violate abstract regulations as set out in directives, human rights charters, etcetera.
PARAGon contributes a computational mechanism for finding explanations for non-
compliant institution designs used to rectify non-compliance. The explanations are minimal
counts-as rule additions, deletions and modifications that ensure compliance. Moreover, the
explanations keep institution designs as close as possible to designers’ original intentions.
PARAGon formalises constraints called secondary legal rules, which define when in-
stitutions and institutional changes can be enacted. PARAGon formalises such secondary
rules as rule-modifying counts-as rules, which ascribe rule change at various points in time.
For example, a government voting for a rule change counts-as enacting a rule change. De-
termining rule change legality is difficult, since changing counts-as rules alters social con-
texts, which rule changes are conditional on. PARAGon contributes formal reasoning for
determining when rule changes count-as legal rule changes.
The PARAGon framework was developed under the SHINE (Sensing Heterogeneous
Information Network Environment) project1, which aims to form large-scale heterogeneous
sensor networks, using existing sensors in the environment belonging to external stake-
holders. PARAGon aims to support automated governance for large scale heterogeneous
‘SHINE’ sensor networks. Firstly, by automating the application of multi-level governance
to forming SHINE sensor super-systems of sub-systems, comprising a thin SHINE insti-
tution layer abstractly governing the design of sub-system institutions towards coordinated
regulations for collecting environmental data collection. Secondly, PARAGon supports sen-
sor network stakeholders with automated institution re-design recommendations to ensure
the institutions are designed compliantly. Thirdly, PARAGon supports automated reasoning
for how and when sensor system regulations are changed over time as different governance
needs arise (e.g. as the data needs change or as it emerges existing rules are inadequate).
The PARAGon framework makes both formal and practical contributions. From the
formal side, this dissertation aims to formalise previously informal notions provided by
political science and legal philosophy. Particular attention is paid to understanding the new
conceptualisations and testing them against a number of case studies to assess whether the
formal contributions provide ‘correct’ inferences. From the practical side, the contributed
reasoning is either coupled with an implementation or a computational characterisation of
the formal concepts providing necessary details for implementation. This dissertation lies
at the intersection of legal philosophy and symbolic artificial intelligence.
1http://shine.tudelft.nl
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Ten grondslag aan deze dissertatie ligt de behoefte in de hedendaagse globalistische wereld
aan een precieze methode om overheden, organisaties en andere regelgevende instanties in
staat te stellen de beperkingen die ze opleggen aan zichzelf en anderen te evalueren. De
modus operandi van een organisatie bestaat uit het instantiëren en uitvoeren van verbin-
tenissen tussen zichzelf en haar deelnemers. Organisationele verbintenissen dienen echter
wel de externe wetgeving te respecteren, zoals de wetgeving waarin de rechten en vrijhe-
den op het gebied van gegevensbescherming zijn neergelegd. Verbintenissen kunnen alleen
worden geïnstantieerd door verbintenissenrechtelijke processen te volgen, die vaak bilat-
erale overeenstemming en afweging vereisen. Overheden moeten wetten opstellen en daar-
naast inzicht hebben in de hedendaagse context van nationale en internationale governance-
hiërarchie waarin wetgevers isolationisme uit de weg gaan en elkaar proberen te beïnvloe-
den. Overheden dienen sancties te voorkomen door zich te houden aan de beperkingen die
zijn opgelegd via internationale verdragen en mensenrechtenhandvesten. Overheden kun-
nen wetten alleen maar instantiëren door hun eigen, reeds bestaande wetgevingsprocedures
te volgen. Met andere woorden: het ontwerpen en instantiëren van instituties, zoals wetten
en verbintenissen, is onderworpen aan beperkingen.
De rode draad bij deze voorbeelden is dat ontwerpers van instituties, zoals organisaties
en overheden, in twee opzichten beperkt zijn. Ze zijn lichtelijk gebonden in hoe de institu-
ties die ze instantiëren moeten worden ontworpen, en sterk gebonden in hoe en wanneer ze
institutionele veranderingen kunnen instantiëren. We zien duidelijk dat dergelijke beperkin-
gen op schrift bestaan, ook al kunnen we niet fysiek zien hoe de machinerie werkt die de
beperkingen toepast en ze rond de institutionele ontwerpers aantrekt. Derhalve is het moeil-
ijk precies te begrijpen hoe ontwerpers van instituties moeten opereren te midden van deze
beperkingen.
Deze dissertatie gaat in op deze problematiek door een formeel raamwerk aan te reiken
voor het analyseren van institutioneel ontwerp en instantiatie-governance. Door formalis-
ering biedt het raamwerk een mathematisch rigoureus overzicht van de beperkingen die
opgelegd zijn aan institutionele ontwerpen en instantiatie van institutionele veranderingen.
Daarmee worden de onzichtbare beperkingen zichtbaar, niet in fysiek opzicht, maar als
symbolen op een pagina waarop algemeen institutioneel redeneren wordt gedefinieerd. Va-
nuit het oogpunt van conceptualisatie is het grootste voordeel dat we in staat zijn de institu-
tionele beperkingen te begrijpen en eventuele conceptuele tekortkomingen te identificeren.
Oftewel, in de woorden van Leibniz, “De enige manier om onze redeneringen te corrigeren,
is ze net zo tastbaar te maken als die van de Mathematici, zodat we een fout van ons in één
oogopslag kunnen ontwaren”.
Er zijn drie grote praktische voordelen. In de eerste plaats wordt formeel redeneren
alom verspreid in heldere mathematische taal. Institutie-ontwerpers en rechters passen
exact dezelfde redeneringen toe, waardoor uitspraken voorspelbaar worden, mits ze uit-
gaan van dezelfde juridische grondslagen. Bovendien kunnen burgers door toepassing van
iii
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dezelfde institutionele redeneringen gemeenschappelijke kennis hebben van het moment
waarop wijzigingen in regelgeving worden geïnstantieerd. In de tweede plaats faciliteert
het raamwerk automatisering van anderszins cognitief lastige taken bij het begrijpen van de
beperkingen die zijn opgelegd aan ontwerpers van instituties. In de derde plaats gaat het
raamwerk in op de pragmatica middels toepassingen op casestudies uit de praktijk, om zo
de betekenis van gehanteerde institutionele beperkingen te kunnen begrijpen.
Samenvattend, introduceert deze dissertatie het PARAGon-raamwerk voor Practical
Automated Reasoning for Assessing Governance met betrekking tot het ontwerpen en wi-
jzigen van instituties.
Een centrale plaats in het PARAGon-raamwerk wordt ingenomen door Searle’s wel-
bekende institutionele constitutieve "geldt als"-regels in de vorm “A geldt in context C als
B”. Voorbeeld: “een stuk papier met bepaalde aanduidingen van de Europese Unie geldt
in de context van de Europese Unie als geld”. Deze regels bouwen een sociale realiteit
van brute feiten op en reguleren veranderingen in de sociale realiteit wanneer de brute
feiten veranderen. PARAGon levert drie hoofdbijdragen die gebaseerd zijn op geldt-als-
regels. PARAGon biedt geformaliseerd redeneren voor een governance-architectuur, mul-
tilevel governance genaamd, waarbij instituten op meerdere governance-niveaus opereren.
De instituties op het laagste niveau schrijven concrete reguleringen voor om samenlevin-
gen te besturen (bijv. nationale wetgeving), terwijl instellingen op hoger niveau abstracte
reguleringen opleggen met betrekking tot de concrete regulerende uitkomsten van lagere
instituties (bijv. richtlijnen, mensenrechtenhandvesten en supranationale overeenkomsten).
Het PARAGon-raamwerk leidt van geldt-als-regels af of concrete reguleringen op lagere
governance-niveaus zodanig kunnen worden toegepast in sociale contexten dat ze een in-
breuk vormen op abstracte reguleringen als neergelegd in richtlijnen, mensenrechtenhand-
vesten, enzovoort. PARAGon reikt een berekeningsmechanisme aan voor het vinden van
verklaringen voor niet-compliante institutie-ontwerpen die gebruikt worden om
non –compliantie te herstellen. De verklaringen zijn ten opzichte van geldt-als-regels min-
imale toevoegingen, verwijderingen en aanpassingen die zorgen voor compliantie. Verder
houden de verklaringen de institutie-ontwerpen zo dicht mogelijk bij de oorspronkelijke
bedoelingen van de ontwerpers.
PARAGon formaliseert beperkingen, de zogenaamde secundaire rechtsregels, die
definiëren wanneer instituties en institutionele wijzigingen geïnstantieerd kunnen worden.
PARAGon formaliseert dergelijke secundaire regels als rule-modifying geldt-als-regels, die
op verschillende momenten wijzigingen van regels toekennen. Een stemming in het par-
lement om een regel te wijzigen geldt bijvoorbeeld als het instantiëren van een regelwijzig-
ing. Het bepalen van de legaliteit van regelwijzigingen is lastig aangezien een verandering
van geldt-als-regels leidt tot een verandering van sociale contexten, waar regelwijzigingen
afhankelijk van zijn. PARAGon biedt een formele redenering voor het bepalen wanneer
regelwijzigingen gelden als wijzigingen van rechtsregels.
Het PARAGon-raamwerk is ontwikkeld in het kader van het project SHINE (Sensing
Heterogeneous Information Network Environment)2, dat beoogt grootschalige heterogene
sensornetwerken te vormen met behulp van bestaande sensoren in de omgeving die toe-
behoort aan externe belanghebbenden. PARAGon beoogt ondersteuning van geautoma-
tiseerde governance voor grootschalige heterogene SHINE-sensornetwerken. In de eerste
2http://shine.tudelft.nl
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plaats door automatisering van de toepassing van multi-level governance op de vorming
van SHINE sensor-supersystemen van subsystemen, bestaande uit een dunne SHINE insti-
tutielaag die op abstracte wijze het ontwerp van subsysteem-instituties aanstuurt richting
gecoördineerde regulering voor het verzamelen van milieugegevens. In de tweede plaats
ondersteunt PARAGon belanghebbenden in het sensornetwerk met aanbevelingen voor het
geautomatiseerd herontwerpen van instituties om zo te waarborgen dat de instituties op
compliante wijze worden ontworpen. In de derde plaats ondersteunt PARAGon geautoma-
tiseerde redenering voor hoe en wanneer regels van sensorsystemen in de loop der tijd wor-
den gewijzigd naarmate andere governance-behoeften ontstaan (bijv. als de data gewijzigd
moeten worden of als blijkt dat bestaande regels ontoereikend zijn).
Het PARAGon-raamwerk levert zowel formele als praktische bijdragen. In formeel
opzicht streeft deze dissertatie naar het formaliseren van voorheen informele noties die va-
nuit de politieke wetenschap en de rechtsfilosofie werden aangeleverd. Bijzondere aandacht
wordt besteed aan het begrijpen van de nieuwe conceptualisaties en het toetsen ervan aan
een aantal casestudies teneinde te beoordelen of de formele bijdragen resulteren in ‘cor-
recte’ inferenties. In praktisch opzicht wordt de aangedragen redenering gekoppeld aan
ofwel een implementatie ofwel een rekenkundige karakterisering van de formele concepten
die de noodzakelijke details aanleveren voor implementatie. Deze dissertatie bevindt zich
op het raakvlak van rechtsfilosofie en symbolische artificiële intelligentie.
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1
INTRODUCTION
The only way to rectify our reasonings is to make them as tangible as those of the
Mathematicians, so that we can find our error at a glance, and when there are disputes
among persons, we can simply say: Let us calculate [calculemus], without further ado, to
see who is right.[153]
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
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In today’s increasingly connected world, governments, organisations and other regula-
tory bodies do not operate in isolate free from control. Let us take a look at three examples.
Our first example concerns the SHINE1 project under which this dissertation’s research was
conducted. SHINE aims to form systems comprising heterogeneous environmental sensors
(e.g. cellphone cameras, weather radars) contracted from the sensor owners to collect en-
vironmental data. However, constraints are placed on forming contracts, in the sense that a
sensor owner is only likely to agree to a contract if it meets their own policies stating what
rights the contract should confer and what liberties it should not take away. Our second ex-
ample concerns European Union (EU) law. In the EU, member states’ governments enact
legislation to meet governance aims. When the EU council wishes to coordinate legislation
across the union, an EU directive is issued. Directives constrain and direct member states
to implement regulations that meet cross–national aims. For example, retaining communi-
cations data for EU–wide criminal investigations [71]. In turn, national legislation and EU
directives are also required to confer rights and uphold liberties specified in the EU Charter
of Fundamental Rights [72]. Our third example concerns the rules that make enacting and
changing regulations possible. An organisation can only enact a legally valid and binding
contract if the rules and processes that state how and when contractual regulations are en-
acted are followed [117, p.96]. The EU council is only able to legislate directives according
to the rules that give it rule–making powers [73, Art. 288]. The United States government
has the power to enact laws by following law making procedures, but laws cannot be created
that apply to the past [221, Art. 1 Sec. 9 Cl. 3]. In other words, governments, organisations,
contract writers and regulatory bodies are constrained in their regulatory activities.
These examples are all about institutions and the constraints placed on institution de-
signers. Institutions are sets of rules and regulations, such as national legislation and con-
tracts [27, 208]. Institution designers are governments, contract writers, organisations and
other regulatory bodies. Institutions regulate, organize and guide individuals’ behaviour in
a society towards collaboratively meeting societal aims [186]. Societal participants are au-
tonomous agents, such as people or software agents, which are liable to act in their own self
interests. Hence, institutions pair regulations with penalties to ensure it is in an individual’s
own self–interest to comply for the greater good of the governed society [15, 41][44, p.80].
Institution designers craft institutions to regulate agents towards societal aims, such as peo-
ple contractually participating in an organisation collecting and providing data, or citizens
participating in a society whilst respecting one another’s rights. By regulating rather than
regimenting (forcing certain) agent behaviour, institution designers can achieve societal
aims whilst preserving agents’ autonomy.
Institution designers are also autonomous agents and hence are liable to act in their own
self–interests. Consequently, regulations are placed on institution designers to reign their
behaviour in. The first two examples showed how institution designers are governed in the
institutions they design. Some institutions are designed to govern societies, such as na-
tional legislation. But, such institutional designs are in turn governed by other institutions,
such as EU directives and human rights charters. The third example shows how institution
designers are regulated in their ability to enact institutional changes by establishing new
institutions or change existing institutions. By enactment, we mean in the sense of passing
of a new law or a change to legislation, making a contract legally binding or more generally
1http://shine.tudelft.nl
3the social action of making an institutional change legally valid and imposed on agents.
For example, enacting contracts or changing existing institutional rules to meet new aims.
Governing regulatory change is defined by rules that stipulate when institutional changes
are enacted. Hence, institution designers autonomously design and enact institutions, but
institution designers are also governed in the institutions they design and the institutional
enactment process.
In today’s increasingly technological world, operationalising institutions by applying
rules and regulations is not just left up to opaque human reasoning. Instead, the fields of
Normative Multi–Agent Systems and AI and Law are concerned with automated reasoning
for institutions by contributing formal frameworks that interpret and apply institutions (we
discuss background on implemented systems later in Chapter 2, and a literature survey is
provided by [12]). Formalisation, in general, takes informal reasoning, that is ambiguous
and unclear, and exposes it in plain sight with precise mathematically rigorous definitions.
Yet, thus far the reasoning involved in the governance placed on institution designers
has not been formalised. We can see a common thread is shared by our examples, in that
institution designers are constrained loosely in how the institutions they enact should be
designed and strongly in how and when they can enact institutional changes. Yet, although
we can clearly see such constraints exist in their written form, we cannot physically see pre-
cisely how the machinery that applies and tightens those constraints around the institutional
designers works. It is consequently hard to grasp how exactly institution designers need to
operate under institutional design and enactment constraints. This dissertation addresses
this knowledge gap, by contributing a formal framework for analysing institutional design
and enactment governance. To understand more specifically why such formal reasoning
is important, let us first take a closer look at the concepts behind institutional design and
enactment governance.
From the institutional design governance perspective, institution designs are gov-
erned by other institutions in what is called multi–level governance [121]. In this disser-
tation, multi–level governance is conceived as higher–level institutions designed to govern
and guide the institution designs, enacted by autonomous institution designers, operating
at lower governance levels. Multi–level governance facilitates institution designs in being
coordinated, when viewed as being related in a wider multi–institution system (e.g. [244]).
For example, at a national level a government enacts institutions to govern a nation. At
a cross–national level institutions are designed to guide national governments in enacting
institutions with coordinated regulations. Moreover, designers are guided in ensuring their
designs do not take away rights and liberties, such as by human rights charters. In multi–
level governance, institution designers have autonomy to design institutions according to
their aims, but their institution designs are also subject to being governed and guided by
higher–level institutions.
Multi–level governance creates the possibility for institution designs to be non–compliant.
A non–compliant institution design is problematic. From the higher governance levels’ per-
spective non–compliant institution designs are uncoordinated with other institutions gov-
erning separate jurisdictions, do not uphold rights and/or do take away liberties. From an
institution designer’s perspective, they are liable to face punishment for non–compliant de-
sign. When societal members act in a non–compliant way they are liable to being penalised
in order to guide society towards compliance[11, p. 279]. Hence, when an institution
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designer designs a non–compliant institution, they are liable to being fined or having insti-
tution designs annulled [210] by judiciaries. Non–compliance in multi–level governance
should be detected and avoided before institution enactment by an institution designer in
order to avoid punishment, and detected after institution enactment by a judiciary to issue
punishment and thus incentivise institution designers in enacting compliant institutions.
From the institutional change enactment governance perspective, institutional rules
define the legislative actions that constitute a valid institutional change enactment condi-
tional on the social context [20]. In a simple case, a legislature voting by majority on an
institution enactment change suffices. In other cases, there are further constraints on valid
institution change enactment, such as there being no valid way to change an institution in
the past (retroactively) [221, Art. 1 Sec. 9 Cl. 3] “No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto
Law shall be passed”. In general, there are rules that state how and when rules are changed.
According to the influential legal philosopher Hart, these are secondary institutional rules
and they create the possibility for governments to change legislation and citizens to create
contracts [117, p.81]. When an institution designer designs or changes an institution out-
side of the secondary rules the “enacted” changes are invalid. For example, enactment does
not occur merely by physically writing institutional rules without following the necessary
voting procedure set out by secondary rules. From an institution’s perspective, invalid en-
actments or changes do not take place. Hence, the system or society the institution governs
should ignore such invalid enactments in order to have the correct and shared view of an
institution’s rules.
Formal reasoning is important for the governance of institution design and enactment.
Specifically, for precision and automation:
Precision. In general, formalisation removes ambiguity. Without ambiguity, rigorous
interrogation of the underlying reasoning is possible. Hence, reasoning flaws can be
found and fixed, which can have real positive and negative consequences for agents
being rewarded or punished. Moreover, formalisation communicates in clear mathe-
matical terms the reasoning involved. Hence, given an institution and the facts of a
case, agents can independently come to the same conclusions by applying identical
reasoning.
From a multi–level governance perspective, an institution designer can predict whether
a judiciary would find the institution design non–compliant. With one caveat, the de-
signer and judiciary must have the same legal rule base, including any unwritten
rules such as conceptual interpretations. Prediction benefits an institution designer
who can choose to not enact a non–compliant institution in order to avoid punish-
ment.
In the case of governing the institutional change enactment process with secondary
rules, all agents governed by an institution are able to come to the same understanding
over the changes made to the rules they are governed by. A common understanding
benefits two agents in neither having a different understanding of the regulations
in place nor misunderstanding what they ought to do according to the institutions
governing them.
Automation. Formalisation removes ambiguity, which is a necessary pre–requisite
5for automation since it means, potentially, the formal reasoning can be implemented
in a computational language as a program for a computer to execute.
From the multi–level governance perspective, automation lowers compliance check-
ing costs. A judiciary does not face the dilemma over either arduously determining if
an institutional design is compliant or forego judgement and face the possibility that
institution designs are allowed to be uncoordinated or take away agents’ rights and
liberties without punishment. Automation also lowers compliance checking costs for
institution designers and helps rectify non–compliance. Fixing non–compliance is
not necessarily easy. There can be multiple possible explanations for why an insti-
tution is non–compliant in there there is often a space of many compliant institution
designs. For example, EU member states are at liberty to comply with an EU directive
in many ways [76, p.5]. Yet, some compliant designs will meet an institution design-
ers’ objectives more than others. By automating compliance checking, searching for
explanations for non–compliance that can be used to rectify the underlying causes is
also automatable in a way that meets an institution designer’s aims the most.
It is non–trivial to determine how an institution is changed according to secondary
rules governing rule change. For example, a new rule might be enacted stating rules
can be changed by majority vote. Enacting such a rule affects which future rule
changes can be enacted. More generally, without wishing to delve into the temporal
details at this point, rule changes can also be applied to the past, present or future
and have many complex interacting affects with other rule changes. Automation
takes over the cognitively difficult task for a human of determining when rule change
enactments are legally valid.
In order to address the need for precision and automation, institutional design and en-
actment governance should be formalised, but there is a lack of formal work in this area.
This dissertation addresses this problem by proposing the PARAGon2 formal framework
for Practical Automated Reasoning for Assessing Governance of institution design and en-
actment. The formalism comprises precise definitions for compliance in multi–level gover-
nance, a mechanism to determine explanations and rectifications for non–compliance, and
precise definitions for institution enactment validity according to secondary rules.
Moreover, this dissertation adopts a practical approach in two senses. Firstly, it provides
definitions that are either coupled with a corresponding computational implementation or
are defined in such a way as to make it obvious how the reasoning can be implemented.
Thus, the formalisation provides automated reasoning. Secondly, the conceptualisations
are aimed at capturing a number of real–world case studies in a realistic setting that in-
cludes factors such as time and change. The framework allows an institution designer to
specify the institutions in a formal grammar and determine using the reasoning whether the
design is compliant in multi–level governance and rectify any non–compliance. Moreover,
institution designers and agents governed by institutions alike can apply the framework to
determine which rule changes are validly enacted and when. The framework users need
2Just as an institution defines ideality, a paragon is an example of a person or thing regarded as a perfect example
of such an ideal [191]
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not understand the underlying mechanics, in terms of how it is decided what the regula-
tory effects of an institution are. Rather, users only need to understand what the concept
of an institution being used by the system is and correctly provide as input the various
institutions that are governing/being governed and the actions of various agents that are
occurring. Consequently, the reasoning burden can be delegated to a computer to mechani-
cally determine institution design compliance, rectifications for non–compliance and valid
rule change enactment.
This chapter proceeds to introduce the research questions in section 1.1. We describe
how this dissertation fits into the SHINE project in section 1.3. Then, the research approach
is described in section 1.2. Finally, the outline of this dissertation is given in section 1.4.
1.1. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
As we discussed, there is a lack of formal and practical reasoning for governing institution
design and enactment that needs addressing. This leads to the main research question:
How can institutional design and enactment governance be supported with for-
mal reasoning?
The main research question is broken down into five sub–questions.
The idea is to contribute formal reasoning to support human stakeholders in understand-
ing the constraints placed on institution designers. Stakeholders need a way to represent
institutions and their governance relationships. This leads to our first research question.
Sub–research question 1: What is a suitable representation to specify institu-
tional design and enactment governance?
It is important for the representation to be natural, by which we mean with a clear cor-
respondence to how written and verbal institutions are represented, for two reasons. Firstly,
from the precision perspective we are interested in formalising institutional governance to
make it clear what we mean by the relevant concepts. The idea being, the concepts are
exposed and can be interrogated, and discussed and debated for ‘correctness’. A natural
representation supports this aim by demonstrating to what extent the formalised reasoning
is doing all the work of coming to correct conclusions and to what extent it is actually
highly dependent on the way an institution is written. The latter case is far from desirable.
For example, if we have to represent an institution in a very convoluted or procedural way
to get the correct reasoning results, it is reasonable to assume that the informal reasoning
has hardly been formalised at all. From the automation perspective, a ‘user’ 3 needs to face
as little burden as possible, meaning they should be able to specify an institution close to
how they would a written law without thinking about how a computer might interpret it.
To give a contrasting example, we could simply provide the user with an abstract computa-
tional machine (e.g. a Turing machine [225]) and give the user all the flexibility to specify
institutions in whichever way they want as procedural code. However, by giving users an
3a user of the PARAGon framework can be a human agent interested in reasoning about institutional design and
change enactment governance, such as to avoid punishment for non–compliant design. A user can also be a
researcher wishing to understand the precise meaning of the concepts involved.
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‘unnatural’ language to specify institutions, we have contributed nothing to automating in-
stitutional governance reasoning. Hence, a natural representation is central to being able
to critique the PARAGon framework, and the framework itself providing the benefits of
formalisation for institutional design and enactment governance.
The PARAGon framework answers this question by providing different ways to repre-
sent institutions depending on whether we are interested in the governance of institution
design or change enactment. The first step in answering the question is to gather back-
ground knowledge on the kinds of institutional rules and regulations we wish to represent
and to what extent there are already suitable grammars to represent those concepts in Chap-
ter 2. Then, in Chapter 3 and 4 we provide a representation for multi–level governance
and apply it to European Union laws. A simpler representation for governing institutional
designs is provided in Chapter 5 and applied to a crowdsourced mobile sensing scenario
inspired by the SHINE project. In Chapter 6 we provide a further representation language,
this time focussed on secondary rules used to govern institutional change enactments. Once
we have a way to represent institutions, we need a way to reason about them, leading to our
next four sub–research questions.
The first aspect we look at is compliance of institution designs in multi–level gover-
nance. Although it is expected that institution designers enact compliant institutions, due
to designers’ autonomy it is not guaranteed. Compliance of institution designs should be
evaluated to enable institution designers to understand whether their designs are compliant
before enactment, and higher governance levels’ judiciaries in punishing institution design-
ers for offending institution designs. Compliance should be assessed in a precise and con-
sistent way, such that the same notion of compliance is shared by institution designers and
judiciaries. Hence, compliance requires formalisation. Since this dissertation takes a prac-
tical approach, addressing real–world needs, compliance should be formalised to capture
its real–world informal notion. This leads to our next sub–research question:
Sub–research question 2: How can we formalise compliance in multi–level
governance?
In general, compliance involves adhering to regulatory requirements [172]. In multi–
level governance, compliance represents whether from the perspective of institutions de-
signed at higher governance levels (e.g. [76, p.5]), lower–level institutions regulate in a
‘good’ way to meet particular higher–level governance aims. There is a difference between
societal compliance and institution design compliance. Societal compliance focuses on
agent behaviour, which is already widely formalised [12], such as agents being compliant if
they do not murder one another according to institutions that prohibit murder. On the other
hand, institution design compliance focuses on whether the effects of regulations are good,
such as by being coordinated with other institutions’ regulatory effects (e.g. controlling
carbon emissions through high–level international institution design coordination [188]),
conferring human rights (e.g. prohibiting murder) and respecting liberties. So, compliant
institution design is formalised by defining when the regulatory effects at lower governance
levels are compliant with the regulations at higher governance levels.
The formal notion of compliance in multi–level governance must, however, also take
into account abstraction. In multi–level governance, there are conceptual differences be-
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tween institutions operating at different governance levels. Institutions embody institutional
concepts defined with context–sensitive conceptualising rules [214]. For example, a rule
stating that a soldier killing another person who is not a member of an opposing army is
murder. Such conceptual rules serve an important role, since they allow regulations to be
succinctly defined over high–level concepts [32]. For example, a regulation prohibiting
murder as opposed to a regulation prohibiting a soldier from doing such and such. Separate
institutions can potentially define the same concepts differently or define different concepts
altogether. Moreover, since institutions define regulations over separate concepts, the regu-
lations themselves have different, context–sensitive, meanings. In multi–level governance,
we can see higher governance levels in fact use more abstract concepts. For example na-
tional legislation might concretely require communications data to be stored (e.g. [226]).
Yet, human rights charters describe abstract notions such as the right to a private and fam-
ily life [48]. Therefore, compliance should be defined in terms of concrete lower–level
governance regulations being compliant with abstract higher–level governance regulations.
Moreover, compliance should account for the meanings of the regulations potentially being
entirely different depending on the social context.
The PARAGon framework provides a formal definition of compliance in multi–level
governance in Chapter 3, reconciling the different, context–sensitive, regulation meanings
from a conceptually concrete lower–level institution compared to a conceptually abstract
higher–level institution. By defining compliance in multi–level governance, we are able to
unambiguously determine compliance with mathematical rigour and regularised predictable
results for a real world setting.
Having a formal definition of compliance does not necessarily reveal how to practically
reason about compliance in a computational way. This leads us to the third sub–research
question:
Sub–research question 3: How can institutional design compliance in multi–
level governance be computationally verified?
Computationally verifying institution design compliance in a practical way is desirable
to reduce compliance checking burdens placed on the various actors involved in multi–level
governance. Whilst each institution designer at each level of governance must provide the
institutions being governed and doing the governing as input, there should be no burden
on those designers to implement or understand the mechanics of compliance checking. As
Sergot exemplifies using the law [216], institutions are sets of declarative rules. Whilst
rules can influence each other, and rules can define procedures which should be followed,
the ordering of the rules themselves should not impact their meaning. What we can take
from this is that institutions are not algorithmic and any algorithmic reasoning applied to an
institution is not visible in an institutional specification. Consequently, institution design-
ers are not particularly concerned with the reasoning mechanisms used to operationalise
institutions. So, automated compliance checking is needed to ensure institution designers
do not need to take extra effort in applying the formalised reasoning. That is, by providing
a computational framework which hides the mechanics (i.e. algorithms or semantics) for
compliance checking. So, what we aim for when answering this research question, is a
computational framework that takes a natural representation of institutions as input and de-
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termines if an institution design is compliant in a sound and complete way (i.e. equivalent)
with respect to our formal notion of compliance.
The PARAGon framework contributes computational compliance checking in multi–
level governance in Chapter 5, which is sound and complete with respect to our formal
notion of compliance. This supports judiciaries in determining penalties issued on insti-
tution designers for non–compliant designs. Moreover, it supports institution designers in
avoiding penalties by indicating a non–compliant institution design should perhaps not be
enacted.
For an institution designer it might be simplistic to state that they can simply avoid
punishment by not enacting a non–compliant institution design. Firstly, in the case that
an institution designer is actually obliged to enact an institution in order to implement the
imperatives issued by a higher–level institution, as is required in complying with EU Direc-
tives and other cross–national institutions. Secondly, in the case that an institution designer
prefers to enact an adjusted and compliant institution rather than not enacting an institution
at all. This leads us to our fourth sub–research question:
Sub–research question 4: How can non–compliant institution designs be ex-
plained in order to rectify non–compliance according to the institution de-
signer’s objectives?
Institutions are designed with a purpose, to guide societies towards an ideal envisaged
by the institution designer or guide and coordinate other institution designs towards an ideal.
We are interested in resolving non–compliant designs. Mitchell [174], provides a number
of reasons for (non–)compliance in general, such as the non–compliance if agentive actions
in society. Pertinent to institution design, non–compliance can occur due to preference,
in our case because institution designers prefer a non–compliant institution design due to
its positive governance effects, even in the face of penalties for non–compliance. Non–
compliance can also occur due to incapacity, in our case simply because the institution
designers do not know how to design a compliant institution.
These reasons for non–compliance should be taken into account when rectifying non–
compliant institution designs. From the non–compliance due to designer preference per-
spective, any non–compliance resolution should balance the requirement to successfully
adjust the design to be compliant against the objectives of the institution designer. Assum-
ing the non–compliant design was crafted to achieve particular governance aims, resolving
non–compliance must remain as closely as possible to the original design’s regulatory ef-
fects. From the non–compliance due to designer incapacity perspective, non–compliance
resolution should take into account the fact that incapacity can be due to institutions being
complicated, comprising many interrelated rules and regulations [97, p.14] [171, p.2]. This
means it can be non–obvious to an institution designer which rules and their interactions
are causing non–compliance.
Assuming an institution designer wishes to resolve non–compliance in a way they un-
derstand, non–compliance resolution should seek the simplest and most general explana-
tions for non–compliance, to support the institution designer in understanding and reme-
dying the underlying problems. For example, the following case of non–compliance could
have multiple explanations, which resolve the non–compliance – a lower governance level
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institution is governed by a higher–level institution in only obliging agents that are adults
in providing personal information, but the lower–level institution obliges both children and
adults to provide personal information. One possible explanation for non–compliance is
that it is due to there existing a rule that obliges people to provide personal data and that
rule should be removed to ensure compliance. A second explanation for non–compliance
that gives less drastic institution re–design advice and is, is that the rule obliging peo-
ple to provide personal information is too general and it should be modified to only ap-
plying to adults. In summary, non–compliance resolution should adhere to an institution
designer’s own objectives and recommend the simplest explanations and rectifications for
non–compliance.
The PARAGon framework answers this question in Chapter 5 with a computational
non–compliance resolution mechanism.
The previous research questions address institution design governance, our fifth and last
research question addresses institution change enactment governance:
Sub–research question 5: How can we formally define when legally valid
institutional change enactments occur?
Institutional change enactment is constrained in its validity according to secondary le-
gal rules. We need a formal definition of when, for a set of secondary legal rules, particular
physical behaviour such as ‘the thing we call’ voting on a rule change causes the social
action of rules actually being changed. Such secondary rules create the possibility to take
the social action of changing rules [20]. These rules making rule change possible are also
themselves changeable [220]. Formalising the legal validity of rule change enactment must
take into account the fact that changing rules can affect further rule change enactments.
Since we are dealing with real–world case studies the temporal aspect of secondary rules
is a factor. It is possible, for example, for secondary rules to make past rule change en-
actments possible. Institution designers have enacted past rule changes in order to ‘undo’
the consequences of ‘bad’ institution design decisions [192]. The implication is that, since
changing rules can affect rule change enactments, changing rules in the past can affect rule
changes at various other points in time, including in the more recent past, the present or the
future. So, what this research question requires is that we formalise rule change enactment
validity whilst taking into account complex temporal interdependencies between secondary
rules and rule changes.
The PARAGon framework answers this research question in Chapter 6 with a formal
framework for determining when rule changes count–as legal rule change enactments. In
answering this question, special attention is paid to formalising in such a way that demon-
strates the computational mechanism to decide whether a rule enactment is valid. More-
over, an account of the temporal aspects is given, demonstrated against a number of real
and imagined case studies.
By addressing these research questions the following argument is made:
This dissertation formalises governing governance by giving a rigorous math-
ematical definition for institutions being governed in how they should be de-
signed and how institutional change enactments can be made.
Now we proceed to the approach we take to answering the research questions.
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1.2. RESEARCH APPROACH
This dissertation’s result is the PARAGon framework for formally reasoning about govern-
ing institution design and enacting changes. A research approach was followed to develop
the PARAGon framework and its constituent parts. The approach is to start with a litera-
ture review and then per research question gather case studies, develop a formal framework
and apply model checking to assess the framework against the case studies. Each step is
described as follows.
Literature review: this step achieves three aims. This research started out in the
broad area of institutional and normative reasoning. The first aim was to understand
informal definitions of the main concepts involved, namely institutions and norms,
governance and closely related concepts. The second aim was to identify an area of
research which was both useful to the SHINE project of governing large–scale sen-
sor systems (and systems of systems) and had not been looked at previously from an
Artificial Intelligence perspective. Namely, the governance of institution design and
enacting changes. The third aim was to identify a single underlying formalism pro-
viding more primitive concepts (institutions and regulations) on which the PARAGon
framework can use as foundations.
Framework development cycle: The next step was, per research question, to iter-
ate the following three sub–steps. The iterative cycle terminates when applying the
PARAGon framework to case studies results in a natural representation and judge-
ments that correspond to real–world judgements or what we would intuitively ex-
pect. Although, ‘natural representation’ and ‘intuitive expectations’ are subjective,
the representation and reasoning are made precise so that they can be argued for and
against.
– Gather case studies: Each research question addressed a real–world govern-
mental process to formalise and automate. To answer the research questions,
the first step was to gather or synthesise relevant case studies against which the
framework was developed, to ensure it was grounded in a realistic setting.
– Formalisation: The next step was to take the relevant case studies and under-
stand the specific reasoning involved in order to come to the intuitive outcome
for each case study. Then, to provide a more general account of the reason-
ing through formalisation, defining a formal syntax and semantics, potentially
coupled with a corresponding computational mechanism. Following Hansson’s
argument [114], the purpose of formalisation is not to produce an empirically
supported theory, but rather to precisely define previously informal concepts (in
our case secondary rules, governance of institution design and so on).
– Model checking case studies: given a formal language comprising a represen-
tation and semantics, it is possible to formally represent the case studies and
construct models for those case studies. By a model, we mean a logical model,
which for a logical theory is a structure that satisfies the theory (if such a struc-
ture exists). By constructing a model, it is possible to check various properties
of the theory. In our case, the logical theory is an institutional specification and
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a series of events. The events either occur hypothetically as a part of an of-
fline institution design check (e.g. checking how the institution behaves when
an agent decides to collect data) or events which occur in reality (e.g. agents
voting on rule enactments). The properties being checked are whether an in-
stitution design is compliant, ways to rectify non–compliance and which rule
changes have validly been enacted and when. During this step, it was often re-
vealed that there were counter–intuitive results for the developed semantics and
given case studies, consequently further refinement of the formalisation was
required and the previous steps repeated.
Putting it all together: The final step in the research approach was to apply the re-
sults and reflect on open questions. This step takes the application further to show its
practical relevance by implementing part of the PARAGon framework in a prototype
system described in Chapter 7. Each component of the PARAGon framework has its
own implications. In this step those implications are compared and synthesised into
an overall conclusion and set of unanswered questions in the final chapter, Chapter 8.
1.3. THE SHINE PROJECT
This research was initiated and supported by the SHINE project of TU Delft. SHINE was
a large interdisciplinary research project. It aimed to develop techniques for acquiring
and coordinating large numbers of heterogeneous data resources (e.g. cellphone sensors,
radars and people). The idea was to use these sensors to gather a wide range of detailed
environmental data (e.g. rainfall and pollution levels). In so doing, various stakeholders
(e.g. citizens, municipalities) can gain answers to questions pertaining the environment
(e.g. ‘how do I get from A to B whilst avoiding flooding?’). SHINE looked at the problem
from many different angles, such as algorithms for configuring sensors, user modelling,
governing and coordinating resources, and visualising the acquired data to help answer
questions.
This dissertation contributes techniques for formalising governance, with a focus on
formalising governance which is, arguably, particularly suitable for governance and coor-
dination of ‘SHINE–like’ sensor systems of various types. For example, governing and
coordinating systems of cellphones gathering geospatial audio data to determine crowding
levels or systems of weather radars used to determine rainfall levels. The formalisation is
applied to a mixture of governance case studies, from national and international data and
human rights laws to imagined SHINE sensor system regulations. The idea is to formalise
compliance in multi–level governance and institutional enactment validity as found in the
social world to support automated ‘SHINE sensor system’ governance.
Multi–level governance is relevant to SHINE according to the argument that it is a nec-
essary governance architecture for governing heterogeneous sociotechnical systems (e.g.
what is also called polycentric governance [197, 198]). We will exemplify why using ex-
amples concerning SHINE systems. On the one hand, a homogeneous sensor system com-
prising users crowdsourced into donating their cellphone sensors can, arguably, be governed
with a single set of related regulations. For example, regulations defining a communal econ-
omy with a single incentive for users to contribute data (i.e. receiving data from a common
pool in return). On the other hand, SHINE aims to form heterogeneous sensor systems
1.3. THE SHINE PROJECT 13
which, arguably, are unsuitable for a ‘one–size–fits–all’ set of regulations. For example,
a system comprising weather radars contributed by organisations could operate best as a
market economy, where organisations are incentivised to join the system in order to trade
data. In this case, the regulations for a crowdsourcing sensor system operating as a commu-
nal economy are entirely inappropriate. One possibility is to view each set of sensors as a
separate sensor sub–system and write regulations to govern those sub–systems separately to
form a super system of sub–systems. However, this places a burden on the SHINE–system
institution designer in writing appropriate regulations for each sensor sub–system.
Multi–level governance offers an architecture to move the burden of writing specific
regulations from the SHINE–system institution designer to the sensor sub–system stake-
holders. The architecture proposes a solution, in the same vein as existing proposals of
poly–centric governance for smart–grids comprising heterogeneous energy sub–systems
[57]. The idea being, that the stakeholder wishing to form a heterogeneous SHINE sen-
sor system crafts an institution at a second governance level which governs the design of
institutions governing the separate sub–systems. The ‘SHINE institution’ is a thin gov-
ernance layer, comprising abstract regulations requiring that sub–sensor–systems are gov-
erned by institutions which regulate resources towards collecting useful environmental data
and punishing sensor owners for contributing erroneous data. Appealing to the principle
of subsidiarity, what can be done at the local level should be left up to the local level,
the SHINE institution would give space for the sensor sub–system stakeholders to deter-
mine which data is collected and what the incentives are (e.g. a market economy or a
communal economy). In return, sensor sub–system stakeholders can design institutions to
govern those sub–systems in order to join the SHINE super–system and gain data from
other sub–systems in return. The PARAGon framework helps to operationalise multi–level
governance for forming SHINE systems governed by a higher–level SHINE institution, by
automating compliance checking and non–compliance rectification.
The automated reasoning for compliance checking is also applicable to the SHINE
project’s aim of crowdsourcing the existing sensors people already own and their time.
For example, crowdsourcing people in donating their cellphone audio sensors in order to
detect geo–spatial crowding, or crowdsourcing people into taking photographs of the sky
when requested to determine pollution levels. This type of sensing is dubbed by the SHINE
project as ‘request driven social sensing’ and a key idea behind it is that people are offered
contracts for use of their devices and time. Since people are ideally offered many contracts
to address many data needs as and when they arise, it is important cellphone users can au-
tomatically accept or reject contracts on the basis of policies they define stating how, when
and for whom their cellphone sensors can be used. In this situation, a policy stating sen-
sor usage governs offered contracts. The automated multi–level governance reasoning can
be used to automate such contract rejection and is implemented in a prototype simulated
crowdsourced mobile sensing system described in Chapter 7.
Secondary rules governing institutional enactment are relevant to SHINE from the per-
spective that they provide sensor system stakeholders a flexible and automated way to gov-
ern sensor systems’ regulatory change. Flexibility is meant in two senses. Firstly, stake-
holders are able to make how regulatory change legally operates flexible. This is important
since the sensing aims or dynamics of the system are liable to changing over time and
hence regulatory changes need to be enacted to meet stakeholders new aims or system par-
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ticipant’s changing behaviour. Secondly, the way in which the regulatory change enactment
process is defined is flexible. For example, one sensor system can define regulatory change
as requiring sensor system participant’s democratic vote, this might be suitable for a system
of crowdsourced cellphone users that donate their cellphone sensors to the system partly
due to having a say in how that system is run. In another case, where designing regulations
requires highly–technical knowledge of sensors’ operation, a sensor system’s regulatory
change may be defined on the basis of elected technocrats coming to an agreement. Hence,
secondary rules allow a diverse range of governance and regulatory change enactment styles
to be defined for different sensor systems in a way that enables those system’s regulations
to adapt, as deemed appropriate, to new aims and needs.
The PARAGon framework supports realising these benefits by contributing formalisa-
tion to automatically determine how and when regulatory changes are legally enacted. For
example, such as due to a vote to move a system from a market economy where data is
traded to a communal economy where data is contributed to a common pool and shared.
Moreover, formalisation means the way in which changes are enacted is automatically
changed according to legal rule changes, such as moving from a directed democracy to
an elected technocracy. Automation means system stakeholders can operate a flexible gov-
ernance system at lower cost and therefore makes systems where flexible governance is
necessary, such as for diverse SHINE sub–systems, more viable.
1.4. DISSERTATION OUTLINE
The dissertation outline is depicted in figure 1.1. This dissertation is broken up into the
introduction (Chapter 1) and the background (Chapter 2), then the main contributions of
formal reasoning for governing institution design and change enactment (chapters 3 to 6),
and finally an illustration of the framework’s application (Chapter 7) and the conclusions
(Chapter 8). The main technical contributions begin by looking at soft constraints. These
are constraints that create the possibility for (non–)compliance and, respecting agents’ au-
tonomy, cannot be guaranteed to be complied with. In our case, the soft constraints specify
how an institution should be designed (chapters 3 and 4). We subsequently contribute
a mechanism for revising an institution design to be compliant with such soft constraints
(Chapter 5). Then, we move to reasoning about governance in the form of hard institutional
constraints. These are constraints that are not violatable. In our case, the hard constraints
are secondary institutional rules defining when institutional change enactment is possible
(Chapter 6).
The following chapters are described in more detail:
Chapter 2 provides background starting with an overview of the informal concepts
we wish to formalise and reason about. Then, proceeding to analyse the existing
knowledge and its gaps in formalising governance of institution design and change
enactment. Next, suitable frameworks that provide preliminary formalisation on
which to build the PARAGon framework are compared. Finally, suitable founda-
tional formalisations are selected on which this dissertation builds.
Chapter 3 contributes a formalisation of compliance in multi–level governance, pro-
viding a way to precisely determine compliant institution designs in a predictable
way.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Chapter 2
Background
Chapter 6
Institution
Change and Enactment
Validity
Institutional Design Compliance
Chapter 3
Formalising
Compliance
Chapter 4
Computational
Compliance Checking
Chapter 5
Rectifying
Institutional Design
Non-Compliance
Chapter 7
Application
Chapter 8
Conclusions
Figure 1.1: An overview of the dissertation with suggested reading orders.
Chapter 4 contributes the computational means to go about detecting compliance in
multi–level governance, furthermore this chapter contributes a computational frame-
work which is sound and complete with respect to the more theoretical formalism in
the previous chapter.
Chapter 5 contributes a computational mechanism to automatically rectify non–
compliant institution designs.
Chapter 6 contributes a practical formalisation of institution design validity, looking
at when rule changes count–as legal rule change enactments in the face of secondary
rules governing the rule change enactment process.
Chapter 7 describes a prototype application of compliance checking institution de-
signs (contracts in this case) to forming networks of crowdsourced users and their
cellphones in order to collect and aggregate weather data whilst giving users auton-
omy over how, when and for whom their devices are used.
Chapter 8 concludes with discussion on the contributions, implications and direc-
tions for future work.
16 1. INTRODUCTION
1.5. LIST OF PUBLICATIONS
The chapters in this dissertation are based on the following publications:
King, T. C., Li, T., De Vos, M., Dignum, V., Jonker, C. M., Padget, J., & van Riems-
dijk, M. B. (2016, July). Automated Multi–level Governance Compliance Check-
ing. Journal of Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (JAAMAS). International
Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems. (In Submission)
King, T. C., Dignum, V., & Jonker, C. M. (2016). When Do Rule Changes Count–as
Legal Rule Changes? In Proceedings of the 22nd European Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (ECAI 2016). Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications. Vol
285. (pp. 3 – 11). IOS Press. http://doi.org/10.3233/978–1–61499–672–9–3
King, T. C., Li, T., Vos, M. De, Jonker, C. M., Padget, J., & Riemsdijk, M. B.
Van. (2016). Revising Institutions Governed by Institutions for Compliant Reg-
ulations. Coordination, Organizations, Institutions, and Normes in Agent Systems
XI: COIN 2015 International Workshops, COIN@ AAMAS, Istanbul, Turkey, May
4, 2015, COIN@ IJCAI, Buenos Aires, Argentina, July 26, 2015, Revised Selected
Papers., 9628, 191 – 208.
King, T. C., Li, T., De Vos, M., Dignum, V., Jonker, C. M., Padget, J., & Riemsdijk,
M. B. Van. (2015). A Framework for Institutions Governing Institutions. In Proceed-
ings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent
Systems (AAMAS 2015) (pp. 473–481). Istanbul, Turkey: International Foundation
for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.
King, T. C., Liu, Q., Polevoy, G., Weerdt, M. de, Dignum, V., Riemsdijk, M. B.
van, & Warnier, M. (2014). Request Driven Social Sensing (Demonstration). In A.
Lomuscio, P. Scerri, A. Bazzan, & M. Huhns (Eds.), In Proceedings of the 2014
International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS
2014) (pp. 1651 – 1652). Paris, France: International Foundation for Autonomous
Agents and Multiagent Systems.
King, T. C., Riemsdijk, M. B. Van, Dignum, V., & Jonker, C. M. (2015). Supporting
Request Acceptance with Use Policies. Coordination, Organizations, Institutions,
and Norms in Agent Systems X: COIN 2014 International Workshops, COIN@ AA-
MAS, Paris, France, May 6, 2014, COIN@ PRICAI, Gold Coast, QLD, Australia,
December 4, 2014, Revised Selected Papers (pp. 114 – 131). Springer.
2
BACKGROUND
There is a lot of work which tries to do sophisticated statistical analysis. You know,
Bayesian so on and so forth. Without any concern for the actual structure of language. As
far as I’m aware that only achieves success in a very odd sense of success [...] I don’t
know anything like it in the history of Science. [196]
Noam Chomsky
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This chapter makes the following contributions:
• An overview of the informal background knowledge from multi–agent systems, phi-
losophy of language and law, and political science. The focus is on institutions, and
institutional design and enactment governance.
• Formalisation requirements for the PARAGon framework.
• A comparison of existing formal approaches and the extent to which they fulfil the
PARAGon framework’s requirements.
This dissertation formalises reasoning for understanding institutional design and enact-
ment governance. The formalisation supports institution designers in designing compliant
institutions and enacting institutional changes in a valid way. The same formalisation allows
judiciaries to determine if punishments should be imposed for non–compliant institution
designs. Moreover, the formalisation supports agents in understanding when institutional
rules are changed. Generally, the objective is to formalise the informal concepts involved
in governing institution design and rule change enactment to the extent that the reasoning
can be executed by a computer.
In this chapter, we give background on the research contributed by this dissertation.
First, we situate the research within the wider field of autonomous agents and multi–agent
systems in Section 2.1. Then, Section 2.2 gives a broad overview of institutions and norms
from an informal point of view. Section 2.3 summarises the formal foundations required for
this dissertation to build on and the new formal building blocks this dissertation develops
in order to formalise institutional design and enactment governance. Section 2.4 outlines a
number of relevant formalisations of institutions on which the contributions of this disserta-
tion can be based. Special attention is paid to identifying to what extent existing approaches
can be built on by this dissertation and where there are knowledge gaps. We summarise the
knowledge gap in Section 2.6 and outline the approach we take.
2.1. AGENTS AND MULTI–AGENT SYSTEMS
The research presented in this dissertation overlaps with the field of Agents and Multi–agent
systems. Examples include socio–technical systems and human societies. To situate this
dissertation, it is important to give some background on the general concepts used by the
field.
When we talk about an agent, we mean an entity which has the ability to act on the
world, or in other words possesses agency [211]. Philosophy contributes many agent con-
cepts, primarily dealing with human agents and action. Agency as the ability to act in-
tentionally is a view taken by Bratman [31], Goldman [96] and Mele [169]. Under this
definition agents are able to bring about changes of their own volition to realise their in-
tentions. The view that agency is the ability to initiate action spontaneously regardless of
intention is taken by Ginet [95], Lowe [161] and O’Connor [184], among others. A more
complicated agent, called a ‘person’ is described by [84] as being able to act both on the
world and also on their own internal mental states (e.g. realising second–order desires).
Agents can be significantly simpler – Dennett [56] questions the conceptual utility in re-
quiring mental attitudes as pre–requisites for agency. He undercuts arguments for requiring
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mental attitudes in the agent concept with Occam’s razor – they should only be ascribed
to agents if they help with predicting action. Agents need not be human or biological at
all, Wooldridge [240, 241] offers a frequently used definition of an artificial autonomous
agent in the MAS community. According to Wooldridge, an agent is software able to act
in an environment to meet its own goals, often those given to it at design–time. Without
attempting to resolve the differences between these stances the key point subscribed to by
this dissertation and the wider field is that agents are able to act on their environment, by
extension act in ways that affect one another and importantly act autonomously in ways that
cannot be controlled directly.
A system comprising agents is called a multi–agent system (MAS). Such systems can
be biological (e.g. a nation state comprising humans), artificial (e.g. a software system
of agents controlling sensors) or mixed (e.g. a system comprising teams of humans and
robots). An MAS is often formed with a goal in mind or an idea of how the agents should
behave, from the perspective of the system’s stakeholders (e.g. the members of a nation state
or the designer of a software system). For example, a nation state may have the societal goal
to minimise the number of car accidents. Another example is a system comprising software
agents on people’s cellphones for collecting and aggregating location and sound level data
to determine large crowds of people [162]. To achieve the MAS’ ideal and system goals
as envisioned by the relevant stakeholders, the agents in an MAS need to act collectively.
For example, driving on the same side of the road to avoid collisions or configuring sensors
appropriately (e.g. ensuring a microphone is on) for the data being gathered. An MAS is
a system comprising agents which is typically designed with an aim or ideal for agents to
collectively achieve.
The autonomy of agents in an MAS makes it difficult to ensure agents collectively
achieve the MAS’ goals. Agents are liable to acting in their own self–interests (e.g. turning
cellphone sensors off to conserve cellphone energy rather than contributing data) and if
agents are left to their own devices their actions are liable to be uncoordinated (e.g. driving
on different sides of the road). Mechanisms for system–wide agent control are required to
ensure agents achieve the MAS’ goals.
Different mechanisms to control and coordinate agents are available. We split these
mechanisms into bottom–up control, top–down governance and bottom–up compliance with
top–down control. Which approach is appropriate depends on the level of control a system
stakeholder (e.g. software designer, national government) has over the agents and con-
versely, the level of agency an agent has.
• Bottom–up control – this approach relies on being able to control artificial agents
directly. Specifically, by programming agents to coordinate their behaviour and col-
lectively achieve the MAS’ goals. Even basic software agents only capable of react-
ing to a single percept with no memory of past percepts and actions have been shown
to exhibit complex emergent coordination such as decentralised gathering and col-
lecting of objects [89]. For more complex cases agent programming languages have
been proposed, often based on an architecture where reasoning is compartmentalised
into mental constructs such as beliefs, desires and intentions (BDI). In these archi-
tectures agents can communicate and therefore be programmed to coordinate their
behaviour (e.g. [52, 55, 119, 202, 205]), in the coo–BDI agent architecture for BDI
(Belief, Desires, Intentions) agents’ cooperation and coordination is supported with
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specific constructs for sharing plans [8]. Overall, the bottom–up control approach
works by coordinating an MAS from the bottom level comprising the agents and
their internal reasoning by regimenting the behaviour of each individual agent, such
as by programming their behaviour in being coordinated and collaborative.
• Top–down governance – this approach deals with cases where agents cannot be
controlled directly. For example, when the agents are biological (e.g. humans).
Since such agents cannot be controlled directly they are liable to act in their own
self–interests. A common example is the tragedy of the commons [115], where
given no constraints it is optimal for agents to act in their self–interests based on
the premise that other agents will be doing the same. A top–down approach is also
required when an open artificial multi–agent system [118] is designed comprising
heterogeneous agents that are unknown a–priori. In an open artificial MAS agents
are liable to changing over time and are contributed by various programmers such
that they are not (easily) reprogrammable and hence should be guided in behav-
ing in the right way rather than being directly controlled. In top–down governance
regulations prescribe how agents should behave (e.g. agents should drive on the
left) coupled with rewards/punishments to give agents reason to comply (e.g. fines).
Whilst in this situation direct control of agents cannot be automated, the top–down
governance can. For example, formal and/or automated reasoning for: monitoring
agents’ compliance [34, 38, 75, 79, 175]; determining which regulations apply and
when and which agents are compliant and should be rewarded or punished [25–
28, 40, 42, 43, 58, 63, 97–103, 103, 130–132, 159, 160]; synthesising institutions
[176–178]; verifying institution designs meet certain correctness properties and do
not enable agents to exploit regulations [148, 167]. In this approach societal coor-
dination is realised by top–down governance in the sense that it operates at a level
sitting above the entire system and governs agents rather than directly controls them.
• Bottom–up compliance with top–down governance – this approach lies in between
the two previously mentioned approaches as a way to automate compliance with
top–down governance. In this approach, norm–aware agents are programmed. A
norm–aware agent could be an artificial agent contributed to an open MAS with top–
down governance. Here, the agent can act appropriately to comply with the top–
down governance with no assumptions that the regulations placed on the agent will be
known a–priori. Research in this area has focussed on agent programming languages,
semantics and reasoning for agents acting in a compliant or preferable way way with
the regulations and organizations the agents might join (e.g. [6, 50, 52, 124, 128, 129,
152, 170, 218, 222]).
This dissertation provides reasoning for both top–down governance and bottom–up
compliance with top–down governance. Top–down governance reasoning is provided for
determining whether institutions are being designed in a bad way (i.e. the designs them-
selves are non–compliant in multi–level governance) or institutional changes are enacted
without following procedure (i.e. secondary legal rules are not adhered to and thus institu-
tional changes are invalid). Bottom–up compliance with top–down governance is provided
for institution designers themselves, so that they can design institutions in a compliant
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way and validly enact institutional changes. In the former case, bottom–up compliance is
supported with automated reasoning to find explanatory rectifications for non–compliant
institutions. In the next sections we will give background on institutions and governing
institutional design and enactment.
2.2. GOVERNING MULTI–AGENT SYSTEMS
In this section we discuss governance of multi–agent systems from a conceptual point of
view. This dissertation builds on concepts of institutions, discussed in Section 2.2.1 and
norms discussed in Section 2.2.2. This dissertation contributes new formal conceptuali-
sations involved in institutional design and enactment governance. Background informal
concepts for institution design and enactment governance are described in Section 2.2.3.
2.2.1. INSTITUTIONS
Institutions provide top–down governance of agents. A definition from economics is given
by North [182], as a set of rules regulating behaviour enforced with rewards and punish-
ments. For example, fining agents or simply deviating from certain rules being considered
a societal taboo and therefore affecting trust. Ostrom [185] provides a similar definition,
put best in her own words as “the prescriptions that humans use to organize all forms of
repetitive and structured interaction”. In legal theory Ruiter [208] agrees with North and
also analogously refers to institutions as a kind of “social agent”, realised as agents prac-
tising the institution with behaviour that complies with the institution’s rules. John Austin
[14] viewed the law (legal institutions) as rules laid down by one individual who has power
over another. Alternatively, Ruiter [208] also views contracts between agents as legal in-
stitutions. In legal positivism, legal rules’ validity depends on the source (i.e. whether
legislated by a legislator) [88]. According to these definitions regulative rules are an essen-
tial part of an institution and when an institution is legislated, such as by a parliament, it is
a legal institution.
In philosophy [173] an institution is viewed as comprising regulative rules but also rules
establishing the language and concepts with which agents and a social reality are talked
about. For example, a rule stating ‘I do’ establishes what we call ‘marriage’. Such rules
come about through social acceptance. Concepts such as marriage established by an institu-
tion, according to Searle [213, 215], are institutional facts and come about only because an
institution makes social actions (e.g. marrying) possible. These institutional facts describe
a social reality ascribed by the institution, giving an institutional interpretation of the brute
(actual) reality. Searle refers to the facts that are independent of an institutional interpreta-
tion as brute facts, referring to a ground truth. For example, an institutional fact might be
‘paper’ which refers to a brute fact ‘the thing we call paper’. Searle proposes constitutive
institutional counts–as rules of the form “A counts–as B in a context C”, to which from brute
facts (As) ascribe more abstract institutional facts (Bs) in a particular social context entailed
by the social reality (Cs). For example, the thing we call paper counts–as paper. In turn in-
stitutional facts may count–as further institution facts. For example, an agent does not just
possess paper with 10 euros written on it, various watermarks and an identification number.
Rather, that piece of paper is collectively agreed as counting–as money in the context of
a particular nation state and so the agent possesses money in the right context. Counts–as
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rules establish a concise social description of reality, which can feasibly be talked about at
a more abstract, social level, than would otherwise be possible (e.g. ‘money’ is far more
concise than a fine–grained description of everything that constitutes money).
Searle argues counts–as rules also ascribe special statuses and deontic powers to var-
ious concepts [215]. For example, a piece of paper that counts–as money gives an agent
possessing it the special deontic power to purchase goods. But, only because there is a
social institution ascribing a special status to the money. On the deontic dimension of in-
stitutions, Searle says that various obligations are entailed by an institutional fact having a
certain status. For example, a police person has a socially recognised status where they are
obliged to uphold the law. In fact, Searle states that counts–as rules ascribing institutional
facts and assigning statuses to those facts are necessary for there to be a deontology – “No
language, no status functions. No status functions, no institutional deontology” [215, p.14].
Searle states institutions contain constitutive counts–as rules, which create a social reality
from brute facts, and counts–as rules are necessary for a deontology.
Ricciardi [206] views related constitutive rules (e.g. all the rules ascribing meaning and
status to money) as constituting the institution they belong to (e.g. the ‘money’ institution).
A classic example from Ricciardi is the rules of chess constituting the game of chess and
the institution of chess. Moves can physically be made on a chess board that do not conform
to chess’ rules, but then the game of chess is not being played and the chess institution does
not recognise those moves. Hence, an institution (e.g. chess) is its set of rules.
The key points in these definitions subscribed to by this dissertation are:
• Institutions can be created by law makers (legislation), between agents (contracts)
or through social acceptance. This dissertation mostly focuses on legal case–studies,
but we do not tie ourselves to any particular institution source.
• Institutions are a set of related counts–as rules, which ascribe a social meaning to
brute facts by building an institutional reality comprising institutional facts (n.b. this
differs from the more complicated notion of an institution as a social agent). Chap-
ter 3, and Chapter 6 focus on formalising constitutive rules.
• Institutions are used to govern and guide agents towards an ideal with rules and reg-
ulations (a deontology), rewards and punishments. Chapters 3 to 5 focus on this
regulatory aspect of institutions.
• Counts–as rules and a social reality are necessary for an institution to have a deontol-
ogy.
In the next section we will describe in more detail the deontic aspect of institutions and
its informal representation.
2.2.2. NORMS
In this section we discuss institutional regulations, called norms, further. Norms state what
the social reality should be (e.g. an agent should pay for a train ticket before boarding
a train). With a suitable mechanism to ensure norms are abided by, norms guide agents
towards an ideal. Two mechanisms to ensure norms are abided by are discussed in the
literature: regimentation and enforcement.
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Regimentation [135] forces norm compliance on agents by controlling their behaviour
directly. For example, by programming agents so they cannot board a train unless they
have paid for a ticket or by constructing a barrier at the train station that does not let agents
onto the train platform unless they have a ticket. One drawback of regimentation is that it
assumes hard constraints can be implemented (e.g. an agent can be directly programmed or
there are physical barriers that can be constructed). Another drawback is that regimentation
does not acknowledge that there are exceptional circumstances under which norms should
not be followed – for example when an agent needs to drive faster than the speed limit in
the case of an emergency. Regimented norms act as hard constraints on agents’ actions,
which is not always possible or in the best interests of the agents and the system. We do not
consider norm regimentation in this dissertation.
Enforcement [107] gives agents the option to comply with norms that act as soft con-
straints on agents’ behaviour. To give reasons for agents to comply, secondary reward and
punishment norms come into force if a primary norm is violated. For example, a norm stat-
ing an agent should pay a fine for boarding a train without a ticket. In turn, the secondary
norms can have further enforcing norms. For example, a train guard that finds an agent who
refuses to pay a fine should throw the non–compliant agent off the train. This dissertation
considers norms that can be violated and are supported through enforcement.
Norms take two common forms in the literature. Firstly, an evaluative representation
lacking an explicit deontic modality (obligation/permission/prohibition). Secondly, a modal
representation where the deontic modality is explicit.
Evaluative norms are found in some formal work [9, 105]. In an evaluative representa-
tion norms are represented as counts–as rules denoting that “A counts–as being good/bad/-
compliant/a violation in a context C” with no reference to obligation/permission/prohibi-
tion. To give an example based on the UK’s data retention regulations [226] – a commu-
nications provider (e.g. telephonics company) retaining all of a person’s communications
meta–data (e.g. the time a phone call was made) counts–as compliance in the context that
the communications provider is operating in the United Kingdom. An evaluative norm cre-
ates evaluative institutional facts in the social reality. For example, creating ‘compliance’
if meta–data is stored. The social reality does not represent which norms are in force (what
should be done). If we want to know whether the UK’s data retention regulations require
meta–data to be stored then the query is “do the rules state storing meta–data counts–as
compliance in a context that holds in the present social reality?”. Determining which eval-
uative norms are in force requires assessing the constitutive rules for whether they ascribe
a concept counting–as compliance/violation in a context that holds in the social reality.
Modal norms are counts–as statements ascribing explicit deontic (obligation/prohibi-
tion/permission) positions in the social reality. Specifically, as Searle proposed in [213,
p. 63] “A counts–as undertaking an obligation to do B in context C”. For example, com-
municating using a communications provider’s services establishes an obligation for the
communications provider to store your meta–data in the context that they are operating in
the United Kingdom. A modal representation creates a deontic position in the social reality.
For example, an obligation to store communications meta–data. The social reality explic-
itly represents what should be the case or should be done. If we want to know whether
the UK’s data retention regulations require meta–data to be stored then we can look at the
social reality for whether storing meta–data obliged. Determining which modal norms are
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in force requires inspecting the built social reality for which deontic modal statements hold.
In this dissertation, one objective is to reason about norms that govern other norms.
Expressing and determining that particular norms should (not) be imposed differs between
modal and evaluative norms. There are two ways for a norm to express that it is required
that other norms do not require storing communications metadata in the context that a user
has not consented to their communications metadata being stored.
In the evaluative form one possible representation is to nest a counts–as rule within
another counts–as rule. For example, “the rule (storing metadata counts–as compliance
in a context C) counts–as a violation if context C is somehow compatible with the user
not consenting)”. There may be other evaluative representations, but it appears to be the
simplest that fully captures a norm stating the requirement for other norms to not require
a specific social fact. In a modal form an unconditional constitutive rule seems to express
the same thing – “it is prohibited to oblige a user’s metadata to be stored in the context that
they have not consented”.
The modal norm appears simpler and with little difference between prohibiting an obli-
gation to store metadata and the modal norm obliging metadata to be stored. We would
expect that determining compliance is more or less the same for a modal norm obliging
storing metadata compared to a modal norm prohibiting obliging storing metadata. In com-
parison, the evaluative version seems far more complex and is not a simple generalisation
of evaluative norms about events. This dissertation considers a modal norm representation
for simplicity of reasoning about norms that regulate other norms.
Norms prescribe a social reality and are often used together with counts–as rules as-
cribing non–normative institutional facts. According to Sergot [216, 217], and Jones and
Sergot [135], a legal system (what we call an institution) largely consists of rules that define
concepts (what we call counts–as rules ascribing institutional facts). Secondary in occur-
rence to rules defining concepts are the institution’s norms. Definitional rules are used for
succinctness, according to Ross [207]. For example, we can define storing communications
metadata or content data as counting–as storing personal data. If we want to describe a new
concept relating to personal data then we can refer to personal data rather than everything
that constitutes personal data. For example, disrespecting someone’s privacy is storing their
personal data without their consent, rather than storing their metadata or content data or ...
without their consent. Such definitional rules, according to Grossi et al. [109] and Breuker
et al. [32], allow norms to be issued more succinctly over abstract concepts. For example
a norm stating “you should not disrespect someone’s privacy” is more succinct than “you
should not store content data without consent”, “you should not store metadata without
consent”, etcetera. Institutions largely comprise concept defining rules, which ascribe an
abstract social reality, over which norms are concisely defined.
The key points in these definitions subscribed to by this dissertation are:
• Norms can take an evaluative or a modal form. An evaluative form does not make
explicit that there is an obligation/prohibition/permission in force, it simply states
a social action will cause compliance or a violation. A modal form makes explicit
that something is obliged/prohibited/permitted in the social reality. The modal form
offers a simpler way to represent norms governing other norms and a straightforward
way to evaluate such norms. Chapters 3 to 5 formalise modal norms.
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• Two ways to ensure norms are abided by are found in the literature – regimentation
and enforcement. Regimentation assumes agents can be directly controlled. En-
forcement does not assume agents’ actions can be controlled, instead it aims to guide
agents’ behaviour. This dissertation does not make assumptions that agents can be
controlled directly. In chapters 3 to 5 we look at soft constraints which guide, rather
than regiment, agents in their actions within an MAS and how they design institu-
tions. However, in Chapter 6 we look at a kind of hard constraint in the form of rules
stating which institutional rule changes are possible. These are not hard constraints
in the traditional sense (e.g. physically preventing an agent to board a train or di-
rectly controlling an agent’s reasoning to comply with norms). So, we call these hard
institutional constraints.
• Norms are defined in terms of an abstract social reality created by counts–as rules.
Counts–as rules and norms are closely tied, counts–as rules by building an abstract
social reality provide a pragmatic means to author concise norms. The link between
constitutive rules ascribing abstract concepts and norms defined over these abstract
concepts is focussed on in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. Counts–as rules that make the
social action of changing rules possible are addressed in Chapter 6.
2.2.3. GOVERNING INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND ENACTMENT
In this section we discuss how institution designers, such as legislators, are governed. The
need to govern institution designers is motivated by the fact that they are autonomous
agents. Being autonomous agents, institution designers are liable to behaving in ways that
are sub–ideal. For example, designing an institution that takes away agents’ rights or en-
acting institutional rule changes without following relevant procedure, such as obtaining a
majority vote from a parliament. Hence, we look at how institutional designers are gov-
erned in their institutional designs and institutional change enactments, which we describe
further from an informal point of view in this section.
GOVERNING INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN: MULTI–LEVEL GOVERNANCE
The problem with agency is that agents are liable to acting undesirably and hence need in-
stitutional governance; the problem with institutional governance is that autonomous agents
can design subjectively ‘bad’ institutions. For example, an institution can lack coordinated
regulations with institutions governing other jurisdictions or place unacceptable limits on
agents’ rights. One solution is to override an institution designers’ regulations. But this
would violate their autonomy and the principle of subsidiarity – what can be legislated at
the local level should be left up to the local level. Hence, institution designers need to be
guided in designing subjectively good institutions. In MAS agents are guided towards good
behaviour with institutions governing their actions. In order to guide institution designers,
institutions are used to govern institution designs.
Multi–level governance is an umbrella term for governance styles where institution de-
signs themselves are governed. We depict it abstractly in Figure 2.1. The term multi–level
governance is taken from political science [121] (alternatively called multi–tier and poly-
centric governance). An early conceptualisation by Marks [166] views multi–level gover-
nance as negotiation between state actors in the European Union to achieve coordinated
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Figure 2.1: A high–level overview of multi–level governance. At the bottom level there exists MASs (e.g. nation
states, sensor networks). The first level comprises institutions governing MASs (e.g. national legislation, or insti-
tutions governing artificial societies such as sensor networks). The second–level comprises institutions governing
the first–level institutions (e.g. EU directives, cross–MAS objectives). The highest–level comprises institutions
governing lower–level institutions (e.g. human rights charters and constitutions).
goals through regulatory change. The negotiated outcome being binding agreements/insti-
tutions between EU member states to design their institutions (national legislation) in such
a way that they implement those binding agreements. In effect, the negotiations establish a
hierarchy of institutions. The negotiated binding agreement being a higher–level institution
governing the design of member states’ legislation, which are lower level institutions. More
recently, Börzel and Risse [30] conceive multi–level governance as existing at sub–national,
national and supranational levels. Conceptually, elected institutional designers (i.e. local
councils, national governments, EU governing bodies) create institutions to govern institu-
tions at lower governance levels and comply with institutions enacted at higher governance
levels. Hooghe and Marks [121] classify multi–level governance into two types. In the
first type, an institution at a higher–level governs a jurisdiction of institutions nested at a
level below. In this type lower–level institutions do not belong to any other jurisdiction and
are only governed by a single institution at the level above. In the second type institutions
at each level can belong to multiple jurisdictions and therefore be governed by multiple
higher–level institutions. More generally, multi–level governance comprises institutions at
higher governance levels (e.g. EU directives) governing the institution designs operating at
lower governance levels (e.g. national legislation) which in turn might govern institution
designs at even lower governance levels (e.g. sub–national regulations) etcetera.
Multi–level governance guides institution designers towards enacting ideal regulations.
Eichener [65] showed multi–level governance in the European Union successfully resulted
in cooperating legislation on occupational safety. By issuing higher–level institutions, an
EU directive, the EU established workplace health and safety regulations across the EU.
The health and safety regulations were coordinated in the sense that no country had more
relaxed regulations allowing them to out–compete other member states on labour costs.
Hence coordinated regulations ensured no ‘race to the bottom’ was triggered. From a hu-
man rights point of view, multi–level governance has ensured legislation that violated cer-
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tain rights of agents is revoked, such as the right to privacy set out by EU human rights law
[48, 70]. In Artificial Intelligence, Diaconescu and Pitt [57], Pitt and Diaconescu [198],
and Jiang, Pitt and Diaconescu [133], view the multi–level governance paradigm as being
applicable to artificial societies such as smart grids. In [57] sub–systems of energy users
are governed by institutions, each sub–system (e.g. a small housing community) has its
own governance to manage its own energy production and usage. Sub–systems can coop-
erate, requiring coordinated regulations, such as to ensure greater energy stability by shar-
ing energy. Coordinated regulations can be achieved with hierarchical governance, where
an overarching institution ensures institution’s regulations at lower–levels are compatible.
Multi–level governance helps to ensure that regulations are subjectively ideal in the sense
of being coordinated across jurisdictions and upholding agents’ rights.
In multi–level governance, institution designs are governed with regulations that govern
other regulations. Since multi–level governance is regulatory it implies compliance is pos-
sible but not guaranteed. Hence, regulations governing regulations also give the possibility
for non–compliant institution designs. In order to ensure institution designers comply, non–
compliance can result in legal action being brought about [210], which Smith [219, p. 15]
argues is necessary for effective multi–level governance.
From a philosophical tradition, Von Wright argues that [236] regulation governing reg-
ulations (or in his words, higher-order norms) are really there to transmit will. By which
we mean, for example, a regulation requiring another regulation to oblige communications
meta-data is stored, is really issued because the issuer wishes not just that there is an obli-
gation for meta-data to be stored, but also that meta-data is actually stored. That is, the
issuer is transmitting their will for meta-data to be stored via an intermediary regulator,
operating at a lower governance level, acting as a conduit for their will. Following this
idea, it has been shown by Boella and van der Torre [29] that in order to transmit will via
regulation governing regulations there must be regulation enforcement with reward and/or
punishment. Two types of enforcement required for effective regulation governing regula-
tions, need to be distinguished. First, enforcement of the regulation governing regulations,
such as punishing EU member states for not implementing an EU directive, which helps to
ensure the will is transmitted from the higher-authority to a lower-authority. Secondly, the
enforcement of the regulations governing society, which are designed to be compliant with
regulation governing regulations. For example, the Data Retention Directive [71] requires
other regulations to not just oblige meta-data to be stored but also to enforce that obliga-
tion by punishing for not storing meta-data. Without enforcement, a regulation could be
compliant with a directive by obliging meta-data to be stored and yet that obligation would
be meaningless since it is unenforced. Moreover, enforcement is required so that the will
of the higher-authority (e.g. an issuer of an EU directive) is transmitted all the way down
to the societal level. Philosophically, regulation governing regulations only make sense if
firstly they are enforced through reward/punishment for (non–)compliance and secondly if
they also require the enforcement of the regulations that they require to be implemented (if
any).
Determining such (non–)compliance in multi–level governance is different from de-
termining the compliance of societal members with an individual institution. The main
difference is that in multi–level governance, when compared to single–levelled societal
governance, regulations operate at different levels of abstraction. Regulations are the most
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abstract in the highest–level institutions and the most concretely defined in the lowest–level
institutions. To give an example, at the (typically) highest level of governance human rights
charters use abstract terminology such as ‘fairness’ or ‘privacy’ which can have many dif-
ferent interpretations. At a slightly lower–level, such as supranational agreements or EU
directives, the terminology is more precise but countries can comply in different concrete
ways. For example, the Data Retention Directive [71] states that member states should leg-
islate for communications metadata (e.g. the time of a phone call) to be stored between
6 and 24 months. The directive’s regulation is far clearer than human rights regulations,
but does not provide the precise data retention time. At a slightly lower–level, such as at
the level of nation–states, regulations are more concrete. For example, providing a precise
time in which data should be stored. In multi–level governance increasingly abstract regu-
lations are prescribed at increasingly higher levels of governance which can be interpreted
in many different ways, making determining compliance of institutional designs different
from determining compliance of a society’s members.
Institutional design compliance is determined by legal monitors such as courts, which
interpret concrete regulations to determine if they violate more abstract regulations. To give
an example, the European Court of Justice [70] determined that the Data Retention Direc-
tive’s relatively concrete requirement for communications metadata to be stored violated
the EU Human Rights Charter’s requirement for personal data to be processed fairly [72].
The judgement was based on the interpretation that storing metadata was the same as stor-
ing personal data, and storing personal data without someone’s consent was the same as
processing data unfairly. In a different context, where someone has given consent, storing
personal data would not be unfair data processing. Hence, a relationship between concrete
concepts having a context–sensitive abstract meaning is used to determine compliance be-
tween concrete and abstract regulations. According to the Searlian institution concept we
adopt, the context–sensitive rules linking concrete and abstract social facts are constitutive
rules. Hence, the relation between concrete and abstract norms as found in multi–level
governance is derived from constitutive rules.
To summarise, institutions govern the design of other institutions in what is known as
multi–level governance, the main points are:
• Constitutive rules provide context–sensitive links between concrete and abstract con-
cepts and through a derivation, concrete and abstract norms. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4
adopt constitutive rules to determine links between concrete and abstract norms in
different social contexts.
• In multi–level governance abstract regulations at higher–levels are used to govern
concrete regulations at lower–levels. Non–compliant concrete regulations results in
punishment. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 look at formalising and automatically detect-
ing (non–)compliance in multi–level governance. The objective is to flag problems
to institution designers before they enact non–compliant institutions (and hence are
subject to punishment) and to support higher–levels of governance in monitoring
the compliance of lower–level institution designs. In order to support institutional
designers in enacting compliant designs, Chapter 5 looks at finding explanatory rec-
tifications for non–compliant institutional designs.
• Enforcement should be ensured for regulation governing regulations in two senses.
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Firstly, the regulation governing regulations should be supported with rewards and/or
punishments. We do not look specifically at formalising reward and punishment for
regulation governing regulations, but the fact that it should and does exist motivates
the contribution of automated compliance checking in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. Sec-
ondly, regulations governing regulations issued by higher-level authorities really re-
quire that lower-level authorities do not just implement certain regulations in order to
be compliant, but also enforce those implemented regulations. We do not formalise
the general principle of both implementation and enforcement required by regula-
tion governing regulations, but we do formalise the specific requirement of the Data
Retention Directive [71] to be supported with punishments for non-compliance in
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.
GOVERNING THE INSTITUTION DESIGN PROCESS: CONSTITUTIVE SECONDARY LE-
GAL RULES ASCRIBING RULE CHANGE
Constitutive rules define how a social reality grows out of brute facts describing the ground
truth. Moreover, constitutive rules make certain social actions, such as marriage, possible.
Since brute facts (the ground truth) are liable to changing, it follows that the social reality
is liable to changing too and so too the social actions that are possible. Consequently,
constitutive rules both describe how the social reality is built and how it evolves over time.
Biagoli [20] views an institution itself as having similar dynamic qualities, referring to
institutions (legal systems) as organic sets of rules that in themselves change over time.
Constitutive rules regulate the change of the social reality but are also subject to changing
themselves.
According to Hart [117] the complexity of institutions necessitates institutional rules
with the sole function to regulate rule change. Hart refers to these rule–change regulating
rules as secondary rules. Secondary rules state how and when rules can be changed, mod-
ified, repealed and by whom. To give an example, the Italian constitution states that after
a law is voted to be enacted by one of the houses of government it is [204][Art. 73] “pro-
mulgated by the President of the Republic within one month of their approval”. Such rules
regulate rule change by describing the institution design process that must be followed for
rule changes to take place. In other words, rules exist with the exclusive function to state
what actions constitute rule changes and thereby make the social actions of changing insti-
tutional rules possible.
Biagoli [20] views rules regulating rule change as constitutive rules that ascribe what
constitutes a rule change. From this perspective, a physical rule change does not necessarily
count–as a rule change. Physically changing a rule in the Italian rule book (i.e. writing it
down) does not count–as changing the rule on its own. Rather, only the president approv-
ing a law previously voted for by one of the government houses counts–as a rule change,
making the social action of rule change possible.
Following this idea, just as constitutive rules ascribe a social reality, making the social
reality possible, constitutive rules ascribing rule change make rule changes possible. An
analogy can be made to Ricciardi’s argument [206] of the rules of chess constituting the
game of chess where moves made outside of chess’ rules can physically be made but then
the game of chess is not being played. Likewise, physical rule modifications can be made
that do not follow an institution’s constitutive rule change rules, but then according to the
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institution the rule change has not actually taken place. Taking this view to its logical
conclusion – an institution’s rule–modifying counts–as rules constitute its own rule–change
system and ascribe the rule changes that can be made.
The philosopher Suber [220] famously describes changing institutional rules as a game
commonly known as Nomic. In Nomic, a move is proposing a rule change, debating it
and then applying it according to the constitutive rules of the game (e.g. by majority vote
or some other mechanism). Changing the system’s rules can affect which rule changes are
possible in the first place. For example, changing which agents are constituted as being able
to change rules by participating in a vote. Suber observes many paradoxes can also arise, in
the simplest case by modifying rules that make rule modifications possible. It follows that
an agent wishing to change institutional rules to meet their goals, must understand how rule
changes affect the built social reality and similarly which rule changes are possible.
The effects of rule change on the social reality and possible rule changes also takes
a temporal dimension. At the very least, changing rules in the present affects the social
reality and possible rule changes in the future. In some institutions it is only possible to
change rules from the present onwards – such as ascribed by the United States Constitution
[221, Art. 1 Sec. 9 Cl. 3] “No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed”. In
other institutions rule modifications in the past (retroactive modifications) are possible, such
retroactive modifications have been made in the United Kingdom [192, Sec. 58]. Given that
changing rules affects which rule changes are possible, changing rules in the past, present
and future can affect which rule modifications are possible or even happened up until the
present.
In other cases, constitutive rules ascribe rule changes conditional on the effects of the
rule changes. An example is found in the European Convention on Human Rights [48,
Art. 7], which explicitly states that retroactive changes to rules are only possible if they
do not criminalise formerly innocent people in the past. In order for an agent to determine
what rule changes they can make or what rule changes actually took place according to the
institution, the hypothetical effects of rule changes must be accounted for.
The main points are:
• Institutional rules are dynamic and subject to being changed over time. In order to de-
termine what the social reality is at any given point we need to understand how rules
have been modified and the effects of modification. Chapter 6 provides reasoning for
rule modifications.
• Constitutive rules state what rule changes can be made, that is, the rule changes that
are recognised by the institution as being valid. Chapter 6 adopts these kinds of
constitutive rules, earlier chapters 3 to 5 adopt constitutive rules in general but not
rule–modifying constitutive rules.
• Rule changes are conditional on the built social reality, the rule changes that have
and will take place and the potential effect of the rule changes on the social reality.
Chapter 6 pays special attention to an interdependency between rule changes that are
conditional on the built social reality and are able to change the social reality.
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2.3. FORMAL FOUNDATIONS
In the previous section we saw that institution designers are governed in what institutions
they should design and institutional rule enactments they can make. The idea of this dis-
sertation is to formalise practical reasoning in a single framework: to determine which
institutions should be designed, how institutional design non–compliance can be explained
to support rectification and what rule modifications can be made. Several foundations for
the framework are elicited based on the requirement for a practical framework, and our
overview of the informal concepts we wish to formalise given in the previous section. These
foundations are:
• A temporal setting – the physical reality is not static, brute facts are subject to change,
consequently the social reality is also subject to change. When a currency is decom-
missioned, the paper that counted–as money no longer counts–as money. If you are
an academic, you are obliged to submit papers to conferences before their paper sub-
mission deadlines. Practical reasoning implies reasoning for realistic institutions and
consequently reasoning for a temporal setting.
• Constitutive rules – institutions do not govern over a brute reality, but rather a social
reality established by constitutive rules. Constitutive rules are a theory of institu-
tional language and to paraphrase Searle [215, p. 13] if there is no language (e.g.
represented as constitutive rules) then there can be no deontology.
• Modal norms – institutions govern and guide agents towards an ideal with norms.
It is simpler to reason about and represent regulations governing regulations using a
modal rather than evaluative norms, as this dissertation sets out to do.
On top of these foundations, this dissertation lays the following building blocks for
formalising the governance of institutional design and enactment:
• Automatically detecting non–compliance in multi–level governance:
– Regulations governing regulations – in multi–level governance institutions act
to govern other institution designs. The instruments governing institution de-
signs are regulations governing other regulations.
– Abstraction based on constitutive rules – in multi–level governance institutions
are designed at different levels of abstraction. Lower–level institution’s con-
crete regulations are interpreted for whether they comply with the abstract reg-
ulations at higher–levels of governance. The interpretation between concrete
and abstract concepts is based on constitutive rules. In turn, the interpretation
of concrete norms in terms of the abstract norms that govern them is derived
from relationships between concrete and abstract concepts defined by constitu-
tive rules.
• Automatic resolution of non–compliance – when an institution is designed that is
non–compliant, punishments can be issued. In order to avoid punishment an insti-
tution designer should rectify the underlying causes of non–compliance rather than
enacting a non–compliant institution. The assumption is that it is preferable to rectify
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non–compliance whilst remaining as closely to the institution’s original design goals
rather than not enact an institution in the first place.
• Determining which rule–changes can be made:
– Rule–modifying constitutive rules – institution designers are constrained in
which rule modifications they can make by constitutive rules. These constitutive
rules ascribe rule modifications based on the context in which the modification
takes place, including the hypothetical effects of rule modification.
– Modifiable institutions in the past, present and future – institution designers can
make modifications to institutions. These modifications can be at any point in
time made possible by the rule–modifying constitutive rules.
In summary, this dissertation builds on foundational concepts comprising institutional
reasoning in a temporal setting, constitutive rules and modal norms. Building on these
concepts, this dissertation contributes novel formalisations of institutional notions for in-
stitutions governed in multi–level governance, explanations for non–compliant institution
designs and institutions comprising rule–modifying constitutive rules, where the institution
can be modified over time. Collectively, these novel formal building blocks allow us to
reason about institutional design and enactment governance.
2.4. FORMAL APPROACHES
In this section existing formal approaches for normative and institutional reasoning are
compared. We focus on approaches that provide useful historical and conceptual context or
provide foundations on which to base our framework. In formal philosophy, deontic logic
is the field dedicated to the study of ‘ought’ and other normative statements relevant to
institutional reasoning. This section overviews a few systems of deontic logic and related
developments.
2.4.1. STANDARD DEONTIC LOGIC
Von Wright’s Standard Deontic Logic (SDL) 1 [234] is the first deontic logic widely con-
sidered to be a viable formalisation of ought (see [86, p. 5] for a historical overview dating
back to medieval times). SDL is situated in a propositional setting. It introduces modal op-
erators over propositional formulae p to express the deontic modalities of obligation (Op),
prohibition/forbidden (Fp) and permission (Pp).
Von Wright introduced an axiomatisation for the modal deontic operators which, among
other axioms, provided equivalences between the deontic modalities that have been used in
many other systems of deontic logic. These equivalences are, what is forbidden is obliged to
the contrary (Fp =O¬p) and what is permitted is not obliged to the contrary/not forbidden
(Pp = ¬O¬p) (i.e. permission is the dual of obligation). This scheme gives us the well
known deontic square of opposition depicted in Figure 2.2, succinctly summarising the
relationships between the different modalities.
1n.b. Standard is a moniker and does not denote that SDL is by any means the standard [86, p. 39], hence we do
not restrict our search for an appropriate formalism to just SDL.
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Obligatory Op Prohibited Fp
Permissible Pp Omissible P¬p
Figure 2.2: The Deontic Square of Opposition [168]. Contraries are denoted with , contradictories are
denoted with , implications are denoted with and sub-contraries are denoted with . For further
geometric analyses of deontic and related logics see [179].
SDL is not without its problems, rather it is susceptible to a number of so–called para-
doxes. In SDL conditional norms, such as if there is a fence ( f ) it should be a white fence
(w) are represented with formulae mixing propositional sentences and deontic operators
( f →Ow). A problem arises if we extend the previous example with a prohibition on there
not being a fence (F f ), a fact that there is a fence ( f ) and the implication that a painted
fence implies there is a fence (p → f ). The problem is that it leads to a contradiction in
SDL – there ought to be a fence and not a fence (O f ∧¬ f ) [201]. However, in principle,
there should not be a contradiction. In general, a problem arises where there is a primary
norm (forbidden for there to be a fence) that is supported with a secondary norm that when
applied represents a level below what is ideal (the fence should be painted white). Po-
tentially, such a secondary norm can also be used to represent a punishment for sub–ideal
behaviour or circumstances, for example, you should not speed but if you do then you
should pay a fine. Such statements are known as contrary–to–duty norms (CTDs). They are
viewed as being an important aspect of the law where norms are commonly used to define
punishments for non–compliance or state what the sub–ideal circumstances are [134, 135].
Hence, it is important contrary–to–duty norms are handled adequately.
Several proposals address the problems caused by CTDs in SDL. A common view is
to distinguish between prima facie oughts, the oughts that on the face of it hold, and all
things considered oughts [86, p. 256]. For example, prima facie it is forbidden for there to
be a fence and obliged the fence is painted white. All things considered, it is only obliged
the fence is painted white. Proposals addressing CTDs thus derive ‘all things considered’
oughts from prima facie oughts. For example, by using defeasible reasoning [209] to ex-
clude prima facie oughts that are violated, in favour of secondary oughts. Other significant
approaches are preference–based formalisations [228, 230] which interpret ought as ideal
and CTDs as representing sub–ideal circumstances, then separating contradictory oughts
into separate worlds of ideality. For example, in the ideal world it is forbidden for there to
be a fence, in a sub–ideal world the fence ought to be painted white and both do not hold
in the same ideality (hence no contradiction). In all of these approaches the semantics of
classical implication are replaced with non–classical semantics.
Relevant to our dissertation is the fact that, as expected, such a modal representation for
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norms supports nesting. Nested deontic modalities such as OOp are grammatical in SDL.
Unfortunately, SDL is a strictly non–temporal logic and hence unsuitable on its own for
the purposes of this dissertation. Furthermore, SDL lacks constitutive rules; with material
implication as the only conditional of which context is not a part.
2.4.2. ANDERSON’S REDUCTION
Anderson proposed a logic that replaces SDL’s deontic operators in favour of evaluative
norms [9, 10]. In Anderson’s proposal SDL is reduced to alethic modal2 logic by replacing
Op with a formula stating that it is necessary (ä) that going against the norm (¬p) mate-
rially implies a violation (V ): ä(¬p → V ). In Anderson’s reduction, norms are rules that
ascribe violations.
Grossi [105] developed Anderson’s idea further by proposing a logic for evaluative
norms expressed as constitutive rules. In Grossi’s proposal a logic of context and ascriptions
is proposed. In his proposal implications operating on a context i are introduced, denoted
as ⇒cli . Evaluative norms stating that p is a duty are represented as a formula ascribing a
violation V in a context i : ¬p⇒cli V . In Grossi’s proposal, Anderson’s reduction is realised
in a logic of constitutive rules. Hence, Grossi realises the context–sensitive ascription of
abstract institutional concepts, including violation, in a deontic logic.
Aldewereld et al. [4] build on these proposals with a formalism for reasoning about
evaluative norms at different abstraction levels. They combine constitutive rules to ascribe
abstract institutional facts from more concrete brute or institutional facts. Constitutive rules
define norms by ascribing evaluative statements (compliant and violation in their case). To
give their example, the rule “transferring money with a credit card counts–as payment”
ascribes the abstract institutional fact of payment from the more concrete fact of using a
credit card. A norm is then “paying counts–as fulfilment’. The norm is abstract in that it
states someone should make a payment but it does not concretely define, on its own, what
payment exactly is. By providing a semantics for counts–as statements that includes a form
of transitivity, norms can also be concretised. For example, through transitivity, using a
credit–card counts–as fulfilment. In their proposal, constitutive rules are contextual and
hence transitivity only holds between constitutive rules if their contexts are compatible. To
summarise, Aldewereld et al. take the principles behind Grossi’s reduction to constitutive
rules in order to reason about concretisation of abstract norms.
Developments in the reductionist approach to norms are relevant to this dissertation.
First, they offer a way to reason about abstract norms, in this case by concretising abstract
norms. Hence, it seems that the same approach can be taken to multi–level governance. Per-
haps, abstract regulations governing other regulations at higher–levels of governance can be
reified to determine their concrete meaning and therefore whether concrete norms violate
the abstract norms. Conversely, perhaps the same reasoning can be reversed to take con-
crete norms and abstract them to determine if they are compliant with more abstract norms.
However, a major stumbling block is that by reducing norms to evaluative constitutive rules
it is no longer straightforward to represent and reason about regulation governing regula-
tions, as we argued previously. Consequently, this dissertation does not take a reductionist
approach to norms.
2If this is Greek to you, alethic modalities are modalities denoting truth, in comparison to deontic modalities,
which denote normativity.
2.4. FORMAL APPROACHES 35
2.4.3. TEMPORAL DEONTIC LOGICS
The previously described approaches are situated in a static setting with no consideration
for time. Hence, they deal with non–temporal norms. For example the norm ‘you should
not murder’ has no temporal element. However, in the real world duties are often temporal
and contain deadlines. For example ‘you should submit your paper before the submission
deadline’. Thus, there are deontic logics that deal explicitly with time, by which we mean
a temporal ordering of states containing formulae, including temporal obligations.
Several temporal logics independent from deontic logic already exist. The prominent
ones are Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) [199], Computational Tree Logic (CTL) [69] and
CTL* [68], which combines both. There are also logics of actions as transitions between
states. Dynamic logic [116] being a prominent action logic, which combines modal logic
operators of necessity and possibility with actions to express and reason about statements
such as ‘it is possible that action a will cause p to hold’. A common approach to temporal-
ising deontic logic is to combine a deontic logic and one of the aforementioned temporal or
action logics.
To name a few. Broersen et al. [33] combine SDL and CTL. They introduce dyadic
deontic modalities (O(ρ ≤ δ)) representing a propositional formula ρ should hold before or
at the same time as a formula δ representing the deadline. In Broersen et al.’s formalisation
if δ occurs before ρ then a proposition denoting violation holds. Conversely, ρ holding
before or at the same time as δ causes a proposition denoting norm fulfilment to hold. An
obligation holds from one state to the next until it is fulfilled or violated, that is, a norm
persists by default.
F. Dignum et al. [60] combine SDL and dynamic logic. Obligations can take the form
O(α < ρ < δ) representing an obligation conditional on α that requires action ρ to be per-
formed before δ. States also have time indices. The special index now denotes the time of
the current state. In F. Dignum et al’s proposal instantaneous norms that must be fulfilled
immediately are expressed as O(α< ρ < now+1) representing that α causes an obligation
for ρ to be performed before the next state.
F. Dignum and Kuiper [59] combine SDL with a logic of ‘dense’ time in which actions
are not instantaneous. Rather, actions are performed over a time period. An obligation
O(α) represents that an action α should be continuously performed until it is done. It is
interesting to note that violations persist from one state to the next until the norm that has
been violated is ‘repaired’ (e.g. by performing some punishing action, such as paying a
fine).
To summarise, temporal deontic logics allow expressing that there should be an order-
ing in which propositions hold in states or actions are performed. A temporal obligation
holding in a state typically states that at the present time an α should be done/hold before a
δ. Obligations persist from one state to another if not discharged. Hence, if α and δ do not
occur, then α should still be performed/hold before δ. Instantaneous norms then just state
that an α should be done/hold before the next state. In this dissertation we adopt similar no-
tions in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 – a deontic statement persists until discharged,
and either represents one thing should be done before another or that something must be
done instantaneously.
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2.4.4. SEINSOLLEN AND TUNSOLLEN: OUGHT–TO–BE AND OUGHT–TO–
DO
There is a difference between ought–to–be statements about what should hold (seinsollen)
and ought–to–do statements about what should be done (tunsollen) [35]. In SDL [234]
the two are not distinguished; SDL abstracts away from whether a proposition denotes an
action or a state–of–affairs. Subsequent developments have focussed on one or the other, or
both.
• Ought–to–be – logics of this type are characterised by obligations that hold in states
and are about propositions that hold in states. Examples include [33, 53, 98]. It is
interesting to note that ought–to–be can represent two types of obligation explored
in [98]. The first is an achievement obligation: a state of affairs should be achieved
before a deadline. The second is a maintenance obligation: a state of affairs should
be maintained up until a deadline.
• Ought–to–do – logics of this type are characterised by obligations that hold in states
and are about events or actions that occur when transitioning between states. Exam-
ples include [33, 58, 60, 122]. It is interesting to note that Broersen et al. [33], Horty
and Belnap [122], and V. Dignum et al. [58] use a stit (see–to–it–that) operator (or a
version thereof) to represent the action of an agent bringing about a particular state
of affairs. For example stitφ is an action to bring about φ in a state. Consequently,
ought–to–do statements are framed as ought–to–bring–about a particular state, ab-
stracting away from labelled actions whilst still remaining ought–to–do statements.
In this dissertation, we look at obligations about agents’ actions (or events if we view
actions as requiring intention). This is because they seem to be more concrete and are
frequently found in the law – you should not murder, you should not steal, if you do either
you should go to prison. We also look at obligations about obligations to reason about
regulations governing other regulations. Yet, obligations are normative propositions that
hold in states and so obligations about obligations are seinsollen ought statements about
a state of affairs. As Von Wright points out, if obligations are about actions then nested
modalities are nonsensical [235, p. 91]. Where does this leave us, do we look at both
ought–to–do (obligations about actions) and ought–to–be (obligations about obligations
which hold in states)?
One approach would be only to look at ought–to–do. Here, the idea is to follow Wans-
ing’s suggestion [237] that nested obligations are obligations to see–to–it–that obligations
hold. The idea being that a nested obligation is an obligation to perform a locutionary act
to establish an obligation, for example, if we are an authority with legal power, by saying
“I command you to do X” we can see–to–it–that there is an obligation to do X (see Searle’s
account of how to go from is to ought, or obligations from locutionary promises [212]). The
problem is, this means imposing obligations requires agency. However, in this dissertation
we set out to look at institutions with regulations that govern other regulations – an institu-
tion is not a type of agent, it belongs to a class with instantiations that include the written
law, promises, contracts etcetera.
Hence, in this dissertation we combine ought–to–do for obligations that govern agents’
actions and ought–to–be for norms governing other norms. The combination of both was
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also looked at by D‘Altan et al. [51]. Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and 5 combine both types
of ought. Other aspects, of ought–to–be statements such as maintenance and achievement
obligations are not considered in this dissertation.
2.5. PRACTICAL FORMAL GOVERNANCE
In this section a number of frameworks for practical formal governance are proposed. There
are many links between deontic logics and the following research described and hence the
two cannot be easily disentangled. Rather, the following frameworks are characterised
firstly by drawing from a wider informal sphere such as legal and organisational theory,
whilst deontic logics come from a philosophical tradition. Secondly, by being pragmatic,
such as by having a low computational complexity (e.g. by talking about obligations over
single propositions rather than arbitrary propositional formulae) or providing clear links to
implementation. It is important to note that this dissertation falls firmly in practical formal
governance, since it provides a formal account that is characterised in such a way that the
decision procedure is obvious and/or is coupled with a computational framework (i.e. an
implementation).
2.5.1. ORGANISATIONAL FRAMEWORKS
Whilst this dissertation focuses on institutional reasoning a similar coordination mecha-
nism, multi–agent organisations, is also widely studied for formalisation. Like institutions,
organisations comprise a normative dimension. In contrast with institutions, organisations
also comprise constructs such as roles agents play and interaction patterns to achieve vari-
ous organisational objectives. If an institution is legislation, contracts and promises, then an
organisation is a university or a corporation within which institutions can play a part in the
form of contracts and other bodies of rules and regulations. Consequently, formal reasoning
between the two areas has much overlap (e.g. norms), institutions tending to focus on legal
concepts (e.g. legal empowerment to affect an institution) whilst organisations focus on
cooperation concepts and processes to achieve goals (e.g. interaction patterns).
HarmonIA [233] is an organisational framework that focuses on conceptualising ‘elec-
tronic organisations’ and methodologies for their design. In HarmonIA, organisations com-
prise different levels of abstraction. These are an abstract level, concrete level, rule level
and a procedure level. At the abstract level, the organisation defines abstract norms such as
statutes. At the concrete level the organisation refines the abstract level’s norms to concrete
policies. At the rule level further refinements are made to the concrete norms as rules for
agents to follow in order to comply with the concrete norms. The procedure level comprises
the actual computational implementation of the rules. In HarmonIA norms are modal and
their refinement/concretisation is based on the counts–as relation. However, a semantics for
norm refinement is not investigated. Instead the approach is given [233, p.94] and tools to
automate refinement/concretisation are left for future work [233, p.168]. HarmonIA’s focus
is on the conceptualisation and design methodology for organisations in MAS at different
abstraction levels, but not the formal reasoning.
MOISE+ [124] provides a conceptualisation for designing organisations comprising
roles, dependencies between roles and norms. In MOISE+ norms have a modal representa-
tion. In contrast to much of the work in formal philosophy and elsewhere, MOISE+ does not
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provide a formal semantics for norms or other organisational concepts. Rather, it focuses on
programming organisations at an agent level and an organisation–control level. At the agent
level, the J–MOISE+ (sub–)framework provides a way to program agents to enact roles in
a MOISE+ organisation. At the organisation level, the S–MOISE+ [125] (sub–)framework
provides an interface for agents to join a MOISE+ organisation. Through the S–MOISE+
interface organisational constraints are regimented on agents as hard constraints such that
agents are forced to comply. MOISE+ is an agent–organisation framework focussed on
programming agents and organisations, there are many aspects relevant to institutions that
are not considered (e.g. constitutive rules, abstraction and rule change).
OperA [61] is a framework providing an organisation design methodology and formal
organisational reasoning. Conceptually, an organisation in OperA is analogous to a human
organisation. An organisation comprises a social structure defining organisation objectives,
agent roles and relations between roles; an interaction structure describing scenes for agents
to play roles in and landmark objectives for the organisation to achieve; a normative struc-
ture describing the norms agents must abide by when fulfilling roles and interacting in
scenes; and a communicative structure describing the communicative acts agents can make.
An organisational logic formalises OperA organisations. The logic combines deontic logic
and temporal logic to define normative reasoning for the norms agents adopt when enacting
roles and reasoning about the responsibilities and capabilities endowed on agents for en-
acting those roles. The logic also determines when organisational landmarks are achieved.
The formal theory provided by OperA is implemented with the Operetta tool [5] for check-
ing organisational properties. In OperA organisations are the formal counterpart to human
organisations and a formal semantics provides organisational reasoning, but OperA lacks
many aspects found in the legal/institutional sphere (again, constitutive rules, abstraction
and rule change).
OperA+ [133] by Jiang builds on the OperA framework with additional organisation
design concepts and methodology, and novel computational mechanisms for organisational
reasoning. Enhancing OperA’s organisation design methodology, OperA+ proposes multi-
ple levels of abstraction. The most abstract level comprises organisational objectives. From
here, the design process enters a contextual level where the organisation design is concre-
tised by decomposing the organisation objectives into sub–domains or situations. Jiang
uses a top–level objective of train maintenance as an example where in this case the sub–
domains are planned and unplanned maintenance. Such sub–domains are then concretised
further at a solution level, by instantiating the sub–domains as social structures and nor-
mative structures. Like in OperA, the social structures comprise roles agents play and the
normative structure comprises norms. Unlike OperA, OperA+ also includes constitutive
rules for establishing institutional actions from brute facts. Opera+ also introduces an oper-
ational level, comprising groups of agents enacting roles represented as group preferences
for particular actions. OperA+ organisations are operationalised using Coloured Petri Nets
(CPNs), a graph–based formalism for describing distributed systems and computing their
states over time. Norms are represented as CPN graphs, akin to an evaluative norm rep-
resentation. Since norms have an evaluative representation, it is unclear how to extend
OperA+’s representation and reasoning to norms governing other norms. Other aspects
missing from OperA+ but focussed on in the dissertation you are reading now include a se-
mantic definition of links between concrete and abstract norms and governing rule change.
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2.5.2. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS
Institutional frameworks in MAS can be understood as analogous to their informal coun-
terparts (e.g. legislation). Typical elements are constitutive rules, norms, and the ability
for the institution to evolve from one institutional state to the next according to the change
of brute facts and the institution’s constitutive rules. Research on institutional reasoning
falls largely into two spheres, legal reasoning (e.g. for legislation) and open multi–agent
systems (e.g. artificial markets). We describe three frameworks in what is by no means
an exhaustive overview, instead we focus on the frameworks that are closest to what this
dissertation is trying to achieve.
OCeAN [78, 81, 82] (Ontology CommitmEnts Authorizations Norms) is a high–
level institution specification language and an operationalisation in the discrete event cal-
culus. In OCeAN an ontology specifies institutional actions, events and roles agents play
(hence there is an organisational flavour to OCeAN). OCeAN adopts constitutive rules (“A
counts–as B in a context C”) in order to define an agent communication language. Here,
the communicative act ‘A’ counts–as an institutional action in a context where the commu-
nicative agent is playing a role that authorises that agent to realise the institutional action.
For example, an auctioneer telling everyone the auction is open counts–as opening the auc-
tion, where playing the role of auctioneer represents the agent’s authorisation. OCeAN also
contains a normative component, adopting the usual deontic modalities in a modal represen-
tation. OCeAN’s focus is on ontologies, social commitments and organisational concepts
such as roles.
TMDL [98, 103] (Temporal Modal Defeasible Logic) is a non–monotonic logic for
reasoning about institutions over time. The institutional concepts captured are the deontic
modalities, constitutive rules, normative power (the ability for an agent to establish a norm
through a communicative act), and positive and negative rights. The logic is temporal in
the sense that propositions (including modal statements) hold at points in time when they
are initiated by an action according to a rule, and persist in holding (inertia) until they
are terminated. The logic’s modus operandi is defeasibility, the idea that a proposition is
defeasibly proven but a proof to the contrary defeats the proposition and makes it disproven.
In TMDL there are three types of rule in horn–clause form. Firstly, strict rules φ0, ...,φn →
ψ where the consequent is strictly provable when the antecedent is provable and cannot
be disproven if the antecedent is proven. Secondly, defeasible rules φ0, ...,φn ⇒ ψ where
proving the antecedent means the consequent is defeasibly proven, but proving contrary
propositions from the consequents of other rules defeats ψ or the rule’s defeasible premises
and makes ψ disproven. Thirdly, defeater rules φ0, ...,φn  ψ, which do not make their
conclusion proven, but rather defeat contrary premises and conclusions of other rules that
are defeasibly proven. To determine which rules can defeat other rules, a superiority relation
between rules is specified.
Defeasible logic, such as TMDL, defines a proof procedure that can be implemented
in Prolog [13]. The idea is that a derivation asserts the conclusion of a rule, then all the
ways to attack the derivation and its conclusion are found, all the attacks of the attacks are
found, and so on. This process continues until no more attacks can be applied and it is
determined whether there remain any undefended attacks of the original assertion, in which
case it is not proven, and otherwise it is proven. TMDL, through its proof procedure, makes
it possible to reason about exceptions as found in the law and also exceptions to exceptions
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etcetera.
InstAL [42, 43] (INSTitution Action Language) is a framework for temporal institu-
tional reasoning. An institution specification in InstAL comprises events that can occur and
fluents that can hold in the institution, as well as constitutive rules. The events can be ob-
servable corresponding to a brute fact, or institutional such as ‘payment’ or denoting a norm
is violated. Fluents represent institutional facts about a domain, the deontic statements of
obligation and permission in a modal–form, and institutional empowerment denoting an
event is empowered to affect the institution. In InstAL, anything not permitted is prohibited
and hence a prohibitive society is reasoned about. The constitutive rules ascribe institu-
tional events from observable events (corresponding to the notion of a brute fact changing)
and other institutional events. The constitutive rules also ascribe the effects of institutional
events on the institution’s state, causing institutional fluents to be initiated or terminated
from one state to the next. Regulations are represented as constitutive rules where the
consequents are the initiation or termination of obligation, permission and empowerment
fluents.
InstAL’s semantics are defined with a formal framework based on set theory and math-
ematical functions. Complementing the formal framework is a computational framework
that executes institution specifications in response to a trace of observable events. The
computational framework uses Answer–Set Programming (ASP), a non–monotonic logic
programming language [91, 92] based on the stable model semantics [93]. The output of
the framework is a state–transition system. Each state contains fluents representing insti-
tutional facts and normative positions (obligations and permissions). Transitions between
states are the events produced by observable events and the transitive closure of constitu-
tive institutional event generation rules. Fluents persist by default from one state to the next
unless terminated, capturing the common–sense law of inertia using Event–Calculus–like
constructs. InstAL is complemented with a framework for finding rule changes to meet
certain properties, in this case resolving inconsistencies between norms, based on Inductive
Logic Programming in ASP [154, 157].
2.6. KNOWLEDGE GAPS AND APPROACH
In this section we compare the frameworks described previously, depicted in table 4.7,
in terms of their support for PARAGon’s objective of institutional design and enactment
governance reasoning. The comparison is split between foundational representation and
reasoning requirements for our formalisation aims, and the necessary conceptual building
blocks (shown in bold) we require to formalise institutional design and enactment gover-
nance. We also denote those frameworks with a corresponding implementation, although
the degree to which there exists an implementation varies from one framework to another
(see the previous discussion).
The foundational representation and reasoning constructs for this dissertation are modal
norms, since they can be extended to nested modal norms and therefore regulations gov-
erning regulations; a temporal setting for real–world relevance and the reasoning about
rule–change over time; and constitutive rules for reasoning about institutions operating
at different levels of abstraction. The conceptual building blocks we require are: rule–
modifying constitutive rules for ascribing which rules an agent can modify and when; tem-
poral rule modifications; regulations governing regulations for reasoning about multi–level
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Standard Deontic Logic [234]
Anderson’s Reduction [9, 10] and
Subsequent Developments [4, 105]
Temporal Deontic Logics [33, 59,
60]
HarmonIA [233] ~ ~ ~ ~
MOISE+ [124]
OperA [61]
OperA+ [133]
OCeAN [78, 81, 82]
TMDL [98, 103]
InstAL [42, 43, 154, 157] ~
Table 2.1: Comparison between the state–of–the–art knowledge provided by different frameworks. A tick denotes
the framework provides the necessary representation and reasoning constructs. A ~ denotes the framework
only provides a conceptualisation sans semantics in the case of HarmonIA or technologies that can feasibly be
adjusted for our purposes in the case of InstAL. Knowledge in a regular font denotes foundational concepts that
need formalising, knowledge in bold represents the building block concepts that need formalising to reason about
institutional design and enactment governance.
governance; norm abstraction or concretisation based on constitutive rules for interpreting
institutions in multi–level governance; and automatic rule change for compliance in order to
help institution designers in multi–level governance enact institutions whilst avoiding pun-
ishment for non–compliance. As we can see, the foundational components are adequately
supported by some frameworks, however the conceptual building blocks are not and hence
it is those building blocks which the PARAGon framework addresses.
Organisation frameworks support some necessary foundational institutional reasoning
constructs, such as norms and potentially constitutive rules. However, they lack the seman-
tics for the governance of institutional design and change. In the case of the HarmonIA
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framework, whilst significant attention is paid to norm concretisation it is done by way
of example and not with a general semantics. The same is true for the other aspects of
HarmonIA. What HarmonIA does offer, is an indication of on what basis norm abstraction
should be reasoned about. Namely, constitutive rules. In fact, that is the same intuition
this dissertation takes, albeit we provide a formal semantics for reasoning about abstract-
ing rather than concretising norms using constitutive rules. MOISE+, OperA and OperA+
all offer some foundational aspects that could potentially be built on by this dissertation.
However, the institutional reasoning frameworks, focussing on institutions as we do, offer
further institutional reasoning foundations suitable for our aims.
As for the institutional reasoning frameworks – OCeAN, TMDL and InstAL all share in-
stitutional concepts such as norms, constitutive rules and institutional empowerment. Some
differences are that OCeAN also comprises organisation concepts, TMDL incorporates de-
feasible reasoning and InstAL has been used as a basis for Inductive Logic Programming
based norm revision. In all of these frameworks norms are specified at a single level of
abstraction, constitutive rules establish an institutional reality but not rule changes, and de-
tecting and rectifying compliant institution designs is not captured. Hence, all frameworks
provide necessary formal foundations, but do not close the knowledge gap this dissertation
addresses.
The question arises as to the suitability of these frameworks for our purposes. In this
dissertation InstAL is used as a basis for the institutional reasoning we contribute. The
main reason is that in InstAL, due to having an ASP computational framework, it is already
possible to apply existing ASP–based Inductive Logic Programming techniques in order to
resolve problems with institutions. In the case of [157] the problems resolved are normative
conflicts. In this dissertation we seek to resolve non–compliance in multi–level governance
and hence Inductive Logic Programming techniques are used and developed towards our
aims.
The following summarises how the PARAGon framework fills the gap in the knowl-
edge. Determining compliance according to institutional design governance in multi–level
governance requires: regulations governing regulations, and norm abstraction or concretisa-
tion based on constitutive rules, and is addressed with a formal framework in Chapter 3 and
a computational framework in Chapter 4. Automatically resolving non–compliant institu-
tion designs to support designers in avoiding punishment requires automatic rule change for
compliance and is addressed with a computational framework in Chapter 5. Determining
when rule changes are legally made requires rule–modifying constitutive rules and temporal
rule modifications, and is addressed with a formal framework in Chapter 6.
2.7. DISCUSSION
In this chapter we began with an overview of the informal concepts behind multi–agent
systems, institutions, governance and governing governance. Two aspects stand out. First,
there are many parallels between the need to govern agents (due to their autonomy and
liability to deviate from the ideal), and governing institution designers (for the same reason,
since institution designers are also agents). Second, the informal work looked at in the area
of institutions is, in fact, fairly formal (e.g. in the case of Searle’s counts–as rules). On the
other hand, work on governing governance appears distinctly informal, where we largely
drew on work in political science and examples from real–world legislation.
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These aspects led us to identifying the main notions that the PARAGon framework
needs to formalise. First, we elicited the foundational notions to formalise (institutions,
norms). Then, we identified the building blocks required to formalise governing gover-
nance. For example, we elicited the need to rely on modal norms over evaluative norms to
reason about regulations governing regulations. Likewise, we argued that it is clear con-
stitutive rules play an important role in governing of governance both for providing links
between concrete and abstract concepts and governing institutional enactment of new rules
or changes to existing rules. What was unclear at this point was to what extent existing
approaches provided the foundations or the building blocks required.
Hence, we provided a comparison between existing formal approaches. We paid partic-
ular attention to where the gaps in the existing knowledge lie that need to be filled. Based
on this analysis we selected the InstAL framework from which we can use various foun-
dational formal components on which to build the PARAGon framework this dissertation
contributes.

3
FORMALISING COMPLIANCE IN
MULTI–LEVEL GOVERNANCE
For a large class of cases–though not for all–in which we employ the word “meaning” it
can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language[239, Sect. 43]
Ludwig Wittgenstein
This chapter is based on the following papers:
King, T. C., Li, T., De Vos, M., Dignum, V., Jonker, C. M., Padget, J., & van Riemsdijk, M. B. (2016, July). Au-
tomated Multi–level Governance Compliance Checking. Journal of Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
(JAAMAS). International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems. (In Submission)
Which extends the following paper:
King, T. C., Li, T., De Vos, M., Dignum, V., Jonker, C. M., Padget, J., & Riemsdijk, M. B. Van. (2015). A Frame-
work for Institutions Governing Institutions. In Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous
Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2015) (pp. 473–481). Istanbul, Turkey: International Foundation for
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems. [144]
45
46 3. FORMALISING COMPLIANCE IN MULTI–LEVEL GOVERNANCE
In this chapter we look at soft constraints placed on institution designers, which pre-
scribe the institution designs they should enact. The contributions of this chapter are:
• A formal representation language for institutions governing other institution designs
in multi–level governance.
• A formal semantics for determining when institutions are compliant in multi–level
governance, accounting for concrete regulations at lower–levels of governance, gov-
erned by increasingly abstract regulations at higher–levels of governance.
Institutions (e.g. legislation) govern societies towards ideal and coordinated behaviour
with rules and regulations coupled with the means to detect compliance and issue rewards
and punishments. Increasingly, institutional reasoning is formalised and computerised with
automated normative and institutional reasoning frameworks (see [12] for a review). Such
frameworks can support governing bodies in punishing agents and support agents in under-
standing their legal duties.
However, typical institutions are not written in a vacuum. Rather, institutions are con-
strained and regulated by higher–level institutions. This is what is called multi–level gover-
nance [121]. In multi–level governance, institution designers design institutions comprising
rules and regulations, but whose design is also subject to regulation. In 2006 the European
Union issued the Data Retention Directive [71] for harmonising member states’ data re-
tention regulations, in 2009 the UK implemented the directive with the Data Retention
Regulations [226] in order to avoid fines. Yet, in 2014 the European Court of Justice ruled
[70] that the directive was non–compliant with the Charter of Fundamental Rights [72], and
annulled the directive. Legislating in multi–level governance exposes institution designers
to risks of punishment and wasted legislating time and burdens a judiciary with checking
compliance.
So far, institutional reasoning frameworks have focussed on single–levelled societal
governance. Typically, automated institutional reasoning deals with regulations operating
at the level of institutions governing agents and/or corporations. For example, the UK’s
Data Retention Regulations [226] obliges communications providers to store communica-
tions metadata. There lacks reasoning for cases where regulations themselves are regulated
by higher–level institutions in multi–level governance. For example, how EU directives
govern national legislation but where EU directives are in turn governed by human rights
charters. In this chapter we look at how institutions themselves are regulated by higher–
level institutions.
In particular, we look at increasingly abstract regulations at higher–levels of governance
that govern more concrete regulations at lower–levels of governance. Such abstraction sets
multi–level governance apart from single–levelled governance of societies. In multi–level
governance at the highest–level, such as human rights charters, regulations are intention-
ally abstract and open to interpretation. Such abstract regulations provide many ways in
which to (non–)comply. At a lower–level, such as EU directives, regulations are more con-
crete and less open to interpretation. At the lowest level, such as national or sub–national
legislation, regulations are concrete and the least ambiguous. Despite the differences in
abstraction between levels, each level’s institution design must somehow be demonstrated
to be compliant with relatively more abstract regulations at higher–levels.
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To give an example, the European Charter of Fundamental Rights [72] contains vague
regulations requiring that people’s private and family life is respected. The EU’s data reten-
tion directive [71] contains a more concrete regulation requiring communications service
providers (e.g. ISPs and telephonic companies) to store people’s communications metadata
(e.g. a phonecall’s time and place) within a fixed time frame. The directive’s communica-
tions metadata regulation must be shown to be compliant with the Charter of Fundamental
Right’s more abstract right to a private and family life, or else the directive will be annulled.
In fact, the directive was annulled due to violating privacy [70]. At the same time, the di-
rective itself governs the design of institutions – member state’s legislation. Member states
must implement the directive in a compliant way in order to avoid fines. The directive gives
some scope for member states to implement a compliant institution differently, allowing the
data retention period to be between 6 and 24 months. The UK’s data retention regulations
[226] are more concrete and must be shown to ensure communications metadata is stored
within the required time frame, no shorter and no longer. In fact, they do just that, con-
cretely requiring communications metadata is stored for 13 months which complies with
the abstract requirement of the directive to store data between 6 and 24 months. The UK’s
institution must be shown to be compliant with the more abstract regulation of the directive
in order to avoid fines. In turn, the data retention directive must be shown to be compliant
with the more abstract charter of fundamental rights in order to avoid annulment.
To this end, this chapter contributes two main formal building blocks that together con-
tribute a system for detecting non–compliance in multi–level governance. These novel
elements are:
• A way to represent and reason about regulations governing regulations – specifically,
combining norms about agents’ actions with norms that oblige and prohibit the impo-
sition of other norms in different social contexts. In this chapter we look explicitly at
norms, rules that state what should occur and when. In particular, we look at norms
that state what the effects of other norms should be.
• Abstraction based on constitutive rules – specifically, taking concrete norms at lower–
levels of governance and defining a semantics that re–interprets those concrete norms
by abstracting them to the same level of abstraction the higher–levels of governance
govern them at. The semantics define an abstracting relation between concrete norms
and their abstract definitions based on context–sensitive links provided by constitu-
tive rules between concrete and abstract concepts. For example, the European Data
Retention Directive [71] requires member states to store communications metadata.
The semantics determine that storing communications metadata without someone’s
consent is, abstractly, unfair data processing.
This chapter is written to be as self–contained as possible. Thus, we start by describing
the individual components of institutions and the approach we take to reasoning about them
in Section 3.1. The representation we use is given in Section 3.2. The formal reasoning
is presented in Section 3.4. We describe related work in Section 3.5. Conclusions are
presented in Section 3.6.
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3.1. APPROACH
In this section we describe the approach we take to automatically determining compliance
in multi–level governance. Since we are reasoning about institutions in multi–level gov-
ernance, we build on an existing institutional reasoning framework. Our proposal requires
representation and reasoning for: constitutive rules, modal regulatory rules, higher–order
norms, connections between institutions and reasoning about regulation abstraction. The
InstAL (Institution Action Language) framework [42, 43] provides constitutive rules and
modal regulatory rules. Hence, we base our proposal on the InstAL framework and extend
it to multi–level governance with higher–order and abstract norm representation and reason-
ing. We also modify the InstAL reasoning from being about prohibitive societies (where
anything not permitted is forbidden) to permissive societies (everything is permitted un-
less explicitly prohibited), adding explicit prohibitions and removing explicit permissions.
Whilst in InstAL brute facts are observable events or properties which hold in a state (flu-
ents), we only consider brute facts to be observable events. For simplicity, all properties
which hold in a state are institutional and not brute in our framework. Based on InstAL
[42, 43], an institution in our framework specifies six elements.
Firstly, following InstAL, events. Events can represent observable changes to reality,
corresponding to the notion of brute fact. Events can represent changes to the social reality,
corresponding to the notion of institutional fact. For example, the brute fact we call stor-
ing metadata is an observable event, whilst storing metadata and storing personal data are
institutional events.
Secondly, following InstAL, fluents which describe institutional facts holding in a social
reality and are subject to changing over time. For example, a user consenting to process-
ing their data causes a fluent to hold stating they have consented, which is removed if they
revoke their consent. Some fluents represent the deontic positions that hold. The deontic
positions denote institutional empowerments, and obligations and prohibitions. Empower-
ments represent that an institutional event is empowered to affect the institution, meaning
an institutional event can occur in the institution. For example, “storing communications
metadata is empowered to occur”. Empowerments represent hard constraints on the events
that can (in general) occur (for further discussion see [42, 43]). Fluents representing obli-
gations and prohibitions are normative fluents. For example, “an obligation to pay a fine”.
Higher–order normative fluents can also be specified, for example an obligation to oblige
paying a fine. We deal with institutions in a temporal setting, so the various deontic po-
sitions (normative fluents) express that something should be done before a deadline. For
example, an obligation to pay a fine within one month.
Thirdly, following InstAL, constitutive rules which cause institutional events to occur
when observable or other events occur in a given context. For example, “the observable
event of storing metadata counts–as the institutional event of storing metadata”. An exam-
ple of institutional events causing further institutional events to occur is “storing personal
data counts–as unfair data processing in the context that a user has not consented”.
Fourthly, following InstAL, constitutive rules which initiate and terminate fluents in
holding due to institutional events. For example, “a user consenting to storing their data
counts–as initiating the fluent stating the user has consented”. Constitutive rules establish-
ing what we call normative fluents are norms. For example, “a user using a communications
device counts–as initiating an obligation for their communications’ metadata to be stored”.
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Higher–order norms impose higher–order normative fluents. Once a fluent is initiated by
such a rule it holds until it is terminated by another rule. That is, these rules initiate and
terminate inertial fluents.
Modal norms, which are regulative rules, are constitutive rules which initiate and termi-
nate fluents due to institutional events. For example “a user using electronic communica-
tions initiates an obligation for the communications provider to store their communications
metadata”. Thus, norms are not a distinctive element of institutions, but rather a type of
constitutive rule.
Fifthly, extending InstAL, constitutive rules which derive fluents from other fluents in
a particular context. For example, “an obligation to store personal data non–consensually
derives (counts–as) unfair data processing in all social contexts”. Viewed as counts–as
rules, these rules ascribe a special meaning B to a fluent A in a context C. For example, an
obligation to store personal data non–consensually has the special meaning of being unfair
data processing. So long as the fluent ‘A’ holds in a context ‘C’ then its special meaning
‘B’ also holds. But, unlike constitutive rules which initiate and terminate fluents the special
meaning ‘B’ does not hold until terminated, rather, it holds when ‘A’ holds in the context
‘C’. That is the ‘Bs’ in these types of rule are non–inertial fluents, since the Bs do not
persist from over time by default until terminated (i.e. they do not possess inertia). Unlike
the previous rules, constitutive rules which derive fluents from other fluents are not present
in the InstAL framework.
Sixthly, following InstAL, a set of initial inertial fluents which hold in the institution’s
first state and continue to hold until terminated. The set of initial inertial fluents can be
the empty set. To summarise, an institution specifies events, fluents and constitutive rules
which ascribe institutional events or institutional fluents.
Multi–level governance is operationalised with a semantics. This semantics defines
how each institution evolves from one state to the next in response to a trace of observable
events. These events can be real events occurring in the MAS, or hypothetical events if a
pre–runtime check for compliance is performed. An institution’s evolution is schematically
depicted in Figure 3.1 and described as follows.
The institution starts in an initial state in which its initial set of inertial fluents holds.
State transitions are driven by observable events occurring in the MAS (potentially hypo-
thetically). During a state transition, further events occur in an institution according to its
constitutive rules, building up an institutional interpretation of reality based on the observ-
able events that have occurred. Further events signifying there is (non–)compliance also
occur, for example if there is an obligation to store communications’ metadata within one
month and the data is not stored within one month, then a norm violation occurs. If it is
prohibited to oblige storing communications’ metadata, then a higher–order norm violation
occurs. That is, norm violations are institutional events denoting non–compliance. A newly
transitioned to state can contain different fluents from the previous state, based on each in-
stitution’s constitutive rules variously initiating and terminating fluents from one state to
the next. Thus, each institution evolves over time from one state to the next transitioned by
events.
But, how are concrete regulations imposed at lower levels of governance determined
to be (non–) compliant with abstract regulations at higher levels of governance? The ap-
proach we take is to firstly, link each institutional level such that concrete normative fluents
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Figure 3.1: Multi–level Governance reasoning overview
holding in lower level institutions are ‘passed up’ to the corresponding state in higher level
institutions. For example, an obligation to oblige storing communications metadata in the
EU–DRD is ‘passed up’ to the EU–CFR. Likewise, so too are norm compliance events.
Then, in each institutional state of a higher level institution the concrete normative fluents
coming from lower level institutions are re–interpreted and abstracted.
In order to abstract concrete normative fluents, we use constitutive rules on which to
base the abstraction. Recall that constitutive rules establish links between concrete and
abstract concepts, from which we can determine links between concrete and abstract norms.
For example, the obligation to oblige storing communications metadata is re–interpreted as
an obligation to oblige non–consensual data processing. In turn, from these abstractions any
further abstractions are also derived. For example, the obligation to oblige non–consensual
data processing is abstracted simply to being unfair data processing. Thus, each institutional
state contains concrete normative fluents from lower levels and the state contains the closure
of all abstractions on these concrete normative fluents based on constitutive rules.
Given that normative fluents are abstracted, they can be determined for compliance with
abstract higher–order normative fluents that govern them. For example, whether the abstract
obligation to oblige storing data non–consensually is in itself prohibited, or perhaps has an
even more abstract meaning (e.g. unfair data processing) which is prohibited/obliged. So,
concrete normative fluents from lower levels are re–interpreted as more abstract normative
fluents at higher levels to determine whether in their abstract incarnation they cause non–
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Figure 3.2: An example of abstracting normative fluents at different levels of governance based on the context.
Normative fluents oblige/prohibit an aim a occurs before or at the same time as a deadline d . We use < to denote
one thing occurring before another and ≤ to denote one thing occurring before or at the same time as another.
compliance.
An example is depicted in Figure 3.2 based on the running case study. In the EU–
DRD’s first state there is an obligation to oblige storing communications’ metadata, which
is passed up to the EU–CFR. As described, concrete normative fluents are abstracted based
on whether the prescribed event counts–as a more abstract event in a context entailed by the
state. Storing metadata counts–as storing personal data. Storing personal data counts–as
non–consensual data processing in the context where an agent has not consented. In the
EU–CFR’s first state the obligation to oblige storing metadata is abstracted to an obligation
to oblige storing personal data. Then, to an obligation to oblige processing data without
consent. An obligation to oblige processing data non–consensually is abstracted further to
‘unfair data processing’. Unfair data processing is prohibited and thus a norm violation
event occurs in the transition to the EU–CFR’s next state.
In the EU–CFR institution the next state lacks an obligation to oblige processing data
without consent because a user has consented. So, unfair data processing also does not hold.
That is, the abstract meaning of concrete normative fluents evolves as the context evolves.
Consequently, compliance of normative fluents is context sensitive because normative flu-
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Figure 3.3: Discharge and violation (higher–order) normative fluent conditions. < X denotes the event/fluent
holding or occurring strictly before X causes a violation. ≤ X denotes the same, but the condition is non–strictly
before.
ents’ abstraction is context sensitive.
To summarise, our semantics for multi–level governance defines the evolution of each
institution over time in response to a sequence of events. Specifically, whether concrete nor-
mative fluents imposed by lower level institutions have an abstract interpretation in higher
level institutions. Moreover, whether these abstract interpretations of concrete norms vi-
olate abstract higher–order norms in higher level institutions. Such non–compliance can
be determined by inspecting the sequence of events in higher level institutions for higher–
order norm compliance events. The semantics provide a mechanism acting as a kind of
legal monitor for multi–level governance.
3.2. FORMAL REPRESENTATION
In this section we present the syntax for representing multi–level governance. We begin
with representing normative fluents. These are fluents which represent temporal obligations
and prohibitions, meaning they have an aim which should be achieved before a deadline.
In contrast, InstAL considers at temporal obligations and non–temporal permissions, where
anything not permitted is prohibited (a prohibitive society). We look at temporal obliga-
tions and temporal prohibitions, where anything not prohibited is permitted (a permissive
society).
Obligation and prohibition fluents are respectively represented as obl(aim, deadline)
and pro(aim, deadline). The aims and deadlines can be events, fluents or other normative
fluents to represent higher–order normative fluents. Two special events are used in aims
and deadlines, now and never. The event ‘now’ occurs immediately to represent something
should (not) be done immediately. For example, obl(aim, now) means the aim should occur
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‘now’. Our representation is inspired by the formalisation of instantaneous norms in a
variant of dynamic logic [60], which similarly use ‘now’ to refer to the present state. An aim
or deadline event never represents that the aim/deadline never occurs, potentially meaning
the normative fluents lasts indefinitely. For example pro(aim, never) means it is always
prohibited for the aim to occur or in other words the aim should ‘never’ occur.
The informal semantics for normative fluents’ is described in terms of when obligation-
s/prohibitions are discharged and violated, overviewed in Figure 3.3. An obligation fluent,
of the form obl(aim, deadline), represents that the aim should occur/hold before or at the
same time as the deadline to discharge the obligation (fulfil all duties). If the deadline oc-
curs/holds strictly before the aim then the obligation is violated. Prohibition fluents, of the
form pro(aim, deadline), are the inverse of obligations. Prohibitions represent that the aim
should not occur/hold strictly before the deadline. When a normative fluent n is discharged
it causes the event disch(n) to occur. If n is violated then the event viol(n) occurs.
Higher–order norms impose higher–order normative fluents. A higher–order normative
fluent obliges/prohibits another normative fluent is imposed before a deadline. The deadline
is an event or another normative fluent. Compliance–focussed higher–order norms can also
be expressed, which oblige/prohibit compliance with a norm (norm discharge – disch(n))
or violation (viol(n)) occurs before/after an event occurs or another normative fluent is
imposed (e.g. it is obliged a norm is violated before a fine is imposed).
A grammar to specify normative fluents is formalised as:
Definition 1. Normative Fluents Let P be a set of propositions denoting events with typical
element p. The set of normative fluents N |P is the set of all normative fluents n expressed
as:
aim ::= p | n | now | never | disch(n) | viol(n)
deadline ::= p | n | now | never | disch(n) | viol(n)
n ::= obl(aim,deadline) | pro(aim,deadline)
We give some examples concerning two agents, a law enforcement officer called Charles
and an internet communications user called Ada, and an internet communications provider
colloquially called an ISP. The UK–DRR implements the EU–DRD. They state that if a law
enforcement official (e.g. charles) requests the data stored by a communications provider
(e.g. isp) of a user (e.g. ada) then the communications provider is obliged to provide the
data within one month (m1):
obl(provideData(isp, charles, ada), time(m1))
Instantaneous normative fluents express that something should (not) be done or a nor-
mative fluent should (not) be imposed now. One way an institution designer might use
instantaneous norms is to express that as soon as something happens a normative fluent
should be imposed. For example, as soon as a norm is violated it is obliged that there is an
obligation to punish the violator. The EU–DRD as we formalise it, requires that any im-
plementing institution should impose punishment as soon as regulations are violated. Thus,
when there is a violation it imposes a normative fluent obliging an obligation to punish the
violator is imposed immediately:
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obl(obl(punish(isp), time(m6)), now)
Compliance–focussed normative fluents can be used to express that an agent should
discharge/violate a normative fluent before another normative is imposed that rewards/pun-
ishes the agent. For example, in our previous work [145], an obligation expressed “it is
obliged that a norm is violated before a fine is imposed”. Such compliance focussed nor-
mative fluents do not state that a normative fluent being discharged should cause a re-
ward/punishment. Rather, they state that discharge/violation should occur before the re-
ward/punishment is imposed. Following this chapter’s case–study – it is obliged that the
communications provider isp violates the obligation to provide charles with data which
concerns ada before any obligation to punish the communications provider isp is imposed.
obl(viol(obl(provideData(isp, charles, ada), time(m1))), obl(punish(isp), time(m6)))
Normative fluents can also be explicitly first–order, but implicitly higher–order by oblig-
ing/prohibiting fluents that abstractly represent other normative fluents. Recall that various
obligations in the EU–DRD can abstractly be interpreted as unfair data processing. Hence,
the following is an example of an abstract first–order norm that indirectly governs other
norms. The EU–CFR states that it is prohibited to process Ada’s data unfairly (indefinitely):
pro(unfairDataProcessing(ada), never)
We now proceed to representing individual institutions. In short, institutions are spec-
ified as a tuple, extending the formal specification of an institution in the InstAL frame-
work [43]. Generally, speaking, an individual institution describes the things that can occur
(events) and hold (fluents) in the institution as well as the institution’s rules causing events
to occur and fluents to hold. An institution’s constitutive rules – cause institutional events to
occur in response to other events (“an event A counts–as an event B in context C”), fluents
to hold in response to events (“an event A counts–as establishing/removing a fluent B in
context C”), and further, more abstract, fluents to be derived from other fluents (“a fluent A
counts–as a fluent B in context C”). Rules stating fluents are derived are not present in In-
stAL but we introduce them since they provide an abstracting relation between fluents and
thus contribute to our goal of reasoning about abstraction in multi–level governance. Regu-
lative rules are just modal norms represented as constitutive rules which establish normative
fluents, “an event A counts–as establishing an obligation/prohibition in context C”.
Specifically, institutions comprise the following elements:
Events – a set of propositions (E ) denoting events that can occur in the institution,
s.t. now,never 6∈ E , meaning the institution cannot define when the brute events now
and never occur. The set of events comprises:
– Observable events (Eobs) that are exogenous to the institution corresponding to
the notion of a brute fact denoting an event.
– Internal institutional events (Einst) representing an institutional description of
reality.
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– Compliance events (Enorm = {disch(n),viol(n) | n ∈Fcnorm∪Fanorm}) indicating
a normative fluent (in the set of concrete and abstract normative fluentsFcnorm∪
Fanorm) has been discharged or violated.
Fluents – a set of propositions (F ) denoting fluents which can hold in the institution,
comprising:
– Domain fluents (Fdom) providing an institutional description of the state of re-
ality (e.g. an agent has consented to their data being processed).
– Empowerment fluents (Fpow ⊆ {pow(e) | e ∈ Einst}) denoting an event is recog-
nised by the institution in a state and has the power to affect the institution (i.e.
is empowered).
– Normative fluents (Fnorm =Fcnorm∪Fanorm) comprising mutually disjoint sets
of concrete normative fluents (Fcnorm ⊆N |E∪Fdom ) and abstract normative flu-
ents (Fanorm ⊆N |E∪Fdom ):
¦ Concrete normative fluents denote obligations and prohibitions imposed
by the institution about events or domain fluents. These normative fluents
are concrete in the sense of being explicitly imposed by an institutional
norm, rather than being abstract interpretations of other normative fluents
that have been imposed.
¦ Abstract normative fluents denote obligations and prohibitions imposed by
the institution about events or domain fluents. These are abstract in the
sense of not being imposed by the institution, but rather represent an ab-
stract interpretation of other more concrete normative fluents. For example,
an obligation to store personal data is a more abstract interpretation of an
obligation to store communications metadata.
– Inertial and non–inertial fluents, We assume that fluents are either inertial or
non–inertial represented as mutually disjoint sets of inertial fluents (Finert) and
non–inertial fluents (Fninert) such that F =Finert∪Fninert and Finert∩Fninert =
;. Institutions define fluents which can be initiated by the institution’s state
consequence function and then persist from one state to the next by default until
they are terminated. That is, some fluents are inertial. Other fluents hold due to
constitutive rules stating more abstract fluents are derived from more concrete
fluents. These abstract fluents hold whenever the concrete fluents hold and do
not persist from state to state by default. That is, they are non–inertial fluents.
Concrete normative fluents are inertial, since an institution explicitly imposes
them by initiation and termination according to the state consequence function
(Fcnorm ⊆ Finert). Abstract normative fluents are non–inertial since they are
derived from other normative fluents and do not persist from state to state by
default (Fanorm ⊆Fninert).
Contexts – these characterise a condition on a state and denote the social context
each rule is conditional on. A context is a set of positive and weakly negative fluents,
which holds in a state if all the positive fluents hold and none of the negative fluents
hold. Formally, the set of all contexts is X = 2F∪¬F s.t. ¬F = {¬ f | f ∈F } is the set
containing the negation of all elements in the set F .
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State change rules (C : X ×E → 2Finert × 2Finert ), described as a state consequence
function. They specify that due to the occurrence of events conditional on a con-
text holding in a state, inertial fluents are initiated and terminated from one state to
the next. State change rules can be descriptive (e.g. a user consenting to their data
being stored initiates a fluent stating that they have consented) and regulative rules
by initiating and terminating normative fluents (e.g. someone using electronic com-
munications initiates an obligation for the communications provider to store their
communications’ metadata).
Event generation rules – (G :X ×E→ 2Einst ), described as an event generation func-
tion. These rules are only descriptive. They specify that when an exogenous or insti-
tutional event occurs conditional on a context holding in a state another institutional
event occurs.
Fluent derivation rules – (D : X ×F → 2Fninert ), described as a fluent derivation
function. These rules state that a fluent holding in a state derives a non–inertial fluent
holding in the same state, conditional on a social context.
According to these notions, an individual institution is formally defined as:
Definition 2. Individual Institution An institution is a tuple I = 〈E ,F ,C,G,D,∆〉 such
that:
• E = Eobs∪Einst∪Enorm is the set of events.
• F =Fdom∪Fnorm is the set of fluents.
• C :X ×E→ 2Finert ×2Finert is the state consequence function.
• G :X ×E→ 2Einst is the event generation function.
• D :X ×F → 2Fninert is the fluent derivation function.
• ∆ ⊆ Finert is a set of inertial fluents which hold in the institution’s initial state and
persist from one state to the next if they are not terminated.
Some further useful constructs are:
• Σ= 2F to denote the set of all states for I .
• Given a context X ∈ X and an event e ∈ E we denote the result of the consequence
function as C(X ,e)= 〈C↑(X ,e),C↓(X ,e)〉 s.t. the set of initiated fluents is C↑(X ,e) and
the set of terminated fluents is C↓(X ,e).
• For readability if an institution is denoted with a superscript, such as id then all its
elements have the same superscript, such as I id = 〈E id,F id,C id,G id,Did,∆id〉, the set
of states being Σid and the set of contexts being X id.
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We exemplify using institutional specification fragments where for clarity we use a
superscript denoting the name of each institution. The EU–CFR [72, Art. 8.2] states that a
person’s data must be processed fairly. For an agent called ‘ada’, the set of inertial fluents
initially holding in the EU–CFR institution includes:
pro(unfairDataProcessing(ada), never) ∈∆cfr
A communications provider, called ‘isp‘, storing metadata is by default an event em-
powered to affect the Data Retention Regulations:
pow(storeData(isp, ada, metadata)) ∈∆drd
According to the European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) judgement [70] on the EU–DRD,
with respect to the EU–CFR, storing communications metadata counts–as storing personal
data. If an agent’s, Ada’s, metadata is stored in any context (the empty set) then the event
of storing the agent’s, Ada’s, personal data is generated. Additionally, if Ada’s personal
data is stored in the context that Ada has not consented then the event of non–consensually
processing Ada’s data occurs. The following rules are a part of the EU–CFR, incorporating
the ECJ’s judgement.
Gcfr(;,storeData(isp, ada, metadata)) 3 storeData(isp, ada, personal)
Gcfr({¬consentedDataProcessing(ada, isp)},storeData(isp, ada, personal)) 3
nonConsensualDataProcessing(ada)
The EU–DRD [71, Art. 8] requires data concerning people is transmitted to authorities
on request before any undue delay. A fluent initiation rule is conditional on an agent,
Charles, requesting the data from a communications provider, ISP, of another agent, Ada.
In the context that Charles is a law enforcement official the rule initiates an obligation to
immediately oblige that ISP provides Charles with data concerning Ada before any undue
delay.
Cdrd↑({is(charles, lawEnforcement)},requestData(ada, isp, charles)) 3
obl(obl(provideData(isp, charles, ada), undue_delay), now)
According to the ECJ’s interpretation of the EU–DRD [70] with respect to the EU–CFR.
Obliging that personal data is processed non–consensually counts–as unfair data process-
ing. We represent the ECJ’s interpretation as a fluent derivation rule in the EU–CFR insti-
tution. It states that obliging an agent, Ada’s, personal data is processed without consent in
any social context (the empty set) derives the fluent of (counts–as) unfair data processing.
Dcfr(obl(nonConsensualDataProcessing(ada), now),;) 3 unfairDataProcessing(ada)
In multi–level governance, institutions are related in the sense that institutions designed
at lower levels of governance are governed by institutions designed at higher levels of gov-
ernance. In our approach, this means that if a lower level institution imposes an obligation
or a prohibition, then the same obligation/prohibition holds in any higher level institution
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which governs it. Institutions are linked in this way in what we call a multi–level gover-
nance institution, where institutions are ordered by the level they operate at and linked with
a relation between lower level and higher level institutions. The relations linking institu-
tions are expressed as a set of directed edges R between lower level institutions and higher
level institutions they are governed by. Each relation is restricted such that higher levels
cannot be governed by lower levels, such that collectively the relations are always acyclic.
Formally, a multi–level governance institution is:
Definition 3. Multi-level Governance Institution A Multi-level Governance Institution is
a directed graph 〈T ,R〉. The vertices are represented as a tuple T = 〈I1, ...,In〉 of insti-
tutions. The arrows are a set of pairs R = 2[1,n]×[1,n] of institution indexes in T such that
∀〈i , j 〉 ∈R : i < j .
According to these definitions, we can represent the three main aspects of multi–level
governance we focus on in this chapter. Firstly, regulations which regulate other regula-
tions in higher level institutions with higher–order normative fluents in prescriptive rules.
Secondly, the links between lower level institutions governed by higher level institutions
by composing multi–level governance institutions. Thirdly, the interpretation of concrete
concepts and normative fluents as more abstract concepts and normative fluents.
In our framework abstraction can occur in a multi–level governance institution in two
ways. Firstly with constitutive rules which state a concrete concept counts–as a more ab-
stract concept in a particular context. These abstracting constitutive rules are represented
as the event generation function – a concrete event counts–as a more abstract event in a
particular social context; the state consequence function – a concrete event counts–as initi-
ating/terminating a fluent that abstractly describes the social reality in a particular context;
and the fluent derivation function – a concrete fluent counts–as a more abstract fluent in
a particular social context. The second method of abstraction is implicit abstraction of
concrete normative fluents regulating concrete concepts to more abstract normative fluents
regulating abstract concepts. Normative fluent abstraction is defined semantically, based on
constitutive rules between concrete and abstract concepts, and requires no explicit repre-
sentation.
3.3. CASE STUDY FORMALISATION
To demonstrate the representation in full, our case study and its formalisation in the formal
framework are subsequently summarised. We look at three legal institutions. These institu-
tions operate at different levels of abstraction. Higher–levels interpret the regulatory effects
of lower–levels in terms of more abstract normative fluents and concepts based on consti-
tutive rules. Providing the constitutive rules to reinterpret and abstract regulations are the
interpretations provided by courts. For example, the lower–level Data Retention Directive’s
interpretation by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) with respect to the higher–level Char-
ter of Fundamental Rights. We view constitutive rules provided by court interpretations
of a lower–level institution as being a part of the higher–level institution which governs
the lower–level. For example, the Charter of Fundamental Rights comprises its rules and
regulations set out in writing and also the interpretations of the Data Retention Directive’s
concepts provided by the ECJ.
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Formally, the multi–level governance institution is the tupleML= 〈T ,R〉where the in-
stitutions are T = 〈Idrr,Idrd,Icfr〉 and the governance relation is R = {〈drr,drd〉,〈drd,cfr〉}.
Each of the institutions are formalised in tables 3.1, 3.3 and 3.4 where for brevity we leave
out empowerment fluents and upper–case terms represent variables acting as shorthand for
their ground instantiations. For clarity, we use labels rather than indexes for each institution.
Each institution is described and formalised as follows.
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights [72] (EU–CFR, Formalised in Table 3.1),
a third–level institution which through the most abstract regulations governs the Data
Retention Directive. The specific fragments of legislation we look at are:
– Article 7 – “Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family
life, home and communications.” (rule CFRC.2, and CFRIS.1)
– Article 8 – “Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concern-
ing him or her.” (rule CFRC.3, and CFRIS.1) and “Compliance with these rules
shall be subject to control by an independent authority.” (rule CFRC.5, and
CFRIS.1)
Partly based on the European Court of Justice’s interpretation of the Data Retention
Directive [70] we also take the following legal interpretations as holding in the EU–
CFR:
– Storing communications content or metadata counts–as storing personal data
(rules CFRG.1 and CFRG.2).
– Storing personal data if the person it concerns has not consented counts–as non–
consensual data processing. (rule CFRG.3).
– There is unfair data processing whenever there is an obligation for there to be
non–consensual data processing (rule CFRD.1).
– Data is unprotected if there is an obligation to store data in the context that the
data is not anonymised (rule CFRD.4).
– Privacy is disrespected when there is an obligation to store personal data (rule
CFRD.8).
It is interesting to note that the Charter of Fundamental Rights regulates regulations
but in an implicit manner, that is, nowhere does it state that the regulations regulate
other regulations. That is, not obliging and prohibiting obligations or prohibitions,
but rather obliging and prohibiting abstract concepts which can represent obligations
and prohibitions. For example, rather than prohibiting obligations for data to be
processed unfairly, the EU–CFR prohibits unfair processing itself. In this chapter,
we assume that whenever the EU–CFR governs an abstract concept, such as unfair
data processing, then it views obliging that abstract concept as counting–as that ab-
stract concept. For example, processing data unfairly has many interpretations, one of
which is obliging data is processed unfairly. Following this idea, if the EU–CFR pro-
hibits processing data unfairly, then an obligation to process data unfairly is reduced
to the abstract concept of unfair data processing itself, which violates the EU–CFR’s
prohibition. Through transitivity, it follows that an obligation to oblige unfair data
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processing is also reduced in the same way resulting in a violation of a prohibition to
process data unfairly. Interpreting abstract normative fluents as the abstract concepts
they oblige/prohibit is realised with fluent derivation rules:
– Obliging unfair data processing counts–as unfair data processing (rule CFRD.2).
– Obliging data is anonymised counts–as data being anonymised (rule CFRD.3).
– Obliging data is unprotected counts–as data being unprotected (rule CFRD.5).
– Obliging privacy is disrespected counts–as privacy being disrespected
(rule CFRD.7).
– Obliging data is processed counts–as data being processed (rule CFRD.9).
Table 3.1: Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union Formalisation
Gcfr(;,storeData(CommProv0, Agent0, content)) 3
storeData(CommProv0, Agent0, personal)
(CFRG.1)
Gcfr(;,storeData(CommProv0, Agent0, metadata)) 3
storeData(CommProv0, Agent0, personal)
(CFRG.2)
Gcfr({¬consentedDataProcessing(Agent0, CommSerProv)},
storeData(CommProv0, Agent0, personal)) 3
nonConsensualDataProcessing(Agent0)
(CFRG.3)
Gcfr({¬jurisdiction(Location0, eu)},
storeDataAt(CommProv0, Agent0, Location0)) 3
storeDataOutsideEU
(CFRG.4)
Ccfr↑(;,consent(CommSerProv0, Agent0) 3
consentedDataProcessing(Agent0, CommSerProv0)
(CFRC.1)
Ccfr↑(;,viol(pro(privacyDisrespected(Agent), never))) 3
pro(privacyDisrespected(Agent), never)
(CFRC.2)
Ccfr↑(;,viol(pro(dataUnprotected(Agent0, personal), never))) 3
pro(dataUnprotected(Agent0, personal), never)
(CFRC.3)
Ccfr↑(;,viol(pro(unfairDataProcessing(Agent0), never))) 3
pro(unfairDataProcessing(Agent0), never)
(CFRC.4)
Ccfr↑(;,viol(pro(uncontrolByIndepAuth, never))) 3
pro(uncontrolByIndepAuth, never)
(CFRC.5)
Dcfr(;,obl(nonConsensualDataProcessing(Agent0), now)) 3
unfairDataProcessing(Agent0)
(CFRD.1)
Dcfr(;,obl(unfairDataProcessing(Agent0), now)) 3
unfairDataProcessing(Agent0)
(CFRD.2)
Dcfr(;,obl(dataAnonymised(CommSerProv0, Agent0), now))) 3
dataAnonymised(CommSerProv0, Agent0)
(CFRD.3)
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Dcfr({¬dataAnonymised(CommSerProv0, Agent0)},
obl(storeData(CommSerProv0, Agent0, Data0), now) 3
obl(dataUnprotected(Agent0, CommSerProv0), now))
(CFRD.4)
Dcfr(;,obl(dataUnprotected(Agent0, CommSerProv0), now) 3
dataUnprotected(Agent0, CommSerProv0)
(CFRD.5)
Dcfr(;, {obl(storeData(CommSerProv0, Agent0, personal), now)}) 3
privacyDisrespected(Agent0)
(CFRD.6)
Dcfr(;, {obl(privacyDisrespected(Agent0), now)}) 3
privacyDisrespected(Agent0)
(CFRD.7)
Dcfr(;,obl(storeData(CommSerProv0, Agent0, personal), now)) 3
dataProcessed
(CFRD.8)
Dcfr(;,obl(dataProcessed, now)) 3 dataProcessed (CFRD.9)
Dcfr({¬pro(storeDataOutsideEU, never)},dataProcessed) 3
uncontrolByIndepAuth
(CFRD.10)
∆cfr = {pro(privacyDisrespected(Agent), never),
pro(dataUnprotected(Agent0, personal), never),
pro(unfairDataProcessing(Agent0), never),
pro(uncontrolByIndepAuth, never), is(charles, lawEnforcement)}
(CFRIS.1)
The EU Data Retention Directive [71] (EU–DRD) is a second–level institution. It
consists of less abstract regulations than the Charter of Fundamental Rights which
governs it. On the other hand, it has more abstract regulations than the institution it
governs, the UK’s implementation of the EU–DRD called the UK’s Data Retention
Regulations. Whilst both the EU–CFR and the EU–DRD govern regulations, a direc-
tive by nature is written specifically for that purpose as a regulation regulating legal
institution. Consequently, for the EU–DRD we adopt an explicit form for regulations
governing regulations.
The specific fragments of the Data Retention Directive that we formalise are:
– Article 5 – “Member states shall ensure that the following categories of data
are retained under this Directive:” (paraphrased) the data necessary to trace
and identify the source, destination, date, time and duration, and type of a com-
munication. Also, the users’ communication equipment and its location (rule
DRDC.1, and DRDD.2) and “No data revealing the content of the communica-
tion may be retained pursuant to this Directive” (DRDD.2).
– “Member States shall ensure that the categories of data specified in Article 5
are retained for periods of not less than six months and not more than two years
from the date of the communication” (rule DRDC.2).
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– Article 8 – “Member States shall ensure that the data specified in Article 5 are
retained in accordance with this Directive in such a way that the data retained
and any other necessary information relating to such data can be transmitted
upon request to the competent authorities without undue delay” (rule DRDC.3).
– Article 13 (clause 1) – “[...]sanctions are fully implemented with respect to the
processing of data under this Directive.” (rule DRDC.4).
We also take the following legal interpretations as holding in the EU–DRD:
– Something happening after one month counts–as undue delay (rule DRDG.1).
– Paying a fine counts–as being punished (rule DRDG.2).
– Data retention is ensured for a period of between six and twenty–four months
whenever there is a prohibition on deleting the data before 12 months and an
obligation to delete it after 13 months (rules DRDD.1 and DRDD.2).
Table 3.3: EU Data Retention Directive Formalisation
Gdrd(;, time(m1)) 3 undue_delay (DRDG.1)
Gdrd(;,payFine(CommSerProv0, Agent0)) 3 punish(CommSerProv0) (DRDG.2)
Cdrd↑(;,useElectronicCommunication(Agent0, CommServProv0)) 3
obl(obl(storeData(CommServProv0, Agent0, metadata), now), now)
(DRDC.1)
Cdrd↑(;,storeData(CommSerProv0, Agent0, Data0)) 3
obl(ensure_data_retention_period(Agent0,
CommSerProv0, Data0, m6, m24), now)
(DRDC.2)
Cdrd↑({is(Agent0, lawEnforcement)},
requestData(Agent0, CommSerProv0, Agent1)) 3
obl(obl(provideData(CommSerProv0, Agent0, Agent1), undue_delay), now)
(DRDC.3)
Cdrd↑(;,viol(obl(provideData(Co, Ag0, Ag1), undue_delay))) 3
obl(obl(punish(CommServProv0), time(m6)), now)
(DRDC.4)
Ddrd({pro(deleteData(CommSerProv0, Agent0, Data0), time(m12))},
obl(deleteData(CommSerProv0, Agent0, Data0), time(m13))) 3
ensure_data_retention_period(Agent0, CommSerProv0, Data0, m6, m24)
(DRDD.1)
Ddrd({obl(deleteData(CommSerProv0, Agent0, Data0), time(m13))},
pro(deleteData(CommSerProv0, Agent0, Data0), time(m12))) 3
ensure_data_retention_period(Agent0, CommSerProv0, Data0, m6, m24)
(DRDD.2)
∆drd = {obl(pro(storeData(CommProv0, Agent0, content), never), now),
is(charles, lawEnforcement)}
(DRDD.2)
The UK’s Data Retention Regulations [226] (UKDRR) is a first–level institution
which governs communications service providers in the United Kingdom. The frag-
ments of the legislation we formalise are:
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– Article 4 – “It is the duty of a public communications provider to retain the com-
munications data specified in the following provisions of the Schedule to these
Regulations” obliges metadata is stored and prohibits content data is stored (rule
DRRC.1, and DRRIS.1)
– Article 5 – “The data specified in the Schedule to these Regulations must be
retained by the public communications provider for a period of 12 months from
the date of the communication in question” (rules DRRC.2 and DRRC.3).
– Article 8 – “The data retained in pursuance of these Regulations must be re-
tained in such a way that it can be transmitted without undue delay in response
to requests” (rule DRRC.4).
– We assume the regulations are enforced with fines (e.g. rule DRRC.4).
Table 3.4: UK Data Retention Regulations Formalisation
Cdrr↑(;,useElectronicCommunication(Agent0, CommProv0)) 3
obl(storeData(CommProv0, Agent0, metadata), now)
(DRRC.1)
Cdrr↑(;,storeData(CommProv0, Agent0, metadata))) 3
pro(deleteData(CommProv0, Agent0, metadata), time(m12))
(DRRC.2)
Cdrr↑(;,storeData(CommProv0, Agent0, metadata)) 3
obl(deleteData(CommProv0, Agent0), time(m13))
(DRRC.3)
Cdrr↑({is(Agent0, lawEnforcement)},
requestData(Agent0, CommProv0, Agent1, metadata)) 3
obl(provideData(Agent0, CommProv0, Agent1, metadata), time(m1))
(DRRC.4)
Cdrr↑(;,viol(obl(provideData(CommProv0, Agent0, Agent1), time(Length0)))) 3
obl(payFine(CommProv0, secrOfState), time(m6))
(DRRC.5)
∆drr = {pro(storeData(CommProv0, Agent0, content), never),
is(charles, lawEnforcement)}
(DRRIS.1)
3.4. SEMANTICS
In this section we present the formal semantics for multi–level governance. Given a multi–
level governance institution specification the semantics define a model, comprising for each
institution states transitioned between by events, in response to a supplied trace of ob-
servable events. The key idea behind the semantics, depicted in figure 3.4 is to transition
from one state to another, driven by generated events, by initiating and terminating inertial
fluents. Then each state is closed by deriving non–inertial fluents according to an insti-
tution’s fluent derivation function and abstracting concrete fluents to non–inertial abstract
normative fluents according to normative fluent abstraction. Given a multi–level gover-
nance institution model it can be determined whether individual institutions are compliant
with the institutions that govern them in different contexts. The formal semantics provide a
mechanism for automated compliance–checking in multi–level governance.
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Figure 3.4: An overview of the semantics, depicting the transition from the initial state to the next state and state
closure.
In order to reduce repetition the following definitions are with respect to several com-
mon objects. First, a multi–level governance institutionML= 〈T ,R〉where T = 〈I1, ...,In〉
is a tuple of institutions with typical elements being ∀i ∈ [1,n] : I i = 〈E i ,F i ,C i ,G i ,Di ,∆i 〉.
Second, a tuple of states, representing the state of each institution for a single point in time
j – 〈S1j , ...,Snj 〉. Third, a tuple of event sets, representing the events occurring in each insti-
tution for a single point in time j – 〈E1j , ...,Enj 〉.
STATE CONDITIONS
Institutions in a multi–level governance specification contain rules which are conditional
on states and the occurrence of events. Therefore, determining if a rule is ‘fired’ requires
determining in part if its state condition, a social context, holds in a state. We begin by
defining when contexts are modelled by (hold in) a state.
Informally, a state formula is modelled by a state if for each positive fluent in the for-
mula there is an equivalent fluent that is a member of the state and for each negative fluent in
the formula there is not an equivalent fluent that is a member of the state. Rather than defin-
ing modelling a state formula in terms of whether the positive/negative fluent is in the state,
we use equivalence. This is because two normative fluents can have an equivalent meaning
whilst being syntactically different – this is not unusual, in ‘Standard Deontic Logic’ [234]
forbidden X is defined as obliged not X and likewise for much subsequent work.
In our case, we define equivalences between two fluents based on whether they are
are syntactically identical and two normative fluents based on whether their discharge and
violation coincide. Referring again to Figure 3.3, an event/fluent a is obliged to occur/hold
before or at the same time as some d by the obligation fluent obl(a, d) and is prohibited to
occur/hold strictly before d by the prohibition fluent pro(a,d). Given two normative fluents
obl(a, d) and pro(a′,d ′) where a is equivalent to d ′ and d is equivalent to a′, the obligation’s
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and prohibition’s discharge and violation coincide, and therefore they are equivalent. The
equivalences (≡) of obligations and prohibitions according to their discharge and violation
is summarised as obl(a,d)≡ pro(a′,d ′) if a ≡ d ′ and d ≡ a′, a definition that generalises to
higher–order normative fluents.1
Accordingly, we define modelling a state formula as:
Definition 4. State Formulae Let f ∈F i be a fluent. We define ≡ and |= for all contexts
X ∈X i as:
f ≡ f
obl(a,d)≡ pro(a′,d ′) ⇔ a ≡ d ′ and d ≡ a′
Si |= f ⇔ ∃ f ′ ∈ Si : f ≡ f ′
Si |= ¬ f ⇔ Ø f ′ ∈ Si : f ≡ f ′
Si |= X ⇔ ∀x ∈ X : Si |= x
EVENTS
In this section we semantically define the events occurring in an institution, in response
to other events in specific contexts. Precisely, an event generation operation GRi defines
for an institution I i in a multi–level governance institution which events occur in a state
Si in response to a set of events E i . An event occurs in an institution if it is generated by
the institution’s event generation function G i , or if it represents the discharge/violation of
a discharged/violated normative fluent holding in the institution’s state or that of a lower–
level institution the institution governs. The event generation operation is formalised below
and explained subsequently:
Definition 5. Event Generation Operation The event generation operation GRi :Σi×2E i →
2E i is defined for each institution I i w.r.t. the tuple of multi–level governance states
〈S1j , ...,Snj 〉 and event sets 〈E1j , ...,Enj 〉. The operation is defined as GRi (Si ,E i ) = E ′ iff E ′
minimally (w.r.t. set inclusion) satisfies all of the following conditions:
now ∈ E ′ (D37.1)
E i ⊆ E ′ (D37.2)
∃X ∈X i ,e ∈ E ′,e ′ ∈G i (X ,e) : Si |= X ∧Si |= pow(e ′)⇒ e ′ ∈ E ′ (D37.3)
Si |= obl(a,d)∧ (a ∈ E ′∨Si |= a)⇒ disch(obl(a,d)) ∈ E ′ (D37.4)
Si |= obl(a,d)∧ (d ∈ E ′∨Si |= d)∧disch(obl(a,d)) 6∈ E ′⇒ viol(obl(a, d)) ∈ E ′ (D37.5)
Si |= pro(a,d)∧ (d ∈ E ′∨Si |= d)⇒ disch(pro(a,d)) ∈ E ′ (D37.6)
Si |= pro(a,d)∧ (a ∈ E ′∨Si |= a)∧disch(pro(a,d)) 6∈ E ′⇒ viol(pro(a,d)) ∈ E ′ (D37.7)
∃〈h, i 〉 ∈R,e ∈ Ehnorm∩E inorm ⇒ e ∈ E ′ (D37.8)
In more detail:
• D37.1 – the event of now always occurs.
1An example of higher–order equivalence generalisation is obl(obl(a,d),d ′) ≡ obl(pro(d ,a),d ′) ≡
pro(d ′,obl(a,d)), etc.
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• D37.2 – events that have already occurred still occur (monotonicity).
• D37.3 – an event generated by the institution’s event generation function in response
to another event, conditional on a social context modelled by the state and the event
being empowered to occur.
• D37.4 to D37.7 – a compliance event occurring signifying a normative fluent is dis-
charged or violated in a state, by an obliged/prohibited event, fluent or another nor-
mative fluent. Compliance events do not need to be empowered in order to occur.
• D37.8 – norm compliance events occurring in lower level institutions linked to this
institution, also occur in this institution.
Note that GRi is increasingly monotonic and a well–defined partial function. The func-
tion GRi is partial if there is a fault in the institutional specification or the set of events
passed are inconsistent. Specifically, if an institution is defined such that violating a norma-
tive fluent causes an event that discharges the same normative fluent via the event generation
function G (either directly or transitively).
DERIVED FLUENTS
In this section we semantically define deriving fluents from other fluents in a given state. We
define a fluent derivation operation FDi which, operating on an institutional state, extends
the state to include derived fluents based on fluent derivation rules of the form “fluent A
derives fluent B in context C” described by the fluent derivation functionDi . These derived
fluents are the ‘Bs’ from fluent derivation rules where the context ‘C’ holds and the fluent
‘A’ is modelled by the state. By deriving fluents from other fluents in a state, it is possible
further fluents should be derived. Thus, the fluent derivation operation FDi is defined to
close a state by producing an extended state which includes all derived fluents with respect
to the extended state itself. The fluent derivation operation is formally defined as:
Definition 6. Fluent Derivation Operation The fluent derivation operation FDi : Σi → Σi
is defined for each institution I i and a state Si ∈Σi such that FDi (Si )= S′ iff S′ minimally
(w.r.t. set inclusion) satisfies all of the following conditions:
Si ⊆ S′ (D6.1)
∃X ∈X , f ∈ S′, f ′ ∈Di (X , f ) : S′ |= X ⇒ f ′ ∈ S′ (D6.2)
In more detail:
• D6.1 – Closure of the state does not remove any fluents from the input state.
• D6.2 – A fluent derived from another fluent conditional on a social context modelled
by the state according to the institution’s fluent derivation function is a member of
the closed state.
Note that the fluent derivation operation is undefined if an institution’s fluent deriva-
tion function has an output that is inconsistent with its input. For example D({¬B},A) 3 B
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Figure 3.5: Overview for deontological counts–as semantics between concrete and abstract normative fluents,
based on counts–as relations between the elements they prescribe holding in a context entailed by a single state.
or in words “A counts–as B in the context that B does not hold”. In other cases, the flu-
ent derivation operation is multi–valued if at least two rules defined by the institution’s
fluent derivation function are mutually inconsistent. For example D({¬B2},A) 3 B1 and
D({¬B1},A) 3 B2, or in words “A counts–as B1 in the context that B2 does not hold” and
vice versa “A counts–as B2 in the context that B1 does not hold”. The occurrence of these
issues indicates an institution design problem, which should be resolved by the institution
designer.
ABSTRACTING NORMATIVE FLUENTS
This section presents a semantics for abstracting concrete normative fluents. The basic
idea, depicted in Figure 3.5, is to establish new counts–as relations between concrete nor-
mative fluents and abstract normative fluents, based on the concrete concepts they prescribe
counting–as more abstract concepts. In other words, counts–as relations between concrete
and abstract normative fluents are based on other counts–as relations between the concrete
and abstract concepts they prescribe. Before we go into the actual semantics for abstract-
ing concrete normative fluents, we describe the intuition and general semantics, then give
numerous examples and finally the formalisation.
We call the relation between concrete and abstract normative fluents deontological
counts–as and derive it based on three types of counts–as rules (referring again to fig-
ure 3.5). Firstly, based on counts–as between events according to an institution’s event
generation function. Here, we derive relations stating concrete normative fluents about
events count–as an abstract normative fluent about an event. Secondly, based on counts–as
between fluents according to an institution’s fluent derivation function. Here, we derive
relations stating concrete normative fluents about fluents count–as an abstract normative
fluent about a fluent. Thirdly, based on counts–as between normative fluents themselves
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according to the deontological counts–as relation we define. Here, we derive relations stat-
ing higher–order concrete normative fluents prescribing normative fluents count–as a more
abstract higher–order normative fluent prescribing a normative fluent. So, a deontological
counts–as relation between concrete and abstract normative fluents is derived from primi-
tive ontological counts–as relations according to an institution’s event generation and fluent
derivation functions, and deontological counts–as itself in order to derive deontological
counts–as between higher–order normative fluents.
How the deontological counts–as relations between concrete and abstract normative
fluents are derived is described as follows. The intuition is that concrete normative fluents
count–as a more abstract normative fluent if and only if complying with the concrete nor-
mative fluents (i.e. discharging or not violating) by causing an event to occur or fluent to
hold counts–as a certain institutional event or fluent to hold which guarantees the abstract
normative fluent is also complied with (i.e. discharged or not violated).
Following this intuition, we start by describing deontological counts–as for obligations.
In reference to figure 3.5, whenever any of a0 to an occur or hold we are guaranteed b oc-
curs/holds. If there is a concrete obligation imposed on one of a0, ...,an to occur/hold before
a deadline d , then it is guaranteed that complying with the concrete obligation (discharging
or not violating) means a more abstract obligation for b to hold before the same deadline
d is also guaranteed to be discharged or not violated. Therefore, we derive a deontological
counts–as relation stating that a concrete obligation on any of a0, ...,an before d counts–as
a more abstract obligation for b to occur before d .
Prohibitions are different. If a0, ...,an count–as b, then unlike obligations we cannot
apply modus ponens and say that prohibiting a0 before d counts–as prohibiting b before
d . The reason being, a0 not occurring/holding does not mean b does not occur/hold. Thus,
prohibiting a0 on its own does not mean b should not occur. In other words. discharging or
not violating a prohibition on a0 before d does not guarantee that a prohibition on b before
d is discharged or not violated. The reason is b can occur due to any of a1, ...,an occur-
ring/holding (all counting–as b) and thus violate a prohibition on b before d . We might
be tempted to apply modus tollens and say that b not occurring/holding means a0, ...,an do
not occur/hold, therefore prohibiting b before d counts–as prohibiting a0, ...,an before d .
However, this would be concretisation since a0, ...,an are more concrete than b (recall that
concrete concepts count–as abstract concepts, and a0, ...,an count–as b). On the other hand,
we are interested in abstraction. To summarise, unlike obligations modus ponens is inap-
propriate to base counts–as between prohibitions on, whilst modus tollens is inappropriate
since it concretises rather than abstracts.
Instead, we derive a deontological counts–as relation between prohibitions stating that
prohibiting all of a0, ...,an from occurring/holding before d counts–as a prohibition on a
more abstract event/fluent b occurring/holding before d . This is based on the fact that
counts–as is ascriptive defining all ways an abstract institutional concept can occur/hold
when more concrete concepts occur/hold. Since the institutional events/fluents are ascribed
by an institution’s counts–as relations, if none of a0, ...,an occur/hold then b is not ascribed
and therefore does not occur/hold. Thus, complying with (discharging or not violating)
all prohibitions on a0, ...,an occurring/holding before d guarantees that a prohibition on b
before d is also complied with (discharged or not violated).
These informal semantics abstract concrete normative fluents with different concrete
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aims to an abstract normative fluent with a more abstract aim. Normative fluents’ dead-
lines are also abstracted. However, as we observed when defining equivalences between
normative fluents, the aim of an obligation is by definition obliged, whilst the deadline
is prohibited and vice versa for prohibitions. Thus, the abstraction of obligation fluents’
deadlines should be under the same semantics as prohibitions’ aims and vice versa for pro-
hibitions. So, given that a0 counts–as b, a prohibition for z to occur before a0 counts–as
a prohibition for z to occur before b. Alternatively, we can just apply the equivalences
between normative fluents such that we have an obligation for a0 to occur before z which
counts–as an obligation for b to occur before z, which is equivalent to a prohibition for z to
occur before b. Since a state with a prohibition fluent also models an equivalent obligation
fluent and vice versa, we define deontological counts–as based on the normative fluents a
state models and obtain the abstraction of normative deadlines ‘for free’.
This summarises the intuition behind deontological counts–as. More formally, deon-
tological counts–as is defined as the function DCi : Σi → 2F inorm ×F inorm. The function
specifies for a state (S) a relationship (〈N ,n〉 ∈DC(Si )) between sets of relatively concrete
normative fluents (N ) that count–as an abstract normative fluent (n) in the state Si .
We exemplify the deontological counts–as function using our running case study. We
focus on the EU–DRD’s prescriptions formalised as an institution Idrd. Counts–as between
events according to the EU–DRD’s event generation G function state that a communications
provider (isp) storing the content of a user’s (ada) communications data
(storeData(isp, ada, content)) counts–as (causes the institutional event of) storing personal
data (storeData(isp, ada, personal)). Likewise, storing communications’ metadata
(storeData(isp, ada, metadata)) counts–as storing personal data.
Storing metadata or content data counts–as storing personal data. Thus, obliging meta-
data or obliging content data is stored immediately counts–as obliging personal data is
stored immediately, since if a communications provider stores metadata or content data
then it also stores personal data:
〈{obl(storeData(isp, ada, content), now)},
obl(storeData(isp, ada, personal), now)〉 ∈DCi (Si )
〈{obl(storeData(isp, ada, metadata), now)},
obl(storeData(isp, ada, personal), now)〉 ∈DCi (Si )
Prohibiting storing both content and metadata indefinitely counts–as prohibiting storing
personal data indefinitely:
〈{pro(storeData(isp, ada, content), never),
pro(storeData(isp, ada, metadata), never)},
pro(storeData(isp, ada, personal), never)〉 ∈DCi (Si )
Higher–order normative fluents are abstracted using the same intuitions as first–order nor-
mative fluents, but with abstraction based on deontological counts–as. According to our
case study, obliging an obligation to store content data counts–as obliging an obligation to
store personal data. Likewise, obliging an obligation to store metadata counts–as obliging
an obligation to store personal data.
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〈{obl(obl(storeData(isp, ada, content), now), now)},
obl(obl(storeData(isp, ada, personal), now), now)}〉 ∈ DCi (Si )
〈{obl(obl(storeData(isp, ada, metadata), now), now)},
obl(obl(storeData(isp, ada, personal), now), now)}〉 ∈ DCi (Si )
Likewise, but for prohibitions, prohibiting storing metadata and prohibiting storing con-
tent data counts–as prohibiting storing personal data. Thus, obliging to immediately pro-
hibit storing metadata and obliging to immediately prohibit content data counts–as oblig-
ing to immediately prohibit storing personal data. Only obliging to prohibit storing content
data, does not mean it is obliged to prohibit storing personal data:
〈{obl(pro(storeData(isp, ada, content), never), now),
obl(pro(storeData(isp, ada, metadata), never), now)},
obl(pro(storeData(isp, ada, personal), never), now)〉 ∈DCi (Si )
Higher–order prohibition abstraction semantics generalises the intuition of deontological
counts–as for first–order prohibitions, but based on deontological counts–as itself. Prohibit-
ing all concrete normative fluents that count–as a more abstract normative fluent, counts–as
prohibiting the more abstract normative fluent.
According to our case study, indefinitely prohibiting obliging storing content data and
prohibiting to oblige storing metadata, counts–as indefinitely prohibiting obliging storing
personal data. Likewise, for prohibiting prohibitions.
〈{pro(obl(storeData(isp, ada, content), now), never),
pro(obl(storeData(isp, ada, metadata), now), never)},
pro(obl(storeData(isp, ada, personal), now), never)}〉 ∈DCi (Si )
〈{pro(pro(storeData(isp, ada, content), never), never),
pro(obl(storeData(isp, ada, metadata), never), never)},
pro(pro(storeData(isp, ada, personal), never), never)〉 ∈DCi (Si )
Abstracted normative fluents can also be further abstracted. To give an example, in the
EU–DRD the event of storing personal data without someone’s consent counts–as a non–
consensual data processing event. Hence in the context that the agent Ada has not consented
(S |= ¬consentedDataProcessing(ada)) we have the following deontological counts–as re-
lation. It states the EU–DRD is effectively obliging an obligation for data to be processed
non–consensually:
〈{obl(obl(storeData(isp, ada, personal), now), now)},
obl(obl(nonConsensualDataProcessing(ada), now), now)}〉 ∈ DCi (Si )
Deontological counts–as relations are also derived from the fluent derivation function
Di . To exemplify, we take the previous example where we have an abstract obligation oblig-
ing Ada’s data is stored non–consensually. Loosely speaking, the ECJ judged [70] that the
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EU–DRD, by obliging an obligation for non–consensual data processing, violated the EU–
CFR’s prohibition on unfair data processing (e.g. pro(unfairDataProcessing(ada), never)).
But how do we go from a second–order obligation for data to be processed non–consensually
to violating a first–order prohibition on unfair data processing? One possibility is that the
EU–CFR’s fluent derivation function (Dcfr) states that obliging non–consensual data pro-
cessing counts–as unfair data processing, such that
Dcfr(;,obl (nonConsensualDataProcessing(ada)), now)) 3 unfairDataProcessing(ada). Thus
we have the following relation stating the second–order obligation for non–consensual data
processing deontologically counts–as, more abstractly, obliging data is processed unfairly:
〈{obl(obl(nonConsensualDataProcessing(ada)), now), now)},
obl(unfairDataProcessing(ada), now)〉 ∈DCi (Si )
However, obliging data is processed unfairly does not violate the EU–CFR prohibition
on unfair data processing, pro(unfairDataProcessing(ada), never). This is unsurprising,
the EU–CFR does not impose an explicit second–order prohibition, or contain any explicit
higher–order norms for that matter (both in reality and in our formalisation). Unfair data
processing is somehow derived from an obligation to oblige non–consensual data process-
ing. One possibility is as follows: 1. according to the fluent derivation function obliging
non–consensual data processing counts–as unfair data processing, thus 2. obliging an obli-
gation to process data non–consensually counts–as obliging unfair data processing. 3. The
EU–CFR considers whether data is processed unfairly or obliged to be processed unfairly
as irrelevant, both are viewed as unfair data processing. 4. Thus, an obligation to process
data unfairly counts–as unfair data processing according to the fluent derivation function,
Dcfr(;,obl (un f airDataProcessing (ada)),now)) 3 unfairDataProcessing(ada). That
is, normative fluents about abstract concepts are reduced to (ascribed as) those abstract
concepts, in this way first–order norms can indirectly govern other norms.
The idea here does not mean what ought to be the case is the case (unfair data pro-
cessing). Rather, unfair data processing is an abstract concept which has many meanings,
including obliging unfair data processing itself. Note that this means not only is an obli-
gation to process data unfairly reduced to unfair data processing, but so is a second–order
obligation, a third–order obligation, etcetera. Formally:
〈{obl(obl(unfairDataProcessing(ada), now), now)},
unfairDataProcessing(ada)〉 ∈DCi (Si )
〈{obl(obl(obl(unfairDataProcessing(ada), now), now), now)},
unfairDataProcessing(ada)〉 ∈DCi (Si )
...
Following this discussion, we formally define deontological counts–as, based on counts–
as relations which hold in a state according to the event generation function, fluent deriva-
tion function and deontological counts–as itself. For convenience, we collect the event gen-
eration and fluent derivation counts–as relations into a single set Ai which form the func-
tion’s base cases. Since deontological counts–as is also defined based on its own counts–as
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relations (in order to generalise to higher–order normative fluents), deontological counts–as
is also defined recursively. Formally, deontological counts–as is defined as:
Definition 7. Deontological Counts–as Given a state Si , the deontological counts–as func-
tion DCi :Σi → 2F inorm ×F inorm is defined for the state Si ∈Σi such that DCi (Si ) is the min-
imal (w.r.t. set inclusion) set of all pairs 〈N ′,n′〉 where N ′ 6= ; that satisfy the following:
N ′ = {obl(a,d) | a ∈ A}s.t .〈A,b〉 ∈Ai (Si )∪DCi (Si )∧n′ = obl(b,d) ∈F ′norm or (D7.1)
N ′ = {pro(a,d) | 〈A,b〉 ∈Ai (Si )∪DCi (Si )∧a ∈ A}∧n′ = pro(b,d) ∈F inorm (D7.2)
Where the set of abstracting counts–as relations Ai (Si ) for the state Si is defined as:
A(Si )={〈{a},b〉 | X ∈X i ,a ∈ E i ,b ∈G i (X ,a)∧Si |= pow(b)}∪ (D7.3)
{〈{a},b〉 | X ∈X i ,a ∈F i ,b ∈Di (X ,a)} (D7.4)
A state closed under deontological counts–as function is the function DC
i
: Σi → Σi , such
that S′ = DCi (Si ) iff it minimally (w.r.t. set inclusion) satisfies all of the following condi-
tions:
Si ⊆ S′ (D7.6)
∃〈N ′,n′〉 ∈DCi (Si ) :N ′ ⊆ S′∧n′ ∈F ianorm ⇒ n′ ∈ S′ (D7.7)
In more detail. Concrete obligations count–as a more abstract obligation according to
D7.1. Concrete prohibitions count–as a more abstract prohibition according to D7.2. These
counts–as relations are derived from relations between concrete concepts counting–as an
abstract concept defined by the event generation function and fluent derivation function
according to D7.3 – D7.4 (the base cases) and with respect to deontological counts–as itself
since it is defined recursively.
Deontological counts–as does not describe whether normative fluents in a state Si are
abstracted, but rather whether they could be. Closing a state under deontological counts–as
is according to the operation DC
i
. Condition D7.6 ensures any fluents already in the state
remain in the state. Condition D7.7 ensures if concrete normative fluents, should they hold
in a state are abstracted to a normative fluent, and they do indeed hold, then the abstracted
normative fluent also holds. Note that in D7.7 it is ensured only normative fluents which
belong to the abstract set of normative fluents can hold in a state due to being derived from
concrete normative fluents. Consequently, deontological counts–as only adds non–inertial
abstract normative fluents to a state.
Note that DC
i
is a partial function if there is a fault in the institutional specification.
For example, if an institution obliges an event a to occur in some state, and the event a
generates the event b in that state, then b is also obliged to occur in that state. However, if a
generates the event b conditional on b not being obliged then there is a problem. We have
that b is obliged since a is obliged. But, if b is obliged then a does not count–as b, thus
obliged a does not count–as obliged b and so there is no obligation for b to occur. Again,
in principle there is nothing wrong with the possibility of this paradox occurring since it is
an institutional design fault. If we have DC
i
(S)=⊥ then we have detected an institutional
design problem for the institution designer to rectify.
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MODELS
In this section we define a model which describes how each institution in a multi–level
governance institution evolves from one state to the next, driven by observable events which
generate institutional events in state transitions. A model is defined in response to a trace
of observable (exogenous) events.
The approach we take is to put together all the previous operations according to the
following description. An institution starts at an initial state which includes the institution’s
initial set of inertial fluents (∆i ), and the state closed under the fluent derivation and de-
ontological counts–as operations. The institution transitions between states with a set of
events generated by the event generation operation in response to an observable event in the
event trace. Each state transitioned to contains the fluents that held in the previous state that
were not terminated, any newly initiated fluents as well as closing the state under the fluent
derivation and deontological counts–as operations. Additionally, an institution’s evolution
is affected by the evolution of other institutions it governs. This means that a higher level
institution’s state includes normative fluents from lower level institutions it governs. These
normative fluents are ‘passed up’ to the higher level institution in order to abstract the lower
levels normative fluents and determine if they are compliant in their abstract interpretation.
We begin by defining the initial state of each individual institution. Formally and de-
scribed subsequently:
Definition 8. Initial States The initial state Si0 for each individual institution I i w.r.t.ML = 〈T ,R〉 and a tuple of initial states 〈S10, ...,Sn0 〉 is the set Si0 if and only if Si0 mini-
mally (w.r.t. set inclusion) satisfies the following:
Si0 ⊆∆i (D8.1)
∃〈h, i 〉 ∈R,n ∈ (Fhcnorm∪Fhanorm)∩F ininert : n ∈ Sh0 ⇒ n ∈ Si0 (D8.2)
Si0 =FDi (Si0) (D8.3)
Si0 =DC
i
(Si0) (D8.4)
• D8.1 – an institution’s initial set of inertial fluents is included in the institution’s
initial state.
• D8.2 – if the institution governs a lower level institution then it contains any norma-
tive fluents holding in that lower level institution’s initial state.
• D8.3 – the initial state is closed under the fluent dependency operation, such that all
derived fluents are included.
• D8.4 – the initial state is closed under deontological counts–as such that all abstracted
normative fluents are included.
Now we define which fluents are initiated and terminated from one state to the next
in response to a generated set of events (i.e. by the event generation operation). The set
of fluents that are initiated (INITi ) and terminated (TERMi ) from one state to the next are
formally defined as and subsequently described:
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Definition 9. Fluent Initiation and Termination The sets of all initiated and terminated
fluents for I i are respectively defined with the functions INITi :Σi×2E i → 2F i and TERMi :
Σi ×2E i → 2F i :
INITi (Si ,E i )= { f | ∃e ∈ E i ,∃X ∈X i : f ∈ C i↑(X ,e)∧Si |= X } (D9.1.1)
TERMi (Si ,E i )= { f | ∃e ∈ E i ,X ∈X i :Si |= f ∧ f ∈ C i↓(X i ,e)∧Si |= X or
(D9.2.1)
Si |= f ∧ (viol( f ) ∈ E i ∨disch( f ) ∈ E i )} (D9.2.2)
Condition D9.1.1 specifies the set of initiated inertial fluents according to the institu-
tion’s consequence function. An inertial fluent is initiated by the state consequence func-
tion conditional on an event occurring and a social context holding in the state. Conversely,
D9.2.1 specifies the set of terminated inertial fluents includes any inertial fluents terminated
according to the institution’s consequence function. Condition D9.2.2 states any discharged
or violated inertial (concrete) normative fluents are also terminated, meaning discharged/vi-
olated normative fluents do not persist by default2.
A state transition operation (TRi (Si ,E i )) produces a new institutional state based on the
previous state (Si ) due to the occurrence of events (E i ). The new state includes any inertial
fluents that held in the previous state and have not been terminated, any newly initiated
fluents, normative fluents holding, and the state’s closure under the fluent derivation and
deontological counts–as operations. It is formally defined as and subsequently described:
Definition 10. State Transitions The state transition operation TRi : Σi ×2E i → Σi is de-
fined for each institution I i , a state Si and a set of events E i w.r.t. the states of other insti-
tutions 〈S1j , ...,Snj 〉 holding at the same time and ML= 〈T ,R〉, such that TRi (E iSi )= S′ iff
S′ minimally (w.r.t. set inclusion) satisfies all of the following conditions:
∀ f ∈ (Si ∩F iinert)\TERMi (Si ,E i )⇒ f ∈ S′ (D10.1)
∀ f ∈ INITi (Si ,E i )⇒ f ∈ S′ (D10.2)
∃〈h, i 〉 ∈R,n ∈ (Fhcnorm∪Fhanorm)∩F ininert : n ∈ Shj ⇒ n ∈ S′ (D10.3)
S′ =FDi (S′) (D10.4)
S′ =DCi (S′) (D10.5)
• D10.1 – non–terminated inertial fluents persist from one state to the next, following
the common sense law of inertia.
• D10.2 initiated fluents hold in the next state.
2Meaning, if you discharge or violate an obligation you are no longer obliged and likewise for prohibitions. In
some cases, it can make sense for a discharged/violated normative fluent to persist. For example, if you violate
a prohibition on murder, it is still usually the case that you are still prohibited from committing murder. For an
extensive discussion on when it does and does not make sense for obligations and prohibitions to persist after
discharge/violation see [98].
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• D10.3 a higher level institution’s state contains all normative fluents that hold in the
same state of a lower level institution the higher level governs.
• D10.4 the newly transitioned to state includes all normative fluents that can be derived
according to the fluent derivation operation.
• D10.5 the newly transitioned state contains all normative fluent abstractions accord-
ing to deontological counts–as.
We now proceed to event traces. The trace a model defined in response to is a sequence
of observable events recognised by the institutions involved in a multi–level governance
relationship. That is, it is a trace of only those events that can affect the institutions involved,
driving their evolution and the multi–level governance institution’s evolution as a whole.
Each event in a trace needs to be recognised by at least one institution to drive its evolution
over time. We call such a trace, a composite event trace, formally:
Definition 11. Composite Event Trace Let ML = 〈T ,B〉 be a multi–level governance
institution where T = 〈I1, ...,In〉. ctr = 〈e0, ...,ek〉 is a composite trace for ML iff ∀ j ∈
[0,k],∃i ∈ [n] : e j ∈ E iobs
Synchronisation issues can arise between institutions. These issues occur if a composite
trace includes an event recognised by one institution, therefore driving its state forward, but
not recognised by another meaning its state does not evolve. If an event in a composite
trace is not recognised by an institution, then the institution should still transition to a new
state to ensure it is evolving at the same rate as other institutions. We replace unrecognised
events by the event of no change, the null event, in a synchronised trace for each institution
derived from a composite trace. Formally:
Definition 12. Synchronised Trace Let I be an institution, and ctr = 〈e0, ...,ek〉 be a
composite event trace. A trace str = 〈se0, ...,sek〉 is a synchronised trace of ctr for I iff
∀i ∈ [0,k] : if ek ∈ Eobs, sek = ek and sek = enull otherwise.
We now define a multi–level governance institution model. A model comprises se-
quences of states (S) and events (E). One state sequence for each individual institution (Si )
and one sequence of event sets for each individual institution (E i ) driving its state tran-
sitions. A model is defined in response to a composite trace such that the corresponding
synchronised trace for each institution drives its evolution over time, causing events to occur
and driving state transitions forward. Each state and set of transitioning events is defined
for each institution assuming the states and set of transitioning events exist for every other
institution. Formally:
Definition 13. Multi–level Governance Institution Model Let M = 〈M1, ...,Mn〉 be a tuple
of state and event sequence pairs for each institution I i with typical element M i = 〈Si ,E i 〉
where Si = 〈Si0, ...,Sik+1〉 and E i = 〈E i0, ...,E ik〉. Let ctr be a composite trace for ML =
〈T ,R〉 and stri = 〈sei0, ...,seik〉 be a synchronised trace of ctr for each institution I i . Let
∀i ∈ [1,n],∀ j ∈ [0,k] :GRi (Sij ,E ij ) be the event generation operation for I i w.r.t. 〈S1j , ...,Snj 〉
and 〈E1j , ...,Enj 〉. Let ∀i ∈ [1,n],∀ j ∈ [0,k] : TRi (Sij ,E ij ) be the state transition operation for
76 3. FORMALISING COMPLIANCE IN MULTI–LEVEL GOVERNANCE
each institution I i w.r.t. 〈S1j , ...,Snj 〉. The tuple M is a model ofML w.r.t. ctr if and only if:
∀i ∈ [1,n] : Si0 is the initial state of each institution I i w.r.t. 〈S10, ...,Sn0 〉 (D13.1)
∀i ∈ [1,n],∀ j ∈ [0,k] : E ij =GRi (Sij , {seij }) (D13.2)
∀i ∈ [1,n],∀ j ∈ [0,k] : Sij+1 = TRi (Sij ,E ij ) (D13.3)
• D13.1 – the initial state of each individual institution, which is defined with respect to
the initial state of every other institution (meaning a higher–level institution includes
normative fluents from a lower–level institution).
• D13.2 – each institution’s set of events transitioning to a new state comprises all
events generated from the corresponding event in the synchronised trace and the pre-
vious state according to the event generation operation. The event generation opera-
tion is also defined with respect to the states and events from every other institution,
such that norm compliance events are ‘passed up’ between governance levels.
• D13.3 – the next state transitioned from the previous state by the set of transition-
ing events. The state transition operation is also defined with respect to the states
and events from every other institution, such that normative fluents are ‘passed up’
between governance levels.
This concludes multi–level governance institution semantics.
COMPLIANCE MONITORING
A multi–level governance institution model monitors the compliance of other institutions’
regulations and their outcomes. A model determines if the concrete regulatory effects of one
institution are non–compliant with the more abstract regulations of a higher level institution
in a particular context. This is by ‘passing up’ any concrete normative fluents from a lower
level institution to the higher level institution which governs it. Then, abstracting those
concrete normative fluents in the higher level institution according to the higher level insti-
tution’s abstracting constitutive rules (i.e. under the semantics of deontological counts–as).
Then, taking the more abstract interpretation of the lower levels’ concrete normative fluents,
generating any discharge and violation events of the higher level institution’s higher–order
norms that oblige/prohibit the abstracted lower level institution’s concrete norms. All that
is needed to determine if there is non–compliance is to collect a set of violation events from
the multi–level governance model for each institution. Formally, the set of sets of violation
events for each individual institution denoting non–compliance is:
Definition 14. Multi–level Governance Violations LetML= 〈T ,R〉 be a multi–level gov-
ernance institution and M = 〈M1, ...,Mn〉 a model of ML w.r.t. a composite trace ctr such
that ∀i ∈ [n] :M i = 〈Si ,E i 〉,Si = 〈Si0, ...,Sik+1〉,E i = 〈E i0, ...,E ik〉. The tuple V = 〈V1, ...,Vn〉 is
the set of multi–level governance violations for ML w.r.t. ctr if and only if:
∀i ∈ [1,n] :Vi = {e | ∃ f , j : f ∈F icnorm∪F ianorm, j ∈ [k]∧viol( f ) ∈ E ij ∧e = viol( f )}
(D14.1)
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Non–compliance is found if the set of violation events is not the empty set. For an
institution governing a society this implies the society is non–compliant (either in reality if
compliance checking is performed before run–time or hypothetically if not). For a higher
level institution governing a lower level institution non–compliance denotes the regulatory
effects are non–compliant if the violated norms belong to the higher level institution. Such
non–compliant regulatory effects can be due to having a more abstract, non–compliant,
meaning.
3.5. RELATED WORK
In this chapter we presented a formal framework for reasoning about multi–level gover-
nance. Specifically, determining compliance where higher–level institutions which impose
abstract regulations governing lower–level institutions which impose concrete regulations.
The purpose of this chapter is to contribute a rigorous formalisation, with particular at-
tention paid to the philosophical aspects. Closely related works contribute formalisms for
reasoning about hierarchical governance and abstract regulations.
3.5.1. HIERARCHICAL GOVERNANCE
There appears to be little on hierarchical governance and the regulation of regulations. In
[159] Lopez and Luck propose a framework for reasoning about norms governing agents,
created from a top–down governance perspective. Their framework, based on the Z speci-
fication language, gives a precise specification language of a normative system/institution
rather than like ours a specification language and operationalisation (semantics). Like our
framework, theirs offers similar expressivity with temporal norms, rewards, punishments,
etcetera. In particular Lopez and Luck formalize what they call legislative norms which
are special norms filling the role of, viewing norms as being dynamic and subject to cre-
ation, deletion and modification, governing the act of norm changes. This still presents
a substantial difference to the method of hierarchical governance and regulation govern-
ing regulations we propose, since we use higher–order norms that govern the outcome of
other norms from which (non–)compliance is determined (typically pre–runtime). Lopez
and Luck’s legislative norms on the other hand govern the changes to the norms (rules)
themselves.
Boella and van der Torre [26] offer a conceptual formalisation of hierarchical norma-
tive systems in Input/Output Logic (a logic aimed at studying conditional norms [165]).
Like our formalisation, they formalise governance hierarchies, but their formalised con-
cepts have nuanced differences with ours. One of their foci is the role of permissions in
hierarchical normative systems. They look at permissions from two perspectives: firstly
permissions in static normative systems where authorities do not change norms, secondly
permissions in dynamic normative systems where authorities are liable to change norms. In
the first case of static normative systems, permissions are issued by higher authorities (e.g.
existing in higher level institutions) and act to derogate (except) obligations to the contrary
(prohibitions) issued by lower level authorities. Conversely, a higher-level authority issu-
ing an obligation is essentially preventing a lower-level authority from issuing a permission
that derogates the obligation. In the second case of dynamic normative systems, permis-
sions issued by higher-level authorities act to enable lower-level authorities to change the
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normative system in some way, such as permitting a norm to be implemented. The same
goes for obligations and prohibitions, a higher-level authority may prohibit a lower-level
from implementing a permission that derogates other norms. In contrast, we do not look
at derogation, similar concepts would require a kind of defeasibility, which as discussed in
the relation to defeasible logic is left for future work. In terms of norms that enable/disable
changes to a dynamic normative system, we do not look at dynamics of norms in this chap-
ter, but later in Chapter 6 we formalise counts-as conditionals that regulate norm change in
a temporal setting.
Subsequent work by Boella and van der Torre [29] formalises higher-order norms in the
context of security policies. A security governance hierarchy involves global policy makers
obliging/permitting/prohibiting local policy makers to/from obliging/permitting/prohibiting
individual agents to/from sharing information and knowledge. In the formalisation agents
impose norms by ascribing violations to the actions of other named agents. For example,
if agent A prohibits agent B from doing x then agent A ascribes, according to an internal
rule, a violation on B for doing x. Hence, the general approach is to adopt Anderson’s
[9] reduction of deontic logic to alethic modal logic, where the modalities are replaced by
rules with violation as the necessary consequent of prohibited actions/states of affairs. In
order to impose higher-order norms, agents ascribe nested violations. So for example agent
C prohibiting agent A from prohibiting B to do x, is reduced to an ascription by agent C
to the action of agent A ascribing a violation to B doing x (a violation violates a norm).
The formalisation is in contrast to ours. A higher-order norm according to Boella and van
der Torre’s reduction to ascribed violations, is violated only when the norm it prescribes
is violated. Consequently, if there are no violations of first-order norms then there are no
violations of higher-order norms, owing to one focus being on the enforcement of norms
which requires violations being ascribed to agents. In contrast, higher-order norms in our
formalisation are discharged/violated by the mere imposition of obligations and prohibi-
tions by lower-level institutions, although we show examples where violations themselves
are obliged/prohibited, moreover we specifically address the different level of abstractions
norms operate at.
Aside from these different approaches and foci, Boella and van der Torre’s formalisa-
tion in [29] provides an argument for von Wright’s “transmission of will” principle requir-
ing norms of all orders are enforced. As we discussed briefly in the background section
(specifically 2.2.3), it is shown in formalised scenarios that von Wright’s ‘transmission of
will’ [236] does not merely involve an obligation to oblige being fulfilled, but also the
lower-order obligation being enforced. Moreover, higher-order norms should be enforced,
or else lower authority agents acting in their own self interests may (not) impose certain
norms that contravene higher-order norms. Central to demonstrating these two enforce-
ment requirements is the use of violations being ascribed to agents’ actions (including the
action of ascribing violations). In our formalisation, it is grammatical for higher-order
norms to be enforced but in our context of institutions governing institutions higher-order
norm enforcement is meaningless. That is, in our formalisation violation occurs as a part
of a pre-runtime check (e.g. to check whether national legislation implements an EU direc-
tive before a particular deadline) and hence it makes no sense to enforce higher-order norms
when violations occur. Rather we assume rewards/punishments for (non-)compliant institu-
tion designs are imposed by some kind of external process or logic after a pre-runtime check
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has determined (non-)compliance of the institution design as a whole. In comparison, since
Boella and van der Torre are dealing with agents imposing norms on other agents, enforce-
ment of higher-order norms is meaningful. As for transmission of will requiring obliged
lower-order norms to be enforced, we do not have a general formalisation of this require-
ment. However, we do formalise a specific component the EU Data Retention Directive,
which that when obliged obligations are violated then it is obliged there is an obligation for
an offender to be punished. In summary, our work agrees with Boella and van der Torre’s
that both higher and lower-order norms should be enforced, but in the former case we as-
sume an external process handles enforcement and in the latter case we formalise specific
scenarios but provide no generalised reasoning for the transmission of will.
3.5.2. ABSTRACTING NORMS
As we discussed in the background section, there has already been a reduction of Standard
Deontic Logic [234] to a logic of counts–as conditionals representing evaluative norms [9]
(as studied in [106, 112]). For example, ‘B counts–as a violation in a context C’. Following
this idea, Aldewereld et al. [4] propose implemented reasoning for concretising abstract
norms. This is by representing abstract norms as counts–as statements such as ‘B counts–
as a violation in a context C’ and so B is forbidden in C. Then, making use of the fact that
more concrete concepts count–as more abstract concepts (e.g. ‘A counts–as B in context
C’). Finally, applying transitivity to concretise abstract norms (e.g. ‘A counts–as a viola-
tion in context C’, since A counts–as B and B counts–as a violation). Alderwereld et al.
provide a computational approach to the normative reasoning with a rule–based computa-
tional language. The same warning against this approach for multi–level governance that
we make in the background, applies to what differentiates it from our work. Specifically, by
ignoring deontic modalities it is difficult to describe and reason about higher–order norms.
Although concretisation of norms is possible, higher–order normative reasoning (regulation
governing regulations) is not and neither is the abstraction of higher–order norms.
A description–logic based mechanism for reasoning about abstract institutional con-
cepts is also proposed by Grossi et al. [108]. Unlike in our work, Grossi et al. do not
propose abstraction of norms themselves (in fact, they propose concretising concepts),
since normative reasoning is not a part of their proposal. Rather, they offer guidance on
how normative reasoning can be incorporated, either by the reduction of norms to counts–
as, which like us they acknowledge does not support nesting of deontic modalities and
therefore higher–order norms. They also offer an alternative path to normative reasoning.
Namely, assigning different descriptive concepts a ‘role’ of ideal thereby designating their
normativity together with axioms for normative reasoning. The idea being, norms can then
be nested and normative statements concretised. However, this part of the proposal is not
formalised. Furthermore, our work still differs in that we are interested in abstracting rather
than concretising norms in a temporal setting.
In comparison a series of papers by Fornara and Colombetti [79], Fornara [77] and
Fornara, Okouya and Colombetti [80] combine the semantic–web focussed description
logic OWL2DL with normative reasoning. In their proposal obligations are about events
with a time–indexed deadline. Time is not integrated within the underlying logic, rather it
is reasoned using an external process which adds facts to the knowledge–base (e.g. that an
action has occurred, time has passed, etc.). Like our proposal and many others, the dead-
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line of an obligation occurring before the aim triggers violations and potentially causes
punishing obligations to be imposed. In comparison to the work of Grossi et al. they do ex-
plicitly look at representing and reasoning about norms in description logic but do not aim
to reason about the relationship between concrete and abstract concepts or the concretisa-
tion/abstraction of norms. The same differences apply when compared to our own work
with the additional difference that we do not restrict norms to being about events. Rather,
in our proposal normative fluents can be higher–order and about events or other fluents.
Criado et al. [49] look at agent reasoning for fulfilling agent desires about abstract
institutional concepts. Such desires may come about due to the presence of regulative
norms (e.g. an obligation to be married), but their focus is on the concretisation of these
abstract institutional concepts (e.g. if an agent wants to get married, what are the brute
facts that need to be realised?). In relation to our work, Criado et al. also view counts–as,
as providing interpretive primitives in which abstract institutional concepts can be reasoned
about. However, they do not explicitly look at how to transform abstract norms into concrete
ones, or as we do concrete (higher–order) norms into abstract ones to check compliance.
Rather, their focus is on the interpretation of the abstract concepts in order to fulfil agents’
desires.
To summarise, work proposing ways to reason about abstract and concrete norms or
using techniques that can be extended to do so is quite different from our own. Whilst
some work does look at the concretisation of abstract norms, there is apparently no work
that looks at the abstraction of concrete, potentially higher–order, norms. Furthermore,
the aforementioned work that explicitly looks at concretisation is not in a temporal setting.
Rather, our proposal focuses on the temporal aspects where as the institutional context
evolves so does the abstract meaning of concrete norms and thus their compliance with
abstract norms at higher governance levels.
3.6. DISCUSSION
In this chapter, we answered the question “How can we formalise compliance in multi–
level governance?” with a formal framework. The general answer being that a lower–level
institution is compliant in multi–level governance when the effects of its regulations (obli-
gations and prohibitions) are compliant with higher–order regulations at higher–levels of
governance. In particular, taking into account the fact that lower–level institutions operate
at a different levels of abstraction to higher–levels. Accommodating for this fact, compli-
ance is determined based on the abstract meaning of concrete regulations. We adopted the
usual notion of counts–as between concrete and abstract institutional concepts. Based on
the counts–as ontological primitive we semantically defined the abstraction of norms, first
and higher–order, with the notion of deontological counts–as. Under the semantics, con-
crete regulations from lower–level institutions are abstracted to the same level of abstrac-
tion in higher–level institutions. In their abstract form, the effects of concrete regulations
(obligations and prohibitions) are determined for compliance with abstract regulations in
higher–level institutions. It is important to note that the abstract meaning of concrete regu-
lations is context–sensitive. Therefore, whether concrete regulations are compliant depends
on the contexts they are applied in. To summarise, institutions are compliant in multi–level
governance if in different social contexts the abstract meaning of their concrete regulations
is compliant with abstract higher–order norms at higher–levels of governance.
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The strength of the semantics is in formalising the abstraction of concrete norm effects
(obligations and prohibitions), potentially abstracting higher–order concrete norm effects.
By paying particular attention to the norm abstraction semantics, with lengthy discussion
and the application to our case study, we argued the semantics correctly abstract concrete
normative fluents. However, in general the semantics proposed in this section are not with-
out their weaknesses. In particular, as we discussed multiple times, many of the operations
are undefined for cases where an inconsistent institution design causes contradiction. Ar-
guably, the fault is with the institution design and not the semantics. On the other hand,
inconsistent information is a fact of life. In this chapter, we do not propose an inconsis-
tency tolerant semantics. But, it is important for future work to address this weakness.
Particular attention should be paid to resolving inconsistencies arising under the novel se-
mantics provided by deontic abstraction (whereas current work in the literature deals with
inconsistency occurring according to a semantics where abstraction is not modelled).
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Science is knowledge which we understand so well that we can teach it to a computer; and
if we don’t fully understand something, it is an art to deal with it.
Donald Knuth
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This chapter makes the following contributions:
• A computational framework for representing institutions in multi–level governance
and automatically detecting compliance in multi–level governance.
The previous chapter gave a formal definition for when institutions are compliant in
multi–level governance. Special attention was paid to the increasing abstraction of regula-
tions at higher–levels of governance that govern the relatively concrete regulations of lower–
levels of governance. Hence, one objective of this dissertation was achieved. Namely, to
formalise the informal notions of compliance in multi–level governance.
In this chapter the focus moves from formalising compliance to automated compliance
checking with a computational framework that corresponds to the formal framework. The
approach we take is to represent institutions and their semantics as Answer–Set Program-
ming (ASP) programs. By using ASP we can produce models of a multi–level governance
institution for a trace of events. Thus we can automatically determine compliance by in-
specting the generated models for non–compliant lower–level institutions. This follows the
approach of InstAL [42, 43], which provides a representation in Answer–Set Programming
for individual institutions governing MAS. However, we need to provide a novel represen-
tation for institutions governing other institutions in multi–level governance institutions.
Thus, we need to provide a corresponding Answer–Set Program for reasoning about ab-
stract norms governing more concrete norms.
To this end, this chapter contributes the following novel elements for practical reasoning
about compliance in multi–level governance:
• Regulations governing regulations computational reasoning. By taking a formal rep-
resentation of multi–level governance institutions and producing, through a transfor-
mation, a set of answer–set programming rules. These rules capture norms governing
norms’ representation and reasoning. The previous chapter contributed a representa-
tion and semantics for norms governing norms. This chapter contributes the imple-
mentation, such that in our computational framework when a norm at a higher–level
of governance is violated this indicates that the regulatory effects (imposed obliga-
tions and prohibitions) of lower–levels are non–compliant.
• Norm abstraction reasoning. By taking a formal representation of multi–level gov-
ernance institutions and producing through a transformation a set of answer–set pro-
gramming rules. These rules capture the semantics for abstracting concrete norms
based on whether the concrete prescribed concepts count–as more abstract concepts.
• A computational framework based on answer–set programming, including the two
aforementioned representations, which corresponds to the formal framework. That
is, firstly an answer–set program such that for every answer–set program it produces
there is an equivalent model in the formal framework for the same multi–level gover-
nance institution (soundness). Secondly, an answer–set program such that for every
model in the formal framework there is an equivalent answer–set produced by the
answer–set program for the same multi–level governance institution (completeness).
In addition to these contributions, the following application is contributed:
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• An implementation of the aforementioned transformations as a parser and compiler,
extending the InstAL implementation. The implementation provides a high–level
representation language for representing multi–level governance institutions and out-
puts an answer–set programming for checking compliance in those institutions. In
this chapter the contributions are applied to an extensive formalisation of EU law for
assessing compliance in our running case study.
In the rest of this chapter we begin by introducing Answer–Set Programming (ASP) in
4.1. We describe the overall approach we take to representing multi–level governance in-
stitutions in answer–set programming in 4.2. We give the representation in ASP in 4.3. We
demonstrate the proposed computational framework we have implemented as a compiler
which takes a high–level description of a multi–level governance institution. The output
is an ASP program that operationalises a multi–level governance institution. We give an
overview of the implementation and results of executing the resulting ASP program for our
running case study in 4.4. To show that the computational framework provides a practical
implementation of the formal framework we provide soundness and completeness proper-
ties between the two frameworks in section 4.5. The properties are proven in appendices.
We finish with conclusions in section 4.7.
4.1. PRELIMINARIES – ANSWER SET PROGRAMMING
Answer–Set Programming is a non–monotonic logic–programming language [17, 93], for
declaring problems according to the syntax of AnsProlog as a set of first–order rules.
AnsProlog is fully declarative in the sense that the ordering of logical formulae (horn
clauses) makes no semantic difference. Executing an AnsProlog program solves the de-
clared problems by first running a grounder which grounds all rules, replacing variables
with ground terms, and then running a solver against the ground program. A solver com-
putes the set of answer–sets, where each answer–set is a model of the AnsProlog program
and a solution to the problem declared. Answer–sets are computed according to the stable–
model semantics [93].
We use AnsProlog for two main reasons. Firstly, it provides a natural representation of
individual and multi–level governance institutions, where institutions’ functions are repre-
sented as AnsProlog rules. Secondly, it supports meeting the goal of our framework: au-
tomatically checking different contexts, or traces of exogenous events, for whether lower–
level institutions are non–compliant. Using AnsProlog, a single trace of events can be sup-
plied to check for compliance, but we can also specify a partial trace and that all variants
of that trace must be used to check compliance or even all possible traces up to a specific
length must be checked for compliance. It is also possible to declare that each answer–set
produced must have a particular property, such as ‘there must be at least one violation of a
norm in a higher level institution’. In this case the property implies that if no answer–sets
are produced then there is full compliance for all traces up to a certain length. In summary,
Answer–Set Programming provides a natural representation of multi–level governance in-
stitutions and an easy way to perform a contextual search for compliance.
There are many answer–set solvers available (e.g. [67, 91]). We briefly reintroduce the
main definitions to give context for what follows, focussing on the syntax of the CLINGO
[91] grounder and solver making use of a number of its unique constructs. In more detail, an
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AnsProlog program is built from atoms and predicates. Predicates can be ground, such as
lays_eggs(slinky) or non–ground predicates containing variables representing the
ground instance schemas, such as bird(X). Atoms and predicates can be weakly negated,
such as not. 1 A rule r is typically of the form p_0 :- p_1, ..., p_n comprising
a head atom denoted H(r ) and a set of body literals denoted B(r ), which can be delineated
into the positive body atoms B+(r ) and atoms appearing negated in the body B−−(r ). A rule
r can also be a fact by having an empty body such that B(r ) = ; containing only a single
head atom such as lays_eggs(slinky). To give an example adapted from [17], the
following program declares that a bird is an animal that lays eggs which is not a reptile, a
reptile is an animal that lays eggs that is not a bird and slinky is an animal that lays eggs:
bird(X) :- lays_eggs(X), not reptile(X).
reptile(X) :- lays_eggs(X), not bird(X).
lays_eggs(slinky).
A (total) interpretation of an answer–set program is a truth–assignment to literals, com-
prising a set of the atoms assigned the value of ‘true’. An answer–set is a minimal interpre-
tation containing all atoms that are justified in being true. Precisely, for a rule r , the head
atom denoted H(r ) is justified in being true if all positive body atoms, denoted B+(r ), are
true, and none of the weakly negated body atoms, denoted B−−, are true. This implies facts
are always justified in being true (e.g. lay_eggs(slinky)). Looking at the previous
example there can be more than one answer–set. If bird(slinky) is in an interpretation
then reptile(slinky) cannot be in the interpretation for it to be an answer–set, and
vice versa. These answer–sets are:
• { bird(slinky), lays_eggs(slinky) }
• { reptile(slinky), lays_eggs(slinky) }
Determining if an interpretation is an answer–set requires knowing which atoms are
justified according to the program’s rules. In the presence of weak negation this means
we should only consider the rules that do not contain weakly negated atoms that are in
the answer–set. Furthermore, for those rules that remain we do not need to consider their
weakly negated literals to determine if the head is justified. Removing all rules in a program
with weakly negated literals that are in an interpretation and all weakly negated literals from
the remaining rules is called the reduct of the program, formally from [92]:
Definition 15. Reduct Let Π be an Answer–Set Program and X an interpretation of Π, the
reduct denoted ΠX is the set:
{H(r )←B+(r ) | r ∈Π and B−−(r )∩X =;}
We want to determine for a reduct and a set of atoms, whether that set of atoms is closed
under the program (containing all justified atoms) and whether it is minimal (containing no
atoms that are not justified). To give an example, if we have a reduct
Π= { lays_eggs(slinky). bird(slinky) :- lays_eggs(slinky). },
1we ignore the case of strong negation since it is unnecessary in our use of AnsProlog.
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then the set {lays_eggs(slinky), bird(slinky), some_atom} is closed since
lays_eggs(slinky) and bird(slinky) are justified but it is not minimal due to the
presence of some_atom. Formally adapted from [92]:
Definition 16. Let Π be a reduct and X a set of atoms. The set of atoms X is closed under
ΠX if for all r ∈ ΠX , we have H(r ) ∈ X iff B+(r ) ⊆ X . The smallest set of atoms closed
under ΠX is denoted Cn(ΠX ).
An answer–set is simply a minimal interpretation of a reduct of the program for the
interpretation:
Definition 17. Answer–Set Let Π be an Answer–Set Program and X be an interpretation
of Π and ΠX be the reduct of Π w.r.t. X . X is an answer–set of Π iff X =Cn(ΠX ).
In addition to the Answer–Set Programming semantics given above we use three con-
cise ways to represent useful constructs present in CLINGO [91]. Namely, constraints,
choice rules and conditional literals. Constraints are a special type of rule of the form
:−b1, ...,bn. representing a rule with falsity in the head such that if all of b1 to bn are true
in an interpretation then there is a contradiction and therefore the interpretation is not an
answer–set. Choice rules are of the form {a1, ...,an} :−b1, ...,bn., meaning that any atom in
a1, ...,an can arbitrarily be picked for inclusion in an answer–set if b1, ...,bn. is true. Aggre-
gates are present in the body of rules and are of the form l{b1; ...;bn}u where l and u are
positive integers meaning that at least l and at most u elements of b1, ...,bn must be true
for the aggregate to be true. Omitting l or u removes the respective constraint. Finally,
conditional literals can be contained in the body of a rule and are of the form b1 : b2, ...,bn.
They follow the semantics of material implication; conditional literals are true if the head
is true or the body is false. Note that there are no conditional literals in a strict sense, how-
ever an aggregate of the form l{b1 : b2, ...,bn}u means that b1 is counted as being true when
restricted to the domain of b2, ...,bn. Without variables this simply means that b1 is counted
as true when b2, ...,bn is true and hence operates similarly to conditional literals.
4.2. APPROACH
In this section we describe the overall approach we take to reasoning about multi–level gov-
ernance institutions using answer–set programming. The general idea is to take a formal
representation of a multi–level governance institutions. Then, to produce a corresponding
representation of that formal description as a set of answer–set programming rules. More-
over, to also provide a corresponding set of answer–set programming rules which capture
multi–level governance institution’s formal semantics.
The ASP representation for multi–level governance institutions comprises facts repre-
senting the signature of each institution’s formal representation (events and fluents) and
their initial states. Furthermore, the ASP representation comprises rules, which represent
each individual institution’s rules described by their functions (event generation, conse-
quence and fluent derivation).
Each ASP rule, representing an institution rule, comprises an antecedent and a conse-
quent. The antecedent corresponds to the parameters the functions take. For the event gen-
eration and state consequence functions, the corresponding ASP rules’ antecedents com-
prise the occurrence of events and the state conditions. For the fluent derivation function,
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expressing constitutive rules of the form “fluent A derives (counts–as) fluent B in context
C” the corresponding ASP rules’ antecedents comprise conditions on the state modelling
the fluent A and the context C. The consequence of a rule corresponds to the effect of the
function’s returned value on a multi–level governance institution model. This is an event
caused to occur according to G, the initiation and termination of fluents according to C, and
non–inertial fluents holding in a state according to a fluent derivation function D.
Multi–level governance institution semantics is represented in ASP as more general
rules. For example, stating that if an inertial fluent is initiated then it holds until it is termi-
nated. Finally, composite traces are mapped to a corresponding ASP representation as sets
of facts, each stating that an event has been observed at a particular point in time.
The mapping to an ASP program makes use of the same common predicates used pre-
viously in work extending InstAL to settings with multiple institutions [154–156]. In turn
these bear similarities to constructs used in the Event Calculus [150]. To give context for
what follows, the predicates are summarised in their non–ground form:
• holdsat(F,In,I) denotes that the fluent F holds in the institution In at time I.
• observed(E,In,I) denotes that the event E is observed by the institution In at time
I corresponding to the exogenous event that has occurred in the synchronised trace
for the institution.
• occurred(E,In,I) denotes that the event E occurs in the institution In at time I.
• initiated(F,In,I) denotes that the fluent F is initiated in the institution In at time
I.
• terminated(F,In,I) denotes that the fluent F is terminated in the institution In at
time I.
• instant(I) denotes I is a time instant.
• start(I) denotes I is the first time instant.
• final(I) denotes I is the last time instant.
• next(I,J) denotes J is a time instant that is strictly after I such that there is no time
instant between I and J.
The aforementioned predicates are used in both antecedents and consequents of rules.
Such as, stating conditional on particular fluents (not) holding in a state and an event oc-
curring, then an event occurs. This means events in function parameters correspond to
occurred/3 whilst state conditions correspond to sets containing positive and negative
holdsat/3 predicates. An empty state condition (the empty set) is always true and re-
placed with the special atom #true.
In more detail, the translation for representing a multi–level governance institution,
comprising a set of ASP rules, is split into two parts containing the translation of the in-
dividual institutions and the translation of the links between them. For example in the
Charter of Fundamental Rights, cfr, exConsent is an exogenous event, consent is an
institutional event and consentedDataProcessing(ada,isp) is an inertial fluent:
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1 evtype(exConsent,cfr,ex).
2 evtype(consent,cfr,in).
3 ifluent(consentedDataProcessing(ada,isp),cfr).
An event generation function is translated to rules. Each rule contains an occurred/3
atom in the head representing the event that is caused to occur. Each rule’s body com-
prises an occurred/3 atom representing the causal event, and positive and negative
holdsat/3 atoms representing the rule’s condition on the state. For example, the fol-
lowing rule states that non–consensual data processing occurs if Ada’s personal data has
been stored, but she has not consented and non–consensual data processing is empowered
to occur:
1 occurred(nonConsensualDataProcessing(ada),cfr,I) :-
2 occurred(storeData(isp,ada,personal),cfr,I),
3 holdsat(pow(cfr,nonConsensualDataProcessing(ada)),cfr,I),
4 not holdsat(consentedDataProcessing(ada,isp),cfr,I), instant(I).
A consequence function is translated to ASP rules, using initiated/3 and
terminated/3 atoms in the head for the initiation and termination of fluents. Each fluent
initiation and termination rule’s body comprises an occurred/3 atom representing the
event causing a fluent to be initiated/terminated, and positive and negative holdsat/3
atoms representing the context in which the fluent initiation/termination is conditional on.
For example, in the Charter of Fundamental Rights institution the fluent stating that Ada
has consented to data processing is initiated if she consents. In the Data Retention Directive
institution the obligation to oblige metadata is stored is initiated (i.e. imposed) when Ada
uses electronic communications:
1 initiated(consentedDataProcessing(ada,isp),cfr,I) :-
2 occurred(consent(ada,isp),cfr,I), instant(I).
3 initiated(obl(obl(storeData(isp,ada,metadata),now),now),drd,I) :-
4 occurred(useElectronicCommunication(ada,isp),drd,I), instant(I).
The fluent derivation function is represented as ASP rules with holdsat/3 atoms in
the head and body. For example, in the cfr institution ‘unfair data processing’ is derived
from an obligation to process data non–consensually:
1 holdsat(obl(nonConsensualDataProcessing(ada),now),cfr,I) :-
2 holdsat(unfairdataprocessing(ada),cfr,I), instant(I).
The links between institutions are also represented as rules. Generally, a link from a
lower–level institution institution L to a higher–level institution H which governs L com-
prises rules with occurred and holdsat atoms in the head. The occurred rules state a norm
dischargement/violation event occurs in the institution H when it occurs in the institution L.
Likewise, a normative fluent holds in H when it holds in L. All of these rules are produced
such that only the dischargement/violation events occurring in L and consequently in H are
about normative fluents L imposes. Likewise, rules state only normative fluents hold in H
when they hold in L for those normative fluents that L itself imposes. Thus, if L receives
norm dischargement/violation events or normative fluents from another institution, these do
not get passed up to H from L.
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To give an example, the following rule states that when the prohibition on deleting data
before 12 months holds in the UK’s Data Retention Regulations, drr, then it also holds in
the EU’s Data Retention Directive for checking compliance.
1 holdsat(pro(deleteData(isp, ada, metadata),time(m12)),drd,I) :-
2 holdsat(pro(deleteData(isp, ada, metadata),time(m12)),drr,I),
3 instant(I).
Abstraction according to deontological counts–as is also represented as rules, where
the head is a holdsat atom representing the abstract normative fluent conditional on some
concrete normative fluents holding.
Finally, the semantics are represented as more general rules. For example, the following
rules state that an inertial fluent holds in a state if it is initiated or if it held in the previous
state and was not terminated (capturing the common–sense law of inertia):
1 holdsat(P,In,J) :- holdsat(P,In,I),
2 not terminated(P,In,I), next(I,J), ifluent(P, In).
3 holdsat(P,In,J) :- initiated(P,In,I), next(I,J), ifluent(P, In).
4.3. COMPUTATIONAL FRAMEWORK
In this section we detail the computational framework in full. We provide translations from
multi–level governance institution’s representation and semantics in the formal framework
to an ASP program. The transformation provides an ASP program which is sound and
complete with respect to the formal framework, that is, the transformation produces a cor-
responding ASP program. By executing the ASP program we can determine compliance
of lower–level institutions with higher–level institutions in a multi–level governance insti-
tution.
4.3.1. MULTI–LEVEL GOVERNANCE INSTITUTION ASP REPRESENTA-
TION
We begin with a convenient translation between a state condition as it appears in an event
generation or consequence function and its representation in ASP as a set of positive and
negative holdsat/3 atoms. That is, we translate a state condition Exp for an institution
I accordingly:
Definition 18. Expression Translation Let literals be denoted xi for i ∈N. The translation
of an expression Exp for an individual institution I with the label In is defined as:
EX(Exp, I)=

#true if Exp = ;
holdsat(p,In,I) if Exp = p
not holdsat(p,In,I) if Exp =¬p
EX(x0,I), ...,EX(xn ,I) if Exp ={x0, ...,xn}
Individual institutions are translated according to a set of rules for translating each indi-
vidual institution in a multi–level governance institution from their formal representation to
a corresponding ASP representation. Formally and subsequently described in more detail:
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Definition 19. Multi–level Governance Institution ASP Translation Let ML = 〈T ,R〉
be a multi–level governance institution s.t. T = 〈I1, ...,In〉. The program Πinsts is the
multi–level governance institutions program obtained for ML according to the following
translation: ∀i ∈ [1,n](I i = 〈E i ,F i ,C i ,G i ,Di ,∆i 〉) :
I i ⇔ inst(Ini ). (D19.1)
e ∈ E iobs ⇔ evtype(e,Ini ,ex). (D19.2)
e ∈ E iinst ⇔ evtype(e,Ini ,inst). (D19.3)
f ∈F iinert ⇔ ifluent(f,Ini ). (D19.4)
f ∈F ininert ⇔ nifluent(f,Ini ). (D19.5)
initiated(p,Ini ,I) :−
∃X ∈X i ,e ∈ E i ,p ∈ C i↑(X ,e) ⇔ occurred(e,Ini ,I ),
not holdsat(p,Ini ,I), (D19.6)
EX(X,I i ),instant(I).
terminated(p,Ini ,I) :−
∃X ∈X i ,e ∈ E i ,p ∈ C i↓(X ,e) ⇔ occurred(e,Ini ,I),EX(X,I i ), (D19.7)
holdsat( f ,Ini ,I),instant(I).
occurred(e ′,Ini ,I) :−
∃X ∈X i ,e ∈ E i ,e ′ ∈G i (X ,e) ⇔ occurred(e,Ini ,I), (D19.8)
holdsat(pow(e ′),Ini ,I),
EX(X,I i ),
instant(I).
∃X ∈X i , f ∈F i , f ′ ∈Di (X , f ) ⇔ holdsat( f ′,Ini ,I) :− (D19.9)
holdsat( f ,Ini ,I),EX(X,I i ),
instant(I).
f ∈∆i ⇔ holdsat( f ,Ini ,I):−start(I).
(D19.10)
∃〈h, i 〉 ∈R,n ∈ (Fhanorm∪Fhcnorm)∩F ininert ⇔ holdsat(n,Ini ,I) :− (D19.11)
holdsat(n,Inh ,I).
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∃〈h, i 〉 ∈R,e ∈ Ehnorm∩E inorm ⇔ occurred(e,Ini ,I) :− (D19.12)
occurred(e,Inh ,I).
∀ f , f ′ ∈Fcnorm∪Fanorm : f ≡ f ′ ⇔ holdsat(f,Ini ,I) :− (D19.13)
holdsat(f′,Ini ,I),
instant(I).
The translation is described as follows for an individual institution. The first translation
D19.1 ensures the unique label of the institution is a fact. Translations D19.2 to D19.5 add
facts corresponding to the signature of the institution for representing exogenous events,
institutional events, inertial fluents and non–inertial fluents. Translations D19.6 and D19.7
add ASP rules corresponding to the consequence function, ensuring fluents are initiated and
terminated if a condition on a state holds and an event occurs. Translation D19.8 adds rules
for producing events according to the event generation function conditional on a state and
another event occurring. Translation D19.9 adds rules for ensuring non–inertial fluents hold
if they hold according to the fluent derivation function. The initial set of inertial fluents is
added to the institution’s initial state with transformation D19.10. If the institution governs a
lower–level institution, then any normative fluents which hold in the lower–level institution
are ‘passed up’ (if they are non–inertial fluents in the higher–level institution) D19.11.
Likewise for norm dischargement and violation events D19.12. Finally, transformation
D19.13 ensures any normative fluent that is equivalent to another normative fluent that
holds in a state, also holds in that state. This concludes the transformations providing
specific rules for a multi–level governance institution describing when events occur and
fluents are initiated and terminated.
4.3.2. DEONTOLOGICAL COUNTS–AS ASP REPRESENTATION
The formal semantics for deontological counts–as, which abstracts concrete norms, is rep-
resented as a set of ASP rules for each individual institution. The formal semantics for
deontological counts–as is a general function defined for any state describing which rela-
tively concrete normative fluents if they hold cause another, more abstract normative fluent
to hold. This is based on concepts the concrete fluents prescribe count–as more abstract
concepts in a particular state. This is according to the event generation function, fluent
derivation function, and counts–as between normative fluents according to deontological
counts–as itself. The semantics for deontological counts–as are defined in a general way
based on whether concrete concepts could cause a more abstract concept to occur/hold in
a state. This general definition is based on inspecting the input and output of the functions
representing counts–as rules. In other words, the formal semantics are defined by inspect-
ing the left and right hand side of “A counts–as B in a context C” rules for whether the
context C holds in a state and therefore deducing whether A could cause B to occur/hold.
4.3. COMPUTATIONAL FRAMEWORK 93
However, such a general definition is not possible in ASP. This is because counts–as
rules are represented as ASP rules. It is not possible to inspect the left and right hand–side
of ASP rules and determine whether, for a counts–as rule “A counts–as B in a context C”,
if A could cause B. We address the problem of having no foreseeable way to represent the
formal deontological counts–as semantics as general ASP rules. That is by translating from
individual institutions’ formal representation to specific rules that provide the same effects
as deontological counts–as in a flattened form.
Each of these specific rules for deontological counts–as causes a specific abstract nor-
mative fluent to hold in the head. They are conditional on specific concrete normative
fluents holding in the body depending on the context. Deontological counts–as is context–
sensitive, an obligation to store personal data counts–as an obligation to process data non–
consensually only if a user has not consented. This means it is only necessary for certain
concrete normative fluents to hold in specific contexts for abstraction to take place, oblig-
ing personal data is only abstracted if a user has not consented. In different contexts the
concrete normative fluents required for abstraction to take place are potentially different or
no abstraction takes place. If a user has consented then an obligation to store personal data
is not abstracted to non–consensual data processing. So, the body states in which contexts
the concrete normative fluents necessarily hold for abstraction to take place and that at least
one concrete normative fluent must be eligible for abstraction in order for abstraction to
take place.
To give an example for abstracting obliging storing personal data to obliging non–
consensual data processing in the Charter of Fundamental Rights interpretation of the Data
Retention Directive:
1 holdsat(obl(obl(nonConsensualDataProcessing(ada),now),now),
2 cfr, I) :-
3 holdsat(obl(obl(storeData(CommServProv0,Agent0,personal),now),
4 now), cfr, I):
5 not holdsat(consentedDataProcessing(ada,isp),cfr,I);
6 1{holdsat(obl(obl(storeData(isp,ada,personal),now),now),cfr,I):
7 not holdsat(consentedDataProcessing(ada,isp),cfr,I)},
8 holdsat(pow(cfr,nonConsensualDataProcessing(ada)),cfr,I),
9 instant(I).
The head atom is the more abstract normative fluent obliging an obligation for data to
be stored non–consensually. In the body, holdsat(obl(obl(
storeData(CommServProv0,Agent0,personal),now),now),cfr,I):
not holdsat(consentedDataProcessing(ada,isp),cfr,I), represents that
in the context that Ada has not consented to data processing the concrete obligation to oblige
storing personal data must hold in order to be abstracted to obliging an obligation to store
data non–consensually. At least one context in which abstraction can take place must hold
in order for abstraction to actually take place according to
1{holdsat(obl(obl(storeData
(isp,ada,personal),now),now),cfr,I):
not holdsat(consentedDataProcessing(ada,isp),cfr,I)}. In other words,
if Ada has consented to data processing, then no abstraction can take place.
Such specific rules to represent deontological counts–as are formally defined as and
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subsequently described in detail:
Definition 20. Deontological Counts–as Translation Let ML = 〈T ,B〉 be a multi–level
governance institution s.t. T = 〈I1, ...,In〉. The program Πabstr is the deontic abstrac-
tion program obtained for ML according to the following translation: ∀i ∈ [1,n](I i =
〈E i ,F i ,C i ,G i ,Di ,∆i 〉) :
obl(b,d) ∈F ianorm,b ∈ E i holdsat(obl(b,d),Ini ,I) :−
a ∈ E i ,X ∈X ,b ∈G i (X ,a) ⇔ CN,C , (D20.1)
CN= {EX(obl(a,d), I i ):EX(X, I i );} holdsat(pow(b),Ini ,I),
C = 1{CN} instant(I).
pro(b,d) ∈F ianorm,b ∈ E i holdsat(pro(b,d),Ini ,I) :−
CN= {EX(pro(a,d),I i ):EX(X, I i ); |⇔ CN,C, (D20.2)
a ∈F i ,X ∈X ,b ∈G i (X ,a)} holdsat(pow(b),Ini ,I),
CN 6= ;, C = 1{CN} instant(I).
obl(b,d) ∈F ianorm,b ∈ E i holdsat(obl(b,d),Ini ,I) :−
a ∈F i ,X ∈X ,b ∈Di (X ,a) ⇔ CN,C , (D20.3)
CN= {EX(obl(a,d), I i ):EX(X, I i );} C = 1{CN}
pro(b,d) ∈F ianorm,b ∈ E i holdsat(pro(b,d),Ini ,I) :−
CN= {EX(pro(a,d),I i ):EX(X, I i ); |⇔ CN,C, (D20.4)
a ∈F i ,X ∈X ,b ∈Di (X ,a)}, instant(I).
CN 6= ;, C = 1{CN}
obl(b,d),b ∈F ianorm,
r ∈Πabstr(H(r )= holdsat(b,Ini ,I)),
CN= {EX(obl(a,d), I i ):c; | holdsat(obl(b,d),Ini ,I) :− (D20.5)
holdsat(a,Ini ,I) :c; ∈B(r )}⇔ CN,C ,POWS,
POWS=EX({pow(e) | instant(I).
holdsat(pow(e),Ini ,I) ∈B(r )},I i ),
CN 6= ;, C = 1{CN}
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pro(b,d),b ∈F ianorm,
R = {r ∈Πabstr :H(r )= holdsat(b,Ini ,I)}, holdsat(pro(b,d),Ini ,I) :−
CN= {EX(pro(a,d), I i ):c; | r ∈R,⇔ CN,C ,POWS, (D20.6)
holdsat(a,Ini ,I) :c; ∈B(r )} instant(I).
POWS=EX({pow(e) |
holdsat(pow(e),Ini ,I) ∈B(r )},I i ),
CN 6= ;, C = 1{CN} ∈B(r )
In more detail, the first two translations D20.1 and D20.2 produce ASP rules for ab-
stracting first–order norms. Abstraction is based on rules of the type “A counts–as B in
context C” according to the event generation G i function. The second two translations
D20.3 and D20.4 are, like the first, for producing first–order norm abstraction but this time
based on the fluent derivation function Di . For all four translations D20.1 to D20.4 the re-
sulting rules are of the type “obliging/prohibiting A(s) counts–as obliging/prohibiting B(s)
in context(s) C(s)”. These new abstracting counts–as rules act as base cases for produc-
ing further abstracting counts–as rules for higher–order norms by translations D20.5 and
D20.6. That is, translations D20.5 and D20.6 provide rules which abstract concrete higher–
order normative fluents to abstract higher–order normative fluents based on whether the
prescribed lower–order normative fluents count–as abstract lower–order normative fluents
according to deontological counts–as itself.
To give further examples, the rules for abstracting first–order obligations are provided
by the translation according to D20.1 and D20.3. The translation is conditional on there
being an event/fluent a counting–as a more abstract event/fluent b in a context X . This
counts–as relation is according to the event generation and fluent dependency functions.
The result is a rule that states if a concrete obligation fluent about an event/fluent a holds
in a state and that state entails the context X (in which a counts–as b) then a more abstract
obligation fluent prescribing b to occur/hold also holds. In the Charter of Fundamental
Rights two rules cause an abstract obligation to store personal data to hold if either metadata
or content data are obliged to be stored in any context (denoted with #true):
1 holdsat(obl(storeData(commServ,user,personal),now), cfr, I) :-
2 holdsat(obl(storeData(commServ,user,content),now), cfr, I):
3 #true;
4 1{ holdsat(obl(storeData(commServ,user,content),now), cfr, I):
5 #true; },
6 holdsat(pow(storeData(commServ,user,personal)), cfr, I),
7 instant(I).
8 holdsat(obl(storeData(commServ,user,personal),now), cfr, I) :-
9 holdsat(obl(storeData(commServ,user,metadata),now), cfr, I):
10 #true;
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11 1{ holdsat(obl(storeData(commServ,user,metadata),now), cfr, I):
12 #true; },
13 holdsat(pow(storeData(commServ,user,personal)), cfr, I),
14 instant(I).
Rules for abstracting first–order prohibitions are provided by the translations according
to D20.2 and D20.4. The translation is conditional on there being events/fluents a which
in different contexts X count–as an abstract event/fluent b. This counts–as relation is ac-
cording to the event generation and fluent dependency functions. The result is a rule that
specifies for events/fluents a(s) that count–as an event/fluent b in contexts X entailed by a
state, if all the events/fluents a are prohibited (before the same deadline) then a more ab-
stract prohibition on b also holds (with the same deadline). The rule is conditional on at
least one context X in which an a counts–as a b holds. The following is an example rule
produced in the Charter of Fundamental Rights institution based on storing content data or
storing metadata unconditionally counting–as storing personal data:
1 holdsat(pro(storeData(commServ,user,personal),never), cfr, I) :-
2 holdsat(pro(storeData(commServ,user,content),never), cfr, I):
3 #true;
4 holdsat(pro(storeData(commServ,user,metadata),never), cfr, I):
5 #true;
6 1{ holdsat(pro(storeData(commServ,user,content),never), cfr, I):
7 #true;
8 holdsat(pro(storeData(commServ,user,metadata),never), cfr, I):
9 #true; },
10 holdsat(pow(storeData(commServ,user,personal)), cfr, I),
11 instant(I).
Higher–order obligation abstraction rules are provided by the translation according to
D20.5. In more detail, the translation is conditional on there being a rule that states concrete
normative fluents a(s) count–as an abstract normative fluent b in contexts X . The result is
a rule that is similar, albeit abstracting higher–order obligations. The new rule states that
obliging a(s) before the same deadline counts–as an abstract obligation b before the same
deadline in contexts X , so long as one of the contexts for an a to count–as a b holds. To
give an example for the Charter of Fundamental Rights as before, albeit this time a rule
that abstracts obligations on prohibitions to store content and metadata to an obligation to
prohibit storing personal data:
1 holdsat(obl(pro(storeData(commServ,user,personal),never), now),
2 cfr, I) :-
3 holdsat(obl(pro(storeData(commServ,user,content),never), now),
4 cfr, I): #true;
5 holdsat(obl(pro(storeData(commServ,user,metadata),never), now),
6 cfr, I): #true;
7 1{holdsat(obl(pro(storeData(commServ,user,content),never), now),
8 cfr, I): #true;
9 holdsat(obl(pro(storeData(commServ,user,metadata),never), now),
10 cfr, I): #true;},
11 holdsat(pow(storeData(commServ,user,personal)), cfr, I),
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12 instant(I).
Higher–order prohibition abstraction rules are provided by the translation according to
D20.6. In more detail, the translation is conditional on there being rules expressing that
concrete normative fluents as count–as an abstract normative fluent b in contexts X . The
result is a rule that states prohibiting normative fluents as before the same deadline in the
contexts X counts–as prohibiting normative fluent b before the same deadline, so long as
one of the contexts for an a to count–as a b holds. To give an example for the Charter of
Fundamental rights, a rule causes an abstract prohibition on prohibiting storing personal
data to hold if prohibiting prohibitions to store content and metadata hold (in all contexts,
since content and metadata count–as personal data unconditional on a state).
1 holdsat(pro(pro(storeData(commServ,user,personal),never), never),
2 cfr, I) :-
3 holdsat(pro(pro(storeData(commServ,user,content),never), never),
4 cfr, I): #true;
5 holdsat(pro(pro(storeData(commServ,user,metadata),never),
6 never), cfr, I): #true;
7 1{holdsat(pro(pro(storeData(commServ,user,content),never),
8 never), cfr, I): #true;
9 holdsat(pro(pro(storeData(commServ,user,metadata),never),
10 never), cfr, I): #true;},
11 holdsat(pow(storeData(commServ,user,personal)), cfr, I),
12 instant(I).
This concludes our presentation of the ASP representation for deontological counts–as,
as a set of specific rules which flatten the general formal deontological counts–as semantics.
4.3.3. MULTI–LEVEL GOVERNANCE SEMANTICS ASP REPRESENTATION
Now we present the final component of the computational framework, the general semantics
of multi–level governance represented as ASP rules. These semantics comprise two ASP
programs, Πtrace(n) representing a composite event trace and Πbase(n) containing general
rules to produce a multi–level governance model for a trace of composite events represented
in ASP. We begin with the translation from the formal representation of a composite trace, to
a corresponding ASP representation, comprising facts representing an event that is observed
at each point in time:
Definition 21. Composite Trace Translation Let ctr= 〈e0, ...,ek〉 be a composite trace. The
program Πtrace(k) is the ASP trace program for ctr comprising the following set of rules:
{compObserved(ei, i). | i ∈ [n]} (D21.1)
We now present the ASP program Πbase(k) comprising general rules for producing se-
quences of states transitioned between by sets of events for a composite trace, that is, a
multi–level governance institution model. Formally and subsequently described:
Definition 22. Multi–level Governance Semantics ASP Translation The program Πbase(k)
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is the base multi–level governance ASP program:
holdsat(P,In,J) :−holdsat(P,In,I),not terminated(P,In,I),next(I,J),
ifluent(P,In).
(D22.1)
holdsat(P,In,J) :−initiated(P,In,I),next(I,J),ifluent(P,In). (D22.2)
occurred(now,In,I) :−instant(I),inst(In). (D22.3)
occurred(E,In,I) :−evtype(E,In,ex),observed(E,In,I). (D22.4)
occurred(null,In,I) :−not evtype(E,In,ex),observed(E,In,I). (D22.5)
{compObserved(E,J)} :−evtype(E,In,ex),instant(J),
not final(J),inst(In).
(D22.6)
:−compObserved(E,J),compObserved(F,J),instant(J),evtype(E,InX,ex),
evtype(F,InY,ex),E!= F,inst(InX;InY). (D22.7)
obs(I) :−compObserved(E,I),evtype(E,In,ex). (D22.8)
:−not obs(I),not final(I),instant(I). (D22.9)
observed(E,In,I) :−compObserved(E,I),inst(In). (D22.10)
occurred(disch(obl(A,D)),In,I) :−holdsat(obl(A,D),In,I),
1{occurred(A,In,I),
holdsat(A,In,I)}.
(D22.11)
occurred(viol(obl(A,D)),In,I) :−holdsat(obl(A,D),In,I),
not occurred(disch(obl(A,D)),In,I),
1{occurred(D,In,I),holdsat(D,In,I)}.
(D22.12)
occurred(disch(pro(A,D)),In,I) :−holdsat(pro(A,D),In,I),
1{occurred(D,In,I),
holdsat(D,In,I)}.
(D22.13)
occurred(viol(pro(A,D)),In,I) :−holdsat(pro(A,D)),In,I),
1{occurred(A,In,I),holdsat(A,In,I)},
not occurred(disch(pro(A,D)),In,I).
(D22.14)
terminated(N,In,I) :−1{occurred(viol(N),In,I),
occurred(disch(N),In,I)},
ifluent(N,In),holdsat(N,In,I).
(D22.15)
final(k). start(0). instant(0..T) :−final(T).
next(T,T+1) :−instant(T). (D22.16)
The common–sense law of inertia is captured with the first rule, D22.1. This states an
inertial fluent held in the previous state and it has not yet been terminated, then it continues
to hold. Initiated fluents hold in the state after they are initiated due to rule D22.2. The
event of ‘now’ occurs in every time instant according to D22.3. Collectively, D22.4 and
D22.5 ensure there is a synchronised trace for each institution for a given composite trace.
If an event is observed and an institution recognises it as an exogenous event, then that event
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occurs in the institution according to D22.4. If there is no event recognised by an institution
that is observed, then the null event occurs in that institution D22.5. Rule D22.6 gives an
arbitrary choice to include an observed event in the composite trace, which, together with
rules D22.7 to D22.10 ensures there is a complete composite trace of length k and that no
two observable events occur at the same time. Rules D22.11 to D22.14 ensure relevant
compliance events occur when normative fluents that hold are discharged/violated. Rule
D22.15 ensures discharged and violated normative fluents are terminated. Finally, facts and
rules in D22.16 ensure the model and composite trace is of length k, that there are facts
representing time instants between zero and k, and that the time instants are strictly ordered
according to next/2.
This concludes our presentation of the ASP programs which comprise the computa-
tional framework, thus, allowing multi–level governance institutions and their semantics to
be executed and consequently compliance checks performed.
4.4. EXECUTED CASE STUDY
We have written the case study in the high–level computational framework specification
language. By compiling from the specification language to an AnsProlog representation we
are able to assess compliance in our case study’s multi–level governance institution. This
is by executing the resulting AnsProlog program together with a trace of events.
The case study is instantiated for a domain comprising four types. Firstly the agents
acting in the system (ada and charles). Secondly, we specify various types of role,
since we need to distinguish between the agents/organisations and their social status. The
case study differentiates between citizens and law enforcement officials as well as Internet
Service Providers (ISPs) thus we have the roles lawEnforcement and isp. Thirdly, we
distinguish between different data types (content, metadata and personal).
The case study is run against an observable event trace. We chose an observable event
trace which shows the framework’s context–sensitivity to abstract norm reasoning. This is
by testing the use of electronic communications and ISP’s fulfilment of metadata storage
obligations in different social contexts. Namely, the context that an agent, Ada, has not
consented and the context that she has. The trace is given below:
1 observed(exUseElectronicCommunication(ada, isp), 0).
2 observed(exStoreData(isp, ada, metadata), 1).
3 observed(exRequestData(charles, isp, ada), 2).
4 observed(exConsent(ada, isp), 3).
5 observed(exUseElectronicCommunication(ada, isp), 4).
6 observed(exStoreData(isp, ada, metadata), 5).
First the agent Ada uses electronic communications provided by the service provider
ISP. Then, the service provider, ISP, stores Ada’s communications metadata. An agent,
Charles, requests data from ISP concerning Ada. Ada consents to her data being stored
(after it is stored). Ada uses ISP’s electronic communications again. Finally, ISP stores
Ada’s metadata again. In the first half of this observable event trace Ada’s data is stored
without her consent, in the latter half Ada’s data is stored after she has given consent.
The resulting multi–level governance institution model is depicted in Figure 4.1, for
brevity edited to just containing those fluents that are relevant to the discharge and violation
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S0
1) + is(charles, lawEnforcement):
drr, drr
2) + pro(dataUnprotected(ada,
personal), never): cfr
3) + pro(privacyDisrespected,
never): cfr
4) + pro(uncontrolByIndepAuth,
never): cfr
5) + pro(unfairDataProcessing(
ada), never): cfr
6) – + obl(pro(storeData(isp, ada,
content), never), now): cfr, drd
7) + pro(storeData(isp, ada,
content), never): cfr, drd, drr
S1
useElectronicCommunication(ada, isp):
cfr, drd, drr
disch(obl(pro(storeData( ada, content),
never), now)) : cfr, drd
1) is(charles, lawEnforcement):
drd, drr
2) – pro(dataUnprotected(ada,
personal), never): cfr
3) – pro(privacyDisrespected,
never): cfr
4) – pro(uncontrolByIndepAuth,
never): cfr
5) – pro(unfairDataProcessing(
ada), never): cfr
6) pro(storeData(isp, ada, content),
never): cfr, drd, drr
7) – + obl(storeData(isp, ada,
metadata), now): cfr, drd, drr
8) – + obl(obl(storeData(isp, ada,
metadata), now), now): cfr, drd
9) – + obl(obl(storeData(isp, ada,
personal), now), now) :
cfr(from 8)
10) – + obl(obl(
nonConsensualDataProcessing(
ada), now), now): cfr (from 9)
11) – + obl(dataProcessed, now) :
cfr (from 9)
12) – + obl(dataUnprotected(ada,
personal), now): cfr (from 9)
13) – + obl(
nonConsensualDataProcessing(
ada), now) : cfr (from 10)
14) – + obl(privacyDisrespected,
now) : cfr (from 9)
15) – + obl(
unfairDataProcessing(ada),
now) : cfr (from 13)
16) + dataProcessed : cfr (from
11)
17) + dataUnprotected(ada,
personal) : cfr (from 12)
18) + privacyDisrespected : cfr
(from 14)
19) + uncontrolByIndepAuth :
cfr (from 16)
20) + unfairDataProcessing(ada)
(from 15) : cfr
S2
storeData(isp, ada, metadata): cfr, drd,
drr
nonConsensualDataProcessing(ada): cfr
disch(obl(obl(storeData( ada,
metadata), now), now)) : cfr, drd
disch(obl(storeData(i ada, metadata),
now)) : cfr, drd, drr
viol(pro(uncontrolByIndepAut never))
: cfr
viol(pro(privacyDisrespecte never)) :
cfr
viol(pro(dataUnprotected(a personal),
never)) : cfr
viol(pro(unfairDataProcessing(ad
never)) : cfr
1) is(charles, lawEnforcement):
drd, drr
2) pro(storeData(isp, ada, content),
never): cfr, drd, drr
3) pro(storeData(isp, charles,
content), never): cfr, drd, drr
4) + pro(dataUnprotected(ada,
personal), never): cfr
5) + pro(deleteData(isp, ada,
metadata), time(m12)): drd, drr
6) + pro(privacyDisrespected,
never): cfr
7) + pro(uncontrolByIndepAuth,
never): cfr
8) + pro(unfairDataProcessing(
ada), never): cfr
9) + pro(unfairDataProcessing(
charles), never): cfr
10) + obl(deleteData(isp, ada,
metadata), time(m13)): drd, drr
11) + pro(deleteData(isp, ada,
metadata), time(m12)): drd, drr
12) – + obl(
ensure_data_retention_period(
ada, isp, metadata, m6, m24),
now) : cfr, drd
+ ensure_data_retention_period(
ada, isp, metadata, m6, m24) :
drd from 10 and 11
S3
requestData(charles, isp, ada): cfr, drd,
drr
disch(obl(ensure_data_retention_period(ada,
isp, metadata, m6, m24), now)) : cfr, drd
1) is(charles, lawEnforcement):
drd, drr
2) obl(deleteData(isp, ada,
metadata), time(m13)): drd, drr
3) pro(deleteData(isp, ada,
metadata), time(m12)): drd, drr
4) pro(dataUnprotected(ada,
personal), never): cfr
5) pro(privacyDisrespected, never):
cfr
6) pro(storeData(isp, ada, content),
never): cfr, drd, drr
7) pro(uncontrolByIndepAuth,
never): cfr
8) pro(unfairDataProcessing(ada),
never): cfr
9)
ensure_data_retention_period(
ada, isp, metadata, m6, m24) :
drd from 2 and 3
10) + obl(provideData(isp, charles,
ada), time(m1)): drd, drr
11) + obl(provideData(isp,
charles, ada), undue_delay) :
drd from 10
12) – + obl(obl(provideData(isp,
charles, ada), undue_delay),
now) : drd
Figure 4.1: Case study execution. The originating institutions for a fluent are in bold, ‘+’ indicates an initiated
fluent, ‘–’ indicates a terminated fluent. Non–inertial fluents are in bold denoting they are derived from other
fluents according to the fluent derivation and deontological counts–as (norm abstraction) operations. Norm dis-
charge and violation events are highlighted.
of norms. The model is described subsequently.
We first look at the interaction between the UK–DRR and the EU–DRD which governs
the UK–DRR. Accordingly:
• State S0 – Contains fluents stating the agent charles is playing the role of
lawEnforcement in the UK–DRR and EU–DRD. The EU–DRD obliges that it
is prohibited for isp to store the content of ada’s data. The UK–DRR does in-
deed prohibit isp from storing the content of ada’s communications data. Thus, the
obligation to prohibit storing content data in the EU–DRD is immediately discharged
as denoted by the discharge event occurring in the transition to the next state. The
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S4
consent(ada, isp): cfr
disch(obl(obl(provideData( charles,
ada), undue_delay), now)) : cfr, drd
1) is(charles, lawEnforcement):
drd, drr
2) obl(deleteData(isp, ada,
metadata), time(m13)): drd, drr
3) pro(deleteData(isp, ada,
metadata), time(m12)): drd, drr
4) obl(provideData(isp, charles,
ada), time(m1)): drd, drr
5) pro(dataUnprotected(ada,
personal), never): cfr
6) pro(privacyDisrespected, never):
cfr
7) pro(storeData(isp, ada, content),
never): cfr, drd, drr
8) pro(uncontrolByIndepAuth,
never): cfr
9) pro(unfairDataProcessing(ada),
never): cfr
10)
ensure_data_retention_period(
ada, isp, metadata, m6, m24) :
drd from 2 and 3
11) + consentedDataProcessing(
ada, isp): cfr
S5
useElectronicCommunication(ada, isp):
cfr, drd, drr
1) is(charles, lawEnforcement):
drd, drr
2) pro(dataUnprotected(ada,
personal), never): cfr
3) pro(privacyDisrespected, never):
cfr
4) pro(uncontrolByIndepAuth,
never): cfr
5) consentedDataProcessing(ada,
isp): cfr
6) obl(provideData(isp, charles,
ada), time(m1)): drd, drr
7) obl(provideData(isp, charles,
ada), undue_delay): drd
8) pro(dataUnprotected(charles,
personal), never): cfr
9) pro(unfairDataProcessing(ada),
never): cfr
10) pro(storeData(isp, charles,
content), never): cfr, drd, drr
11) + obl(deleteData(isp, ada,
metadata), time(m13)): drd, drr
12) pro(deleteData(isp, ada,
metadata), time(m12)): drd, drr
13) – + obl(storeData(isp, ada,
metadata), now): cfr, drd, drr
14) – + obl(obl(storeData(isp, ada,
metadata), now), now): cfr, drd
15)
ensure_data_retention_period(
ada, isp, metadata, m6, m24) :
drd from 11 and 12
16) – + obl(obl(storeData(isp,
ada, personal), now), now) :
cfr from 14
17) – + obl(privacyDisrespected,
now): cfr from 16
18) – + obl(dataProcessed, now):
cfr from 16
19) – + obl(dataUnprotected(ada,
personal), now): cfr from 16
20) + dataUnprotected(ada,
personal) : cfr from 18
21) + privacyDisrespected : cfr
from 17
22) + uncontrolByIndepAuth :
cfr from 18
S6
storeData(isp, ada, metadata): cfr, drd,
drr
disch(obl(obl(storeData( ada,
metadata), now), now)) : cfr, drd
disch(obl(storeData(i ada, metadata),
now)) : cfr, drd, drr
disch(obl(obl(storeData( ada,
metadata), now), now)) : cfr, drd
disch(obl(storeData(i ada, metadata),
now)) : cfr, drd, drr
viol(pro(uncontrolByIndepAut never))
: cfr
viol(pro(privacyDisrespecte never)) :
cfr
viol(pro(dataUnprotected(a personal),
never)) : cfr
1) is(charles, lawEnforcement):
drd, drr
2) obl(provideData(isp, charles,
ada), time(m1)): drd, drr
3) obl(provideData(isp, charles,
ada), undue_delay): drd
4) pro(dataUnprotected(ada,
personal), never): cfr
5) pro(privacyDisrespected, never):
cfr
6) pro(storeData(isp, ada, content),
never): cfr, drd, drr
7) pro(uncontrolByIndepAuth,
never): cfr
8) pro(unfairDataProcessing(ada),
never): cfr
9) consentedDataProcessing(ada,
isp): cfr
10) obl(deleteData(isp, ada,
metadata), time(m13)): drd, drr
11) pro(deleteData(isp, ada,
metadata), time(m12)): drd, drr
12)
ensure_data_retention_period(
ada, isp, metadata, m6, m24):
drd from 10 and 11
13) – + obl(
ensure_data_retention_period(
ada, isp, metadata, m6, m24),
now): cfr, drd
S7
disch(obl(ensure_data_retention_period(ada,
isp, metadata, m6, m24), now)) : cfr drd
Figure 4.1 (cont.)
transition to the next state also includes the event of ada using electronic communi-
cations provided by isp, due to the occurrence of the exogenous event in the timeline
program stating the same.
• State S1 – Includes new fluents. Firstly, the EU–DRD imposes an obligation on the
UK–DRR to oblige isp to store ada’s communications’ metadata. Secondly, the
UK–DRR imposes an obligation for isp to store ada’s communications’ metadata.
The UK–DRR’s first–order obligation to store metadata discharges the EU–DRD’s
second–order obligation to oblige an obligation to store metadata. The transition to
state S2 includes the event of ada’s communications’ metadata being stored by isp,
driven by the corresponding exogenous event, and consequently the discharge of the
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obligation from the UK–DRR for isp to store Ada’s communications metadata.
• State S2 – The EU–DRD, which governs the UK–DRR, obliges data retention to be
ensured for between 6 and 24 months. In comparison, the UK–DRR, both obliges that
Ada’s communications metadata is deleted before 13 months and prohibits deletion
before 12 months. Hence, the UK–DRR requires that metadata is stored for between
12 and 13 months, which is abstractly interpreted in the EU–DRD as ensuring data is
retained between 6 and 24 months
(ensure_data_retention_period(ada, isp, metadata, m6, m24)
discharging the EU–DRD’s obligation for data to be stored within this timeframe. In
the transition to state S3 charles requests Ada’s data from isp.
• State S3 – Since charles is playing the role of lawEnforcement, this causes the
EU–DRD to oblige that isp is obliged to provide the data before any undue_delay.
Meanwhile, the UK–DRR obliges isp to provide charles with the data within
one month (m1). According to the EU–DRD anything occurring before one month
counts–as the event of undue_delay. Thus the EU–DRD interprets the obligation
to provide data within one month as the abstract obligation to provide data before any
undue delay. This causes discharge of the obligation to oblige data is provided before
any undue delay.
• States S4 to S6 follow largely the same pattern. In the transition to the next state
S4 ada consents to her data being stored, which has no affect on the UK–DRR or
the EU–DRD. Transitioning to state S5 ada uses electronic communications, then
ada’s data is stored, causing the same obligations and prohibitions to be imposed by
the UK–DRR and EU–DRD as when these events occurred previously.
In conclusion, for this trace of events the UK–DRR is compliant with the EU–DRD.
All of the EU–DRD’s normative fluents it imposes are discharged and none are violated. In
comparison, the EU–DRD is non–compliant with the EU–CFR as we will see:
• State S0 – the EU–CFR prohibits the EU–DRD’s regulations from being uncontrolled
by an independent authority. What this means is that data retention should be within
the EU jurisdiction. Likewise, the EU–CFR also prohibits data from being unpro-
tected (i.e. stored without anonymisation), privacy from being disrespected (i.e. per-
sonal data being stored) and data being processed unfairly (i.e. personal data being
stored without an agent’s consent).
• State S1 – a number of the EU–CFR’s prohibitions are violated:
– Violation of the CFR’s prohibition on regulations not being controlled by
an independent authority (meaning, compliance with the EU–CFR’s data pro-
tection rights must be observable by an independent authority, such as by en-
suring data is retained within the EU). The EU–DRD obliges the UK–DRR to
oblige ada’s communications’ metadata is stored. According to the EU–CFR
obliging storing data (of any type) counts–as data being processed, hence an
obligation to oblige storing metadata is abstracted to an obligation to process
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data, which is abstracted further to processing data. The EU–CFR views pro-
cessing data without a prohibition on it being stored outside of the EU counting–
as regulations not being controlled by an independent authority. Hence, the
prohibition on regulations being uncontrolled by an independent authority is
violated.
– Violation of the CFR’s prohibition on unfair data processing. The EU–CFR
interprets storing metadata as storing personal data, thus it determines that there
is an abstract obligation to oblige personal data is stored. In the EU–CFR, stor-
ing personal data in the context that an agent has not consented counts–as non–
consensual data processing (nonConsensualDataProcessing(ada)).
Thus the EU–CFR determines that there is an obligation to oblige non–consensual
data processing of ada’s data. According the EU–CFR an obligation to store
data non–consensually counts–as unfair data processing, hence an obligation to
oblige non–consensual data processing is abstracted to an obligation to process
data unfairly. An obligation to process data unfairly in turn, counts–as unfair
data processing (i.e. from the perspective of the EU–CFR it does not matter if
data is actually processed unfairly or just obliged, both are unfair data process-
ing). This causes the EU–CFR’s prohibition on processing data unfairly to be
violated.
– Violation of the CFR’s prohibition on disrespecting privacy. The obligation
to oblige storing metadata imposed by the EU–DRD is abstracted to an obliga-
tion to oblige storing personal data. In the EU–CFR obliging storing personal
data counts–as the non–inertial fluent for privacy to be disrespected. Hence,
obliging an obligation to store personal data is further abstracted to obliging pri-
vacy is disrespected which also counts–as simply disrespecting privacy. Hence
the EU–CFR’s prohibition on disrespecting privacy is violated.
– Violation of the CFR’s prohibition on data being unprotected. The obliges
an obligation for Ada’s metadata to be stored (according to the an obligation to
oblige personal data to be stored) even in the context that it is not anonymised.
The EU–CFR views an obligation to oblige storing personal data as being
the same thing as processing data, which in the context that the data is not
anonymised is abstractly the same thing as data being unprotected. Hence, the
EU–CFR’s prohibition on data being unprotected is violated.
Each violated prohibition in the EU–CFR is initiated in the next state.
• States S2 and S3 contain nothing of interest from the perspective of the EU–CFR. In
the transition to state S4 Ada consents to her personal data being stored.
• State S4 contains a fluent stating Ada has consented to her personal data being stored.
• State S5 also contains prohibitions in the EU–CFR which are violated by the EU–
DRD, as in state S1, with one difference:
– The CFR’s prohibition on data being processed unfairly is not violated.
The EU–DRD, from the perspective of the EU–CFR, obliges an obligation
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to store personal data. However, since Ada has consented the obligation to
oblige personal data being stored is not abstracted to an obligation to oblige
non–consensual data processing and not subsequently abstracted to ‘unfair data
processing’. Hence, in state S5, unlike in state S2 the EU–CFR’s prohibition
on unfair data processing is not violated since the context is different (Ada has
consented to her data being stored). Meanwhile, the rest of the EU–CFR’s pro-
hibitions are violated (for the second time).
From this case study we can see the UK–DRR is compliant with the EU–DRD (i.e. the
UK’s legislation correctly implements the directive). On the other hand, the EU’s data re-
tention directive is non–compliant with the EU–CFR. In particular, the EU–DRD was found
to be non–compliant in a particular social context with particular prohibitions issued by the
EU–CFR. In different contexts the same prohibitions might not be violated. As we saw in
the context that Ada had consented to her personal data being processed, the directive did
not the violate the prohibition on unfair data processing. This is because the directive’s nor-
mative fluents were not interpreted by the charter as more abstractly counting–as unfair data
processing. Hence, whether there is compliance depends on the context which determines
the abstract meaning of normative fluents. A full compliance check examines all possible
social contexts by checking all possible traces of events that result in unique answer–sets
(or in our formal framework, models).
4.5. COMPUTATIONAL FRAMEWORK SOUNDNESS AND COM-
PLETENESS
We now demonstrate that the computational framework provides an executable implemen-
tation of the formal framework. This is with theorems stating the computational framework
is sound and complete with respect to the formal framework (proofs are provided in the
appendices). We begin by packaging, for convenience, the aforementioned ASP programs
into a single ASP program ΠML(k).
Definition 23. Multi–level Governance ASP Program Let ML= 〈T ,R〉 be a multi–level
governance institution. Let ctr be a composite trace for ML of length n. Let Πinsts and
Πabstr be the institutions and deontic abstraction programs obtained forML. Let, Πtrace(n)
be the trace program obtained for ctr and let Πbase(n) be a multi–level governance base
program. A multi–level governance institution ASP program for ML and a composite
trace ctr is:
ΠML(n) =Πbase(n)∪Πtrace(n)∪Πabstr∪Πinsts
The first property we present gives the set of of events that are maximally in the set of
events according to the event generation operation.
Lemma 1. If GRi is the event generation operation for an institution I i with respect to a
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tuple of events E and a tuple of events S, and E ′ =GRi (Si ,E i ) w.r.t. S and E then ∀e ′ ∈ E ′:
e ′ = now or (T1.1)
e ′ ∈ E i or (T1.2)
∃X ,e : X ∈X ∧e ∈ E ∧Si |= X ∧e ′ ∈G(X ,e)∧Si |= pow(e ′) or (T1.3)
e ′ = disch(obl(a,d))s.t.∃obl(a,d) : Si |= obl(a,d)∧ (a ∈ E ′∨Si |= a) or (T1.4)
e ′ = viol(obl(a, d))s.t.∃obl(a,d) : Si |= obl(a,d)∧ (d ∈ E ′∨Si |= d)∧
disch(obl(a,d)) 6∈ E ′ or (T1.5)
e ′ = disch(pro(a,d))s.t.∃pro(a,d) : Si |= pro(a,d)∧ (d ∈ E ′∨Si |= d) or (T1.6)
e ′ = viol(pro(a,d))s.t.∃pro(a,d) : Si |= pro(a,d)∧ (a ∈ E ′∨Si |= a)∧
disch(pro(a,d)) 6∈ E ′ or (T1.7)
∃〈h, i 〉 : 〈h, i 〉 ∈R,e ∈ Ehnorm∩E inorm (T1.8)
Proof. Immediately follows from Definition 37.
The second property we present gives the set of fluents that are maximally in the closure
of deontological counts–as.
Lemma 2. If DCω is the closure of the deontological counts–as function for an institution
I = 〈E ,F ,C,G,D,∆〉, a state S ∈Σ for I and S′ =DCω(S) then ∀ f ′ ∈ S′ :
f ′ ∈ S or (T2.1)
∃〈N ′, f ′〉 ∈DC(S′) :N ′ ⊆ S′ (T2.2)
Proof. Immediately follows from Definition 7.
We now give the soundness property for the deontic abstraction representation in ASP
with respect to the formal definition of deontological counts–as. In doing so, we demon-
strate that we have provided a transformation that flattens the deontological counts–as func-
tion described in the formal framework to an executable set of ASP rules. The property
states that a state in the answer–set for a multi–level governance answer–set program is
equivalent to the same state in the formal model for the formal framework with the deontic
counts–as function DCiω applied.
Lemma 3. Let ML= 〈T ,R〉 be a multi–level governance institution s.t. T = 〈I1, ...,In〉,
and ctr be a composite trace of length k. Let ∀i ∈ [1,n] Ini be a unique label for I i .
Let ΠML(k) be the multi–level governance ASP program for ML and ctr. Let MP be an
answer–set for the program P∗ = ground(ΠML(k)). Given a set Sij such that
∀i ∈ [1,m],∀ j ∈ [k] :MP |= holdsat( f ,Ini , j )⇒ f ∈ Sij
then Sij =DCiω(Sij ).
Proof. See the appendices.
106 4. COMPUTATIONAL MULTI–LEVEL GOVERNANCE COMPLIANCE CHECKING
The next property we are interested in is soundness for the translation to an ASP pro-
gram as a whole. Specifically, the property states any answer–set for a multi–level gov-
ernance ASP program for a given trace of events corresponds to a multi–level governance
institution model in the formal framework for the same trace of events.
Theorem 1. (Soundness) Given a multi–level governance institution ML = 〈T ,R〉 s.t.
T = 〈I1, ...,In〉. Let ctr = 〈e0, ...,ek〉 be a composite trace for ML. Let ΠML(k) be the
multi–level governance ASP program for ML and ctr. Let ∀i ∈ [1,n] : stri = 〈sei0, ...,seik〉
be a synchronised trace for I i w.r.t. ctr. Let MP be an answer–set for the program P∗ =
ground(ΠML(k)). Then M = 〈M1, ...,Mn〉with∀i ∈ [n] :M i = 〈Si ,E i 〉,Si = 〈Si0, ...,Sik+1〉,E i =
〈E i0, ...,E ik〉 such that:
∀h ∈ [1,n],∀ j ∈ [k], :MP |= holdsat( f ,Inh , j )⇒ f ∈ Shj (T1.1)
∀h ∈ [1,n],∀ j ∈ [k],∀e 6= null :MP |= occurred(e,Inh , j )⇒ e ∈ Ehj (T1.2)
∀h ∈ [1,n],∀ j ∈ [k] :MP |= occurred(null,Inh , j )⇒ enull ∈ Ehj (T1.3)
is the model of ML w.r.t. ctr.
Proof. See the appendices.
The next property we are interested in is completeness. This states that for any model
of a multi–level governance institution in the formal framework, for a trace of events, the
multi–level governance ASP program produces a corresponding answer–set for the same
trace of events.
Theorem 2. (Completeness) Given a multi–level governance institution ML= 〈T ,R〉 s.t.
T = 〈I1, ...,In〉. Let ctr= 〈e0, ...,ek〉 be a composite trace for ML. Let ∀i ∈ [1,n] : stri =
〈stri0, ...,strik〉 be a synchronised trace for I i w.r.t. ctr. Let M = 〈M1, ...,Mn〉 be the multi–
level governance institution model ML w.r.t. ctr where ∀i ∈ [1,n] : M i = 〈Si ,E i 〉,Si =
〈Si0, ...,Sik+1〉,E i = 〈E i0, ...,E ik〉. Let ΠML(k) be the multi–level structure ASP program for
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ML and a composite trace ctr. Let MP be the set of atoms:
∀i ∈ [1,n],∀ j ∈ [k+1] : Sij |= f ⇒MP |= holdsat( f ,Ini , j ) (T2.1)
∀i ∈ [1,n],∀ j ∈ [k] : e ∈ E ij ⇒MP |= occurred(e,Ini , j ) (T2.2)
∀i ∈ [1,n],∀ j ∈ [1,k] : f ∈ (S j \S j−1)∩F iinert ⇒MP |= initiated( f ,Ini , j −1) (T2.3)
∀i ∈ [1,n],∀ j ∈ [1,k] : f ∈ (Sij \Sij+1)∩F iinert ⇒MP |= terminated( f ,Ini , j +1) (T2.4)
∀i ∈ [1,n],∀ j ∈ [k] : e = ctr j ⇒MP |= observed(e,Ini , j ),
MP |= compObserved(e, j ),
MP |= obs( j ) (T2.5)
∀i ∈ [1,n],∀ j ∈ [k] : e = strij 6= enull ⇒MP |= occurred(e,Ini , j ) (T2.6)
∀i ∈ [1,n],∀ j ∈ [k] : enull = strij ⇒MP |= occurred(null,Ini , j ) (T2.7)
∀i ∈ [1,n],∀e ∈ E iobs :MP |= evtype(e,Ini ,ex) (T2.8)
∀i ∈ [1,n],∀e ∈ E iinst :MP |= evtype(e,Ini ,inst) (T2.9)
∀i ∈ [1,n],∀ f ∈F iinert :MP |= ifluent(f,Ini ) (T2.10)
∀i ∈ [1,n],∀ f ∈F ininert :MP |= nifluent(f,Ini ) (T2.11)
∀i ∈ [1,n] :MP |= inst(Ini ) (T2.12)
∀i ∈ [k] :MP |= instant(i ) (T2.13)
MP |= start(0) (T2.14)
∀i , j ∈ [k] : j = i +1⇒MP |= next(i , j ) (T2.15)
MP |= final(k) (T2.16)
Then, MP is an answer set of P∗ = ground(ΠML(k)).
Proof. See the appendices.
This concludes the demonstration of the soundness and completeness of the formal and
computational frameworks, with respect to each other.
4.6. RELATED WORK
In this chapter we presented a computational framework for reasoning about multi–level
governance. That is, we focussed on the practical side. Whilst there are many practical
institutional reasoning frameworks, we find none which contribute automated reasoning for
determining compliance in multi–level governance. We discuss the related work in more
detail as follows.
There have been many different approaches proposed to reason about institutions, nor-
mative systems and organisations which we split into three broad types. Firstly, those
proposing a high–level institution specification language (e.g. [63, 159, 160]) for insti-
tution designers to precisely specify an institution’s software implementation. Secondly,
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those proposing or studying formal logics of norms and other institutional rules (e.g. [26,
58, 110, 111, 165, 229]). Thirdly, those contributing frameworks for formally representing
and reasoning about institutions and normative systems, with an aim for practical imple-
mentations using an algorithmic or logic–programming based approach (e.g. [42, 43, 98,
103, 130, 154]). Our work most closely relates to the latter practical frameworks, which we
discuss in more detail.
The most closely related framework, on which we build, is the Institutional Action Lan-
guage, InstAL, first proposed by Cliffe et al. [42, 43]. Li et al. have made developments on
InstAL for detecting conflicts between norms [156], in particular in interacting institutions
[155] and cooperating institutions [154]. In the work of Li et al. institutions are linked
with special bridge institutions such that events occurring in one can cause events to occur
in another and likewise for fluents being initiated or terminated. Such bridge institutions
have a similar role to our links between different levelled institutions. The difference is that
bridge also operate as a king of institution, evolving from one state to the next such that
the bridges (links) between institutions can change over time. In contrast, we use institu-
tional links which remain static over time. Further developments on InstAL were realised
by Pieters et al. [194, 195] for reasoning about institutions as a means to police and enforce
security policies. In their work, Pieters et al. [194, 195] extend InstAL with rules for non–
inertial fluents which (in our own words) state “when context C holds then so does fluent
B”. These bear similarity to our fluent derivation rules of the form “fluent A derives fluent
B in context C”. But, in our case we view fluent derivation rules as firstly ascribing a special
meaning to a concrete fluent ‘A’ (hence they have a different form) and secondly serving
as a basis for abstracting normative fluents. Our work is also related to our previous work
which was loosely based on InstAL [144, 145] for reasoning about multi–tier institutions
and higher–order norms.
The main differences between these developments and this chapter is we have extended
InstAL for representation and reasoning about multi–level governance. In more detail,
there are differences in reasoning about permissive societies (where anything not prohib-
ited is permitted), instantaneous and indefinite norms, bridged versus linked institutions,
non–inertial fluent rules versus fluent derivation rules, and our main focus in this chapter:
combining higher–order normative reasoning and norm abstraction. We summarise all of
these differences in Table 4.7.
Also relevant are practical approaches for reasoning about normative social commit-
ments (e.g. contracts, promises) [113, 243], using the Event Calculus [150]. These bear
similarity to our own approach since we use EC–like constructs (initiation and termination
of fluents driven by events) and reasoning. Commitments have been formalised with ‘life-
cycle’ elements not present in our notion of norms, such as the creation and deletion of the
commitment/rule (e.g. through an utterance) which in turn imposes obligations in partic-
ular circumstances. Higher–order commitments are grammatical in these approaches but
do not coincide with our notion of higher–order norms. In our case, a higher–order norm
represents a statement such as ‘the outcome of your rules should not be an obligation to do
X in context C’, where X can be a concrete or abstract notion. On the other hand, nested
commitments represent ‘you have promised to me that you will not make a commitment
towards person X to do Y in context C’, here the nesting simply represents that a rule of a
specific form should not be created, regardless of the rule’s effects and the abstract meaning
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Table 4.7: Comparison between closely related developments on InstAL.
of those effects. Consequently, nested commitments, come from a fundamentally different
perspective and are not aligned with our formalisation of regulations which govern other
regulations nor do they capture abstraction.
Another practical institutional reasoning approach is temporal defeasible deontic logic.
Defeasible logic is a non–monotonic logic designed to be implemented in Prolog [13, 183].
There are three rules types in defeasible logic, strict rules (→) whose conclusion is true
so long as the antecedent is true, defeasible rules (⇒) whose conclusion is true unless the
rule is rebutted by another rule, and defeating rules ( ) whose conclusion is never true
but if the antecedent is true rebuts other rules with a contradictory conclusion. Defeasible
logic comprises a proof procedure where rule conclusions are tested for whether they are
true by first asserting them as an argument, then finding all counter–arguments which re-
but them by applying defeating rules, and then recursively counter–attacking all rebuttals
with further arguments, terminating by constraints on non–repeatability of arguments (e.g.
[200]). Defeasible temporal deontic logics proposed by Governatori et al. [98, 103] ex-
tend defeasible logic with rule types and proof procedures for obligations and temporalised
outcomes. In these proposals various legal concepts are formalised, including constitutive
rules and norms. But as far as we know there have been no developments on these ap-
proaches towards norms governing norms and/or norm abstraction, such as for reasoning
about compliance in multi–level governance.
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4.7. DISCUSSION
In this chapter, we answered the question “how can institutional design compliance in
multi–level governance be computationally verified?” with a computational framework.
In doing so, we provided a practical way to reason with the semantics proposed in the pre-
vious chapter. We assessed our proposal along two fronts. Firstly, with a comprehensive
case study based on three–levelled governance in EU law where abstraction and context–
sensitivity are important in determining non–compliance. Secondly, by proving that the
practical implementation in Answer–Set Programming, the computational framework, is
indeed sound and complete with respect to the formal framework showing the two cor-
respond. We used the fact that the formal framework corresponds to the computational
framework to implement the proposal by extending the InstAL compiler, thereby offering
users a high–level language in order to specify multi–level governance and the means to
automatically detect (non–)compliance. To summarise, this chapter provides both a prac-
tical way to determine compliance in multi–level governance and also a way to assess the
previous chapter’s proposed semantics with a real–world case study and its execution.
The main weakness of this chapter’s contributions is that it is heavily dependent on
Answer–Set Programming. In one sense this is not a problem, since the previous chapter
proposed a semantics which ‘stand on their own’. In another sense, this chapter aims to pro-
vide practical reasoning, whilst certain limitations of answer–set programming have prac-
tical implications. Specifically, due to answer–set programming’s limitations, this chapter
was unable to provide general rules for all of the semantics proposed in the previous sec-
tion. In particular, the deontological abstraction semantics, characterised as a function in
the previous section, are represented as a flattened function in the form of ASP rules in
this section. What this means is that any time an institution design is changed and we
wish to check its compliance, then the high–level description of an institution needs to be
newly compiled in its entirety to an Answer–Set Program. If deontological abstraction’s
semantics had a general set of ASP rules, then only the changed rules in the changed in-
stitution would need a new corresponding ASP representation. To address this weakness,
future work should investigate different representation results. Possible ways to achieve
this include a corresponding representation in Prolog (e.g. as for defeasible logic [13]) or
an embedding in a higher–order logic theorem prover where the higher–order logic could
act as a meta–language in which to represent the semantics from the previous section (e.g.
as in [18]).
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This chapter makes the following contributions:
• An application of Inductive Logic Programming (ILP) in ASP, demonstrated with
an implementation, to provide a mechanism that successfully revises rules of a non–
compliant institution to ensure it is compliant.
• A revision mechanism that ensures institution revisions are minimal in their regula-
tory effects through adding, deleting and modifying rules, thereby keeping as closely
as possible to the designer’s original intentions.
In chapters 3 and 4 we presented a formal and computational framework for determin-
ing compliance in multi–level governance. The contributions can be used by a judiciary
to determine punishments for non–compliance or by a legislature to avoid enacting non–
compliant legislation. However, at this point in the dissertation it is unclear how a legislature
should address non–compliance by changing an institutional design. In this chapter we re-
turn to the issue of rule change, but this time asking the question, how can we mechanically
find ways in which legislation can be modified to ensure it is compliant?
On the one hand, an institution designer wishes to avoid punishment for non–compliant
institution designs. On the other hand, an institution designer designed the non–compliant
institution with the aim of meeting particular societal outcomes. At the same time, it is
important not to just rectify non–compliance but also find the simplest explanation for non–
compliant institution designs in order to support a legislator in avoiding making the same
mistakes.
It is an arduous task to determine non–compliance, but even more arduous to rectify it
in a way that keeps as closely as possible to the legislature’s original intentions. Firstly be-
cause different rule modifications, namely addition, deletion and changes to the antecedent,
must be tried to determine if they result in compliance in various contexts and therefore find
a possible explanation for non–compliance. Secondly, they must be compared to alterna-
tive revisions that result in compliance to see if one makes fewer changes to the rules than
another, in order to find the simplest and most general explanation for non–compliance.
Thirdly, because different revisions must also be optimised for keeping as closely as possi-
ble to the designer’s original intentions by still producing the same legal effects (e.g. obli-
gations and prohibitions) that do not result in the institution design being non–compliant.
Clearly, this is a mechanical task ripe for computation.
The idea is to test different changes to an institution design in order to rectify non–
compliance and therefore find possible explanations for non–compliance. Then, to take the
simplest explanation, which minimally changes an institution’s outcomes and rules, and
apply it as a remedy. In this chapter we address the burden on the institution designer in
revising to be compliant with a computational mechanism which also minimise the changes
to the outcomes of the institution design.
This chapter builds on the previous chapters’ formal and computational frameworks.
However, this chapter deals with a simplified version of the formal and computational
framework. We discuss this simpler framework, its application to a new case study and
the approach we take in 5.1. Then, we present the computational mechanism for success-
fully and minimally revising an institution for compliance in section 5.2. We finish this
chapter by comparing to other mechanisms for revising institutions and sets of rules in 5.3
and conclude with discussion on limitations and wider implications in section 5.4.
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5.1. APPROACH
In this chapter, we look at revising rules for compliance. As we saw in the previous chapter,
individual institutions which are governed by other institutions (in that case, within multi–
level governance), can be represented as ASP rules. Building on that idea, the approach we
take to revising an institution to be compliant is to revise its representation as ASP rules,
using ASP itself to try various rule modifications.
However, as we discussed at the end of the preceding chapter, there is a limitation of
the approach taken due to two contributing factors. Firstly, because whenever a constitutive
rule is changed in an institution, then the abstract meaning of concrete normative fluents,
which is derived from the constitutive rules, also changes. Secondly, because normative
fluent abstraction is represented in ASP as specific ASP rules (rather than a general seman-
tics as in our formal framework). Taking these two factors together, this means whenever a
constitutive rule is changed in ASP then potentially other ASP rules must also be changed
representing the abstraction of a normative fluent. Consequently, if we use the framework
presented in the preceding section which includes ASP rules for abstracting normative flu-
ents, then the process of changing rules involves firstly, changing the rules, secondly de-
termining all other normative fluent abstraction rules which need to be changed or added.
This is a complex process and consequently we look at a simpler problem where we change
rules in institutions governed by institutions, where each governance level operates at the
same level of abstraction.
To address this simpler problem, we first re–introduce a simpler version of our frame-
work. In this version of the framework, we define multi–tier institutions, first presented in
[144], which defines a tiering of institutions, each institutional tier governing the tier below,
where norms are not abstracted. We overview the simpler framework in subsection 5.1.1,
then introduce the formal representation in subsection 5.1.2, then we provide the opera-
tional semantics in ASP in subsection 5.1.4. Finally, we describe the main technique we
use, Inductive Logic Programming (ILP) theory revision, in subsection 5.1.6.
5.1.1. MULTI–TIER INSTITUTIONS
We begin by providing an overview of individual and multi–tier institutions, schematically
depicted in figure 5.1. To recap the main concepts, an individual legal institution acts as
a mechanism to guide the behaviour of the system it governs. Institutions define a set of
constitutive and regulative rules which respectively establish an institutional description and
prescription of reality (see Searle’s counts–as relation [215]). Constitutive rules describe
the system governed through creating institutional facts that can represent events caused by
other events (e.g. entering a location which is private counts–as entering a private location),
or they can represent changes to the institutional state (e.g. entering a private location
causes an agent to be at a private location). Regulative rules prescribe what properties
should hold/events should occur in a system by creating obligations and prohibitions in
states (e.g. when requested an agent is obliged to share their location). An institution’s
regulative rules regulate over a social interpretation of reality constructed from brute facts
by constitutive rules.
Conceptually, a multi–tier institution extends the notion of an individual institution gov-
erning an MAS to institutions governing institutions in a tiered structure. Each institutional
tier governs the tier below. The first–tier imposes norms on what occurs and holds in an
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Figure 5.1: Schematic view of a multi–tier institution model
MAS (first–order norms), the second–tier norms on the norms imposed by the first (norms
about first–order norms, i.e. second–order norms), and so on. When a lower–tier imposes a
normative fluent which is non–compliant with a higher–tier, events denoting a higher–order
norm violation occur.
The operational semantics of a multi–tier institution, first presented in [144], allow
such non–compliance to be determined by checking a multi–tier institution model for norm
violations. Depicted in Figure 5.1, the model describes how each i th–tier institution evolves
over time, as an event–state sequence, in response to the evolution of the tier below. The
first–tier evolves in response to a trace of observable events that could occur in an MAS
(i.e. produced for a pre–runtime check). Each tier above the first evolves in response to
the event–state sequence of the institution they govern (i.e. the tier below). States contain
domain fluents describing the MAS and normative fluents prescribing the events that should
occur and fluents that should hold in the tier below (including other normative fluents). Each
state transition is caused by events occurring in the institution from the previous state, which
are in turn driven by the events and states from the tier below. If a normative fluent in a
state is violated by an event or fluent in the tier below (including another normative fluent)
a norm violation event occurs in the transition to the next state. Thus, model–checking can
be used to compliance–monitor one institution with another by checking for higher–order
norm violation events.
Differing from previous chapters 3 and 4 on multi–level governance institutions, in this
chapter multi–tier institutions restrict each i th tier in regulating the tier below i th–order
norms. Moreover, each institutional state does not include the abstraction of any concrete
normative fluents.
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5.1.2. FORMAL REPRESENTATION
In this section we provide the formal representation of institutions and multi–tier institu-
tions from [144] as follows. We start with the representation for normative fluents, which
oblige/prohibit an event occurring or another fluent holding (the aim) before an event occurs
or fluent holds (the deadline). The language of normative fluents is over a set of propositions
denoting fluents and events describing the system being governed. If the set of propositions
includes only non–normative events and fluents, then only first–order normative fluents can
be expressed. If, however, the set of propositions contains first–order normative fluents,
then second–order normative fluents can be expressed and so on. Such higher–order nor-
mative fluents are categorised as: obliging/prohibiting a normative fluent holds before an
event or non–normative fluent holds, obliging/prohibiting an event or non–normative fluent
before a normative fluent holds, and obliging/prohibiting a normative fluent to hold before
another normative fluent holds.
Definition 24. Normative Fluents Let P be a set of propositions denoting fluents and
events, a be the norm’s aim, d the deadline and a,d ∈ P . The set of normative fluents
N |P is the set of all norms n expressed as:
n ::= obl(a,d) | pro(a,d)
Institutions in this chapter share many common characteristics of institutions presented
earlier. Formally, an institution is defined as and described subsequently:
Definition 25. Individual Institution An institution is a tuple I |P = 〈E ,F ,C,G,∆〉, re-
stricted to the set of propositions P , given Eobs,Einstact,Fdom ⊆ P , I |P is defined as:
• Fnorm ⊆N |P is a set of normative fluents.
• F =Fdom∪Fnorm is a set of fluents.
• Enorm = {disch(n),viol(n) | n ∈Fnorm}
• Einst = Einstact∪Enorm where Einstact and Enorm are disjoint.
• E = Eobs∪Einst.
• C :X ×E→ 2F ×2F is a state consequence function.
• G :X ×E→ 2Einstact is an event generation function.
• ∆⊆F is the initial institutional state.
In more detail, an institutional specification gives the signature of events (E ) that can
occur and fluents (F ) that can hold in the institution. The signature is specified from a set
of propositions P to which the institution I |P is restricted to (just I is used if P is unimpor-
tant). The events E is the set of observable events (Eobs), and the set of institutional events
(Einst). The set of institutional events (Einst) consists of events signifying something unre-
lated to a norm has happened (Einstact), or a norm has been discharged/violated (Enorm). The
set of an institution’s fluents (F ), describe the state of a domain (Fdom) such as that being
governed (e.g. an agent is at a location), and the normative fluents (Fnorm) that can hold
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in the institution. Each institution starts at an initial state (∆). An institution evolves from
one state to the next in response to observable events, where, an institutional state is a set of
fluents that are true at that point in time, Σ= 2F denoting the set of all possible institutional
states. Describing the events and state changes that occur are an event generation function
and state consequence function. Both functions’ arguments are a condition on a state, de-
scribing the things that must and must not hold in a state to cause the events/state change,
and a set of events. A condition on a state is described with state formulae, X = 2F∪¬F
denoting the set of all state formulae, where ¬F = {¬ f | f ∈ F } is the weak negation of
all fluents denoting they do not hold. The event generation function (G : X ×E → 2Einst )
states when, conditional on a state, one event counts–as another. The consequence function
(C :X ×E → 2F ×2F ) provides the fluents that are initiated and terminated by events from
one state to the next. As previously, we use C(X ,e)= 〈C↑(X ,e),C↓(X ,e)〉 to denote the con-
sequence function’s result, where C↑(X ,e) is the set of fluents initiated and C↓(X ,e) is the
set of fluents terminated by the event e when the state entails the state condition X .
The approach we take to representing a multi–tier institution is to restrict each i th–tier
institution such that it can contain events and fluents from all the tiers below for monitoring,
but can only govern the tier directly below by imposing i thorder norms. This restriction is
defined by, starting with a set of propositions P which describe the MAS’ events and fluents,
the first–tier I1|P1 imposes normative fluents over the events and fluents of the MAS (i.e.
first–order normative fluents) such that P1 = P . Then, each i th–tier above the first I i |P i
can contain the normative fluents and events (dischargement and violation) from the tiers
below for monitoring (P i = P i−1∪N |P i−1 ∪E i−1norm), but each i th–tier is restricted in only
initiating and terminating normative fluents over these (i.e. i thorder norms). This means,
an institution can potentially also impose norms about the dischargement and violation of
norms in the tier below. We leave this to the discretion of the designer, since in some cases it
can make sense, for example obliging a norm is violated before an obligation to pay a fine is
imposed. For monitoring, we will later define using ASP rules how each tier is linked, such
that each i th–tier contains the normative events and normative fluents produced/imposed
by the tier below. Formally, a multi–tier institution is defined as:
Definition 26. Multi–tier Institution Let P be a set of propositions denoting the domain, a
multi–tier institution is a tuple T = 〈I1|P1 , ...,In |Pn 〉 where:
• Each element of T is an individual institution s.t.
∀i ∈ [n] : I i |P i = 〈E i ,F i ,C i ,G i ,∆i 〉,X i = 2F
i∪¬F i ,
Σi = 2F i
• P1 = P and ∀i ∈ [2,n], P i = P i−1∪N |P i−1 ∪E i−1norm – each i th–tier can contain the
events and fluents that can be defined in the tier below and normative fluents over
these.
• ∀i ∈ [2,n],∀S ∈X i ,∀e ∈ E i : C i↑(S,e)∩N |P i−1 =;,C i↓(S,e)∩N |P i−1 =; – the i th–
tier can only initiate and terminate i thorder norms.
This concludes the representation for individual and multi–tier institutions.
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5.1.3. CASE STUDY
Now, we introduce our case study and demonstrate the multi–tier institution representation
by formalising it. Our case study is in the context of a system for crowdsourcing audio data
from users using specialised cellphone apps, called a soundsensing system [162]. Our case
study is for a tier–1 soundsensing institution (SS) which governs users contributing audio
data using cellphone apps, and for the tier–2 governmental institution (GI) which regulates
the regulations of the soundsensing system away from placing unacceptable limits on user’s
rights. The case study is formalised in table 5.1 and table 5.3. We follow the convention
that upper–case symbols stand for variables. For brevity we leave out the set of events and
fluents for each institution. Both institutions consist of rules describing the domain (e.g.
an agent entering a new location causes the agent to be at that location) and consider the
location ‘street b’ to be private and the agent ‘Bertrand’ to be a child (see the initial states).
The soundsensing institution is described as follows and formalised in Table 5.1:
Soundsensing Tier–1 Institution
• Entering a new location causes an agent to leave the previous location (SSIG.1).
• In general when a norm is violated a generic norm violation event occurs (SSIG.2,
SSIG.3 and SSIG.4).
• Due to a designer error, leaving a location also causes a generic norm violation event
(SSIG.5).
• A user entering a location which is private counts–as entering a private location
(SSIG.6).
• Likewise, leaving a location which is private counts–as leaving a private location
(SSIG.7).
• Entering a new location causes a user to be at that location (SSICI.1).
• Likewise, leaving a location means the user is no longer at their previous location
(SSICT.1).
• When a user turns 14 years of age, they are no longer considered a child (SSICT.2) as
defined in real–world regulations pertaining to the retention of children’s data[227].
• Users are obliged to provide their location on request to give the collected data loca-
tion context (SSICI.2).
• If a user violates a norm they are obliged to pay a fine (SSICI.3).
• Users are forbidden from turning their microphone off to ensure data is collected
continuously (SSIIS).
In turn, the soundsensing institution is governed by a tier–2 governmental institution
designed to meet different aims (e.g. maintaining agents’ rights). It is formalised in table 5.3
and described as follows:
Governmental Tier–2 Institution
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• Entering a new location causes an agent to leave the previous location (GGI.1).
• When a first–order norm is violated a generic norm violation event occurs (GGI.2
and GGI.3).
• Entering a location causes an agent to be at that location (CIGI.1).
• Likewise, leaving a location causes an agent to no longer be at that location (CTGI.1).
• If someone turns 14 years of age then they are no longer a child (CTGI.2), again,
based on real–world regulations pertaining to the retention of children’s data[227].
• It is obliged that fines are only imposed on users after they violate a norm. In the
initial state (GIIS) there is an obligation for a norm violation to occur before an
obligation to pay a fine is imposed. Naturally, the obligation for a norm violation to
occur first does not hold once a fine is imposed. If there is an obligation to pay a fine
and that obligation is discharged (i.e. the fine is paid), then the obligation for a norm
to be violated before a fine is imposed is reinstated (CIGI.2).
• When a user is in an area that forbids audio recording (i.e. a private area), it is
forbidden to forbid them from turning their microphone off (CIGI.3).
• It is forbidden to oblige children (users under the age of 14) to share their location
(GIIS). Similar regulations can be found in the United States Government’s Child
Privacy and Protection Act [227].
This concludes the formalisation of our case study. In the next section we will introduce
the computational framework we use in this chapter and present the results of using the
computational framework to check the compliance of the soundsensing institution with the
governmental institution.
Table 5.1: Soundsensing Institution Formalisation
GSS({at(Loc0,Ag0)},enter(Loc1,Ag0)) 3 leave(Loc0,Ag0) (SSIG.1)
GSS(;,viol(obl(share_location(Ag0),leave(Ag0, Loc0)))) 3
norm_violation(Ag0)
(SSIG.2)
GSS(;,viol(obl(share_location(Ag0),leave(Ag0, Loc0)))) 3
norm_violation(Ag0)
(SSIG.3)
GSS(;,viol(pro(microphone_off(Ag0),leave_soundsensing(Ag0)))) 3
norm_violation(Ag0)
(SSIG.4)
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GSS(;,enter(Ag0, Loc0)) 3 norm_violation(Ag0) (SSIG.5)
GSS({private(Loc0)},enter(Ag0, Loc0)) 3 enter_private(Ag0) (SSIG.6)
GSS({private(Loc0)}, leave(Ag0, Loc0)) 3 leave_private(Ag0) (SSIG.7)
CSS↑(;,enter(Loc0, Ag0)) 3 at(Ag0, Loc0) (SSICI.1)
CSS↑(;,request_location(Ag0)) 3
obl(share_location(Ag0), leave(Ag0, Loc0))
(SSICI.2)
CSS↑(;,norm_violation(Ag0)) 3
obl(pay_fine(Ag0), leave_soundsensing(Ag0))
(SSICI.3)
CSS↓(;, leave(Loc0, Ag0)) 3 at(Loc0,Ag0) (SSICT.1)
CSS↓({child(Ag0)},birthday(Ag0, 14)) 3 child(Ag0) (SSICT.2)
∆SS = {private(street_b),at(ada, street_b),
at(bertrand, street_c),child(bertrand),
pro(microphone_off(Ag0),leave_soundsensing(Ag0))}
(SSIIS)
Table 5.3: Governmental Institution Formalisation
GGI({at(Loc0,Ag0)},enter(Loc1,Ag0)) 3 leave(Loc0,Ag0) (GGI.1)
GGI(;,viol(obl(share_location(Ag0), leave(Ag0, Loc0)))) 3
norm_violation(Ag0)
(GGI.2)
GGI(;,viol(pro(microphone_off(Ag0),leave_soundsensing(Ag0)))) 3
norm_violation(Ag0)
(GGI.3)
CGI↑(;,enter(Loc0, Ag0)) 3 at(Ag0, Loc0) (CIGI.1)
CGI↑(;,disch(obl(pay_fine(Ag0),leave_soundsensing(Ag0)))) 3
obl(norm_violation(Ag0),
obl(pay_fine(Ag0),leave_soundsensing(Ag0)))
(CIGI.2)
CGI↑({private(Loc0)},enter(Loc0)) 3
pro(pro(microphone_off(Ag0),leave_soundsensing(Ag0)),
leave(Loc0))
(CIGI.3)
CGI↓(;, leave(Loc0, Ag0)) 3 at(Loc0,Ag0) (CTGI.1)
CGI↓({child(Ag0)},birthday(Ag0, 14)) 3 child(Ag0) (CTGI.2)
∆GI = {obl(norm_violation(Ag0),
obl(pay_fine(Ag0),leave_soundsensing(Ag0)),
pro(obl(share_location(bertrand),leave(Ag0, Loc0)),
birthday(bertrand, 14))}∪∆SS
(GIIS)
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5.1.4. MULTI–TIER INSTITUTION OPERATIONALISATION IN ASP
The formal representation for multi–tier institutions is complemented by a correspond-
ing ASP operationalisation, much like in chapter 4, for automatic compliance checking
of lower–tier institutions with higher–tier institutions. The ASP program, comprises rules
using the familiar initiated(p, In, I), terminated(p, In, I), occurred(e, In, I),
holdsat(f, In, I), start(I ) and instant(I ) literals outlined previously, as well as the set of
state formula literals EX(X, In, I).
The ASP program comprises several components which we refer to later in this chapter.
Firstly, programs presented in the preceding chapter:
• A program representing a trace of observable events used as input for producing
multi–tier models, the timeline program Πtrace(k) given previously in definition 21.
• an implementation of the operational semantics, the reasoning programΠbase(k) given
previously in definition 22.
Secondly, two new types of ASP program:
• Programs ΠI i for each individual institution I i in the multi–tier institution M ac-
cording to the translation given in the subsequent definition 27.
• A program Πmtreas, given in subsequent definition 28. It represents the filtering func-
tions linking the individual institutions in a multi–tier institution, thereby ensuring
normative fluents and norm compliance events are passed from lower–tiers to higher–
tiers.
The new types of ASP program are defined as follows. First, the programs ΠI i for
representing each individual institution in a multi–tier institution in ASP. Defined and de-
scribed subsequently as:
Definition 27. Multi–tier Institution ASP Translation Let T = 〈I1|P1 , ...,In |Pn 〉 be a
multi–tier institution. The programs ΠI i are defined for each individual institution I i ac-
cording to the following translation: ∀i ∈ [1,n], (I i = 〈E i ,F i ,C i ,G i ,∆i 〉):
I i ⇔ tier(In,i).inst(In). ∈ΠI i (IT.1)
e ∈ E iobs ⇔ evtype(e,In,ex). ∈ΠI
i
(IT.2)
e ∈ E iinstact ⇔ evtype(e,In,in). ∈ΠI
i
(IT.3)
f ∈F i ⇔ ifluent(f,In). ∈ΠI i (IT.4)
C i↑(X ,e)= P⇔ ∀p ∈ P : initiated(p,In,I) :−
occurred(e,In,I), (IT.5)
EX(X, In, I). ∈ΠI i
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C i↓(X ,e)= P⇔ ∀p ∈ P : terminated(p,In,I) :−
occurred(e,In,I ), (IT.6)
EX(X, In, I). ∈ΠI i
G i (X ,e)= E⇔ ∀e ′ ∈ E : occurred(e ′,In,I) :−
occurred(e,In,I), (IT.7)
EX(X, In, I). ∈ΠI i
f ∈∆i ⇔ holdsat( f ,In,I) :−start(I). ∈ΠI i (IT.8)
In more detail, the tier each institution operates at is declared as a fact (IT.1). Events
and fluents are declared as facts as usual (IT.2 to IT.4). Fluents are initiated (IT.5) and
terminated (IT.6) as usual according to the state consequence function. Likewise, events
occur as usual according to the event generation function (IT.7). Finally, the initial state is
represented with holdsat/3 atoms (IT.8).
The links between tiers, for ‘passing up’ normative fluents and norm compliance events
from lower–tiers to higher–tiers for compliance checking are defined as the following ASP
program:
Definition 28. Multi–tier Links ASP Program The program Πmtreas is the following ASP
program:
occurred(disch(obl(A,D)),HIn,I) :−occurred(disch(obl(A,D)),LIn,I),
tier(LIn,I1),tier(HIn,I2),
I2 == I1+1.
(MTS.1)
occurred(disch(pro(A,D)),HIn,I) :−occurred(disch(pro(A,D)),LIn,I),
tier(LIn,I1),tier(HIn,I2),
I2 == I1+1.
(MTS.2)
occurred(viol(obl(A,D)),HIn,I) :−occurred(viol(obl(A,D)),LIn,I),
tier(LIn,I1),tier(HIn,I2),
I2 == I1+1.
(MTS.3)
occurred(viol(pro(A,D)),HIn,I) :−occurred(viol(pro(A,D)),LIn,I),
tier(LIn,I1),tier(HIn,I2),
I2 == I1+1.
(MTS.4)
holdsat(obl(A,D),HIn,I) :−holdsat(obl(A,D),LIn,I),
tier(LIn,I1),tier(HIn,I2),
I2 == I1+1,start(I).
(MTS.5)
holdsat(pro(A,D),HIn,I) :−holdsat(pro(A,D),LIn,I),
tier(LIn,I1),tier(HIn,I2),
I2 == I1+1,start(I).
(MTS.6)
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initiated(obl(A,D),HIn,I) :−initiated(obl(A,D),LIn,I),
tier(LIn,I1),tier(HIn,I2),
I2 == I1+1,start(I).
(MTS.7)
initiated(pro(A,D),HIn,I) :−initiated(pro(A,D),LIn,I),
tier(LIn,I1),tier(HIn,I2),
I2 == I1+1,start(I).
(MTS.8)
terminated(obl(A,D),HIn,I) :−terminated(obl(A,D),LIn,I),
tier(LIn,I1),tier(HIn,I2),
I2 == I1+1,start(I).
(MTS.9)
terminated(obl(A,D),HIn,I) :−terminated(obl(A,D),LIn,I),
tier(LIn,I1),tier(HIn,I2),
I2 == I1+1,start(I).
(MTS.10)
This concludes our short introduction of multi–tier institution operationalisation in ASP.
5.1.5. EXECUTED CASE STUDY
In this section we execute our case study, comprising the soundsensing institution which is
governed by a governmental institution, formalised as a multi–tier institution. That is by ex-
ecuting the multi–tier institutions’ corresponding ASP programs, ΠISS , ΠIGI , together with
the program linking them Πmtreas, the base semantics program Πbase(k) and an observable
trace program Πtrace(k), in the last two cases for a trace of observable events of length k. In
our case, the trace program comprises an event sequence with three elements, represented
as the following ASP facts:
1 compObserved(ex_enter(ada, street_b), 0).
2 compObserved(ex_request_location(ada), 1).
3 compObserved(ex_request_location(bertrand), 2).
In this short trace, first Ada enters a new location, street_b, then Ada’s location is
requested and finally Bertrand’s location is requested. For this short trace, three cases
of non–compliance of the soundsensing institution with the governmental institution are
discovered, as depicted in figure 5.2.
Firstly, when Ada enters a new location due to an erroneous rule in the soundsensing
institution (a designer error), a generic norm violation event occurs in the soundsensing
institution (the first state transition). Due to the generic norm violation event occurring,
the soundsensing institution imposes an obligation for Ada to pay a fine in state S1. How-
ever, the governmental institution only recognises actual norm violation events as causing a
generic norm violation event and obliges an actual norm is violated before an obligation to
pay a fine is imposed. Consequently, the governmental institution’s higher–order norm for
there to be a norm violation before an obligation to pay a fine is imposed is violated in the
transition from S1 to S2.
Secondly, in the soundsensing institution agents are unconditionally prohibited from
turning their microphone off, however the governmental institution prohibits such a prohibi-
tion when an agent enters a private location. When Ada enters a private location (street_b)
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S0
1) + – at(ada, street_a):
governmental, soundsensing
2) + at(bertrand, street_c):
governmental, soundsensing
3) + child(bertrand):
governmental, soundsensing
4) + obl(norm_violation(ada), obl(
pay_fine(ada),
leave_soundsensing(ada))):
governmental
5) + obl(norm_violation(bertrand),
obl(pay_fine(bertrand),
leave_soundsensing(bertrand))) :
governmental
6) + private(street_b) :
governmental, soundsensing
7) + pro(microphone_off(ada),
leave_soundsensing(ada)):
governmental
8 + pro(microphone_off(ada),
leave_soundsensing(ada)):
governmental, soundsensing
9) + pro(microphone_off(bertrand),
leave_soundsensing(bertrand)):
governmental, soundsensing
10) + pro(obl(share_location(
bertrand), leave(bertrand,
street_a)), birthday(bertrand,
14)) : governmental
11) pro(obl(share_location(
bertrand), leave(bertrand,
street_b)), birthday(bertrand,
14)) : governmental
12 + pro(obl(share_location(
bertrand), leave(bertrand,
street_c)), birthday(bertrand,
14)) : governmental
13 + pro(obl(share_location(
bertrand), leave(bertrand,
street_d)), birthday(bertrand,
14)) : governmental
S1
enter(ada, street_b):
governmental, soundsensing
norm_violation(ada):
soundsensing
leave(ada, street_a):
governmental, soundsensing
1) + at(ada, street_b):
governmental, soundsensing
2) at(bertrand, street_c):
governmental, soundsensing
3) child(bertrand): governmental,
soundsensing
4) obl(norm_violation(bertrand),
obl(pay_fine(bertrand),
leave_soundsensing(bertrand))):
governmental
5) + obl(pay_fine(ada),
leave_soundsensing(ada)):
governmental, soundsensing
6) + private(street_b):
governmental, soundsensing
7) pro(microphone_off(ada),
leave_soundsensing(ada)):
governmental, soundsensing
8) pro(microphone_off(bertrand),
leave_soundsensing(bertrand)):
governmental, soundsensing
9) pro(obl(share_location(
bertrand), leave(bertrand,
street_a)), birthday(bertrand,
14)): governmental
10) pro(obl(share_location(
bertrand), leave(bertrand,
street_b)), birthday(bertrand,
14)): governmental
11) pro(obl(share_location(
bertrand), leave(bertrand,
street_c)), birthday(bertrand,
14)): governmental
12) pro(obl(share_location(
bertrand), leave(bertrand,
street_d)), birthday(bertrand,
14)): governmental
13) – obl(norm_violation(ada),
obl(pay_fine(ada),
leave_soundsensing(ada))):
governmental
14) +– pro(pro(microphone_off(
ada), leave_soundsensing(ada)),
leave(ada, street_b)):
governmental
S2
request_location(ada):
governmental
request_location(ada):
soundsensing
viol(pro(pro(microphone_off(a
leave_soundsensing(ada)) leave(
ada street_b))) : governmental
viol(obl(norm_violation(ada),
obl(pay_fine(ada)
leave_soundsensing(ada)))) :
governmental
1) + obl(share_location(ada),
leave(ada, street_b)):
governmental, soundsensing
2) at(ada, street_b): governmental,
soundsensing
3) at(bertrand, street_c):
governmental, soundsensing
child(bertrand): governmental,
soundsensing
4) obl(norm_violation(bertrand),
obl(pay_fine(bertrand),
leave_soundsensing(bertrand))):
governmental, soundsensing
5) obl(pay_fine(ada),
leave_soundsensing(ada)):
governmental, soundsensing
6) obl(share_location(ada), leave(
ada, street_b)): governmental,
soundsensing
7) private(street_b):
governmental, soundsensing
8) pro(microphone_off(ada),
leave_soundsensing(ada)):
governmental, soundsensing
9) pro(microphone_off(bertrand),
leave_soundsensing(bertrand)):
governmental, soundsensing
10) pro(obl(share_location(
bertrand), leave(bertrand,
street_a)), birthday(bertrand,
14)): governmental
11) pro(obl(share_location(
bertrand), leave(bertrand,
street_b)), birthday(bertrand,
14)): governmental
12) pro(obl(share_location(
bertrand), leave(bertrand,
street_c)), birthday(bertrand,
14)): governmental
13) pro(obl(share_location(
bertrand), leave(bertrand,
street_d)), birthday(bertrand,
14)): governmental
S3
request_location(bertrand):
governmental, soundsensing
1) at(ada, street_b): governmental,
soundsensing
2) at(bertrand, street_c):
governmental, soundsensing
3) child(bertrand): governmental,
soundsensing
4) obl(norm_violation(bertrand),
obl(pay_fine(bertrand),
leave_soundsensing(bertrand))):
governmental, soundsensing
5) obl(pay_fine(ada),
leave_soundsensing(ada)):
governmental, soundsensing
6) obl(share_location(ada), leave(
ada, street_b)): governmental,
soundsensing
7) + obl(share_location(bertrand),
leave(bertrand, street_c)):
governmental, soundsensing
8) private(street_b): governmental,
soundsensing
9) pro(microphone_off(ada),
leave_soundsensing(ada)):
governmental, soundsensing
10) pro(microphone_off(bertrand),
leave_soundsensing(bertrand)):
governmental, soundsensing
11) pro(obl(share_location(
bertrand), leave(bertrand,
street_a)), birthday(bertrand,
14)): governmental
12) pro(obl(share_location(
bertrand), leave(bertrand,
street_b)), birthday(bertrand,
14)): governmental
13) pro(obl(share_location(
bertrand), leave(bertrand,
street_d)), birthday(bertrand,
14)): governmental
14) – pro(obl(share_location(
bertrand), leave(bertrand,
street_c)), birthday(bertrand,
14)): governmental
S4
viol(pro(obl(share_location(
bertra leave(bertrand street_c)),
birthday(bertrand 14))) :
governmental
Figure 5.2: Results for a trace, the originating institutions for an event or a fluent are in bold, newly initiated
fluents are denoted with a + and terminated fluents which will cease to hold in the next state are denoted with –.
Violated second–order norms in the second–tier governmental institution are highlighted .
there is still a prohibition on her from turning her microphone off. Consequently, the prohi-
bition on prohibiting Ada from turning her microphone off when she is in a private location
is violated during the transition from state S1 to S2.
Thirdly, when an agent is requested to provide their location the soundsensing institu-
tion obliges them to do so, but this is forbidden by the governmental institution if the agent
is a child, such as Bertrand. In state S3 the soundsensing institution obliges Bertrand, a
child, to share his location. Consequently, in the final state transition the governmental in-
stitution’s prohibition on obliging Bertrand to share his location is violated. This concludes
our presentation of non–compliance for the case study in this chapter. In the final part of this
section we will discuss the approach we take to automatically resolving non–compliance,
by using Inductive Logic Programming.
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5.1.6. INDUCTIVE LOGIC PROGRAMMING: A BRIEF OVERVIEW
We view the problem of revising lower–tier institutions to be compliant with higher–tier
institutions as a theory revision (TR) problem which can be solved using Inductive Logic
Programming (ILP). ILP [180] is a machine learning technique concerned with the induc-
tion of logic theories that generalise (positive and negative) examples with respect to a prior
background knowledge. In non–trivial problems it is crucial to define the search space ac-
curately. This is done by a language bias, that can be expressed using the notion of mode
declarations [180], describing the structure of the elements in the target theory. In the case
presented here, we want to find the ASP rules that contain certain elements in the head and
body. So we will have head and body mode declarations.
An ILP theory revision task is a tuple 〈P,B ,M〉 where P is a set of conjunctions of
literals, called properties, B is a normal program, called the background theory, M is a set
of mode declarations describing the form that rules in the revised theory can take and s(M)
is the set of rules adhering to M . A theory H , called a hypothesis, is an inductive solution
for the task 〈P,B ,M〉, if (i) H ⊆ s(M), and (ii) P is true in all the answer sets of B ∪H .
Our approach to revising a lower–tier institution in a multi–tier institution to be com-
pliant is based on the introduction of new rules, and deleting and revising existing ones.
As discussed in [45], non–monotonic inductive logic programming can be used to revise
an existing theory. The key concept is that of minimal revision. In general, a TR system is
biased towards the computation of theories that are similar to a given revisable theory. The
difference between two programs T and T ′ is denoted as c(T,T ′).
The theory T ′, called a revised theory, is a TR solution for the task 〈P,B ,T,M〉 with
distance c(T,T ′), iff (i) T ′ ⊆ s(M), (ii) P is true in all the answer sets of B ∪T ′, (iii) if
a theory S exists that satisfies conditions (i) and (ii) then c(T,S) ≥ c(T,T ′), (i.e. minimal
revision).
5.2. REVISING INSTITUTIONS FOR COMPLIANCE
In this section we give the details of this chapter’s main contribution: a system for revising
a lower–tier institution to be compliant with a higher–tier institution in a multi–tier insti-
tution. In particular, we are interested in revising the institution which the system user
(an institutional designer) has the power to effect change. We call this institution to be re-
vised a mutable institution. We are interested in revising a mutable institution to meet two
properties:
• Success meaning that a formerly non–compliant institution for an event–trace is com-
pliant for the same event trace after being revised. This means when normative fluents
are obliged to be imposed they are, and conversely any prohibited normative fluents
are not imposed.
• Minimality is a requirement for any revision to minimise the change in consequences
of the new institution compared to the old one. That is, following changes to the
institution the institution’s states are as close as possible to the states prior to the
change(s) for a trace of events. To give an example, the soundsensing institution pro-
hibits agents to turn their cellphone microphone off, whilst the governmental institu-
tion prohibits such a prohibition in areas deemed ‘private’. In this case, an institution
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revision can be successful by removing the soundsensing institution’s prohibition al-
together, but only successful and minimal by removing the prohibition in just those
cases where an agent is at a private location.
We instantiate the problem of revising a mutable institution as an ILP theory revision
task in Section 5.1.6. Then, we take a computational approach to solving the ILP theory
revision task by performing inductive search in ASP [47]. Inductive search is achieved
by transforming the mutable institution represented in ASP to an ASP representation en-
coding the space of ILP theory revisions and enabling different revisions to be tried. We
describe our computational approach using ASP in Section 5.2.2, and the implementation
and revision results for our case study in Section 5.2.3.
5.2.1. REVISING INSTITUTIONS TO BE COMPLIANT IS AN ILP THEORY
REVISION TASK INSTANCE
In this section, we define the revision for compliance task as an ILP revision task according
to the revision for compliance requirements outlined previously. We begin by formally
defining the search space of possible revisions with mode declarations. Mode declarations
define the literals that can appear in the head and body of rules. In the case of revising
a mutable institution in a multi–tier institution, the mode declarations describe the valid
rules for: generating non–normative institutional events, initiating and terminating domain
fluents, and given the mutable institution is the i th–tier, initiating and terminating i thorder
normative fluents (i.e. restricted to only initiating/terminating a normative fluent f if it is
not in the language of norms N |Pri−1 of the tier i −1 below).
Definition 29. Mode Declarations. Let I i = 〈E i ,F i ,G i ,C i ,∆i 〉 be a mutable institution
for which In is a unique label. The mode declarations for I i are a pair M = 〈Mh ,Mb〉
where Mh is the set of head mode declarations and Mb the set of body mode declarations,
defined as:
Mh = {initiated( f ,In,I),terminated( f ,In,I) : f ∈F \N |Pri−1 }∪
{occurred(e,In,I) : e ∈ E iinstact}
Mb = {holdsat( f ,In,I),¬holdsat( f ,In,I) : f ∈F i }∪
{occurred(e,In,I) : e ∈ E i }
The set of compatible rules with the head and body mode declarations are also required
to contain one and only one event in the body. The compatible rules are defined as:
Definition 30. Compatible Rules. Let M = 〈Mh ,Mb〉 be the mode declarations for a mu-
table institution I i = 〈E i ,F i ,G i ,C i ,∆i 〉. An ASP rule l0 :− l1, ...,ln. where n ∈N is com-
patible with M iff l0 ∈ Mh , ∀i ∈ [1,n] : li ∈ Mb and |{l1, ..., ln}∩ {occurred(e,In,I) : e ∈
E i }| = 1. The set of all compatible rules with M is s(M).
Having described the search space of revisions, a theory revision task TR needs to be
instantiated with the properties P that a solution must meet. These properties are typically
positive examples (formulae that are true following a revision) and negative examples (for-
mulae that are false following a revision). In our case we are only interested in supplying
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negative examples, stating that non–compliance is eradicated in a solution to TR. The nega-
tive examples in P are represented as ASP integrity constraints requiring a revised mutable
institution is compliant with all higher–order norms it can violate – including those it does
not violate before revision – ensuring revision does not cause further non–compliance.
Definition 31. Compliance Properties. Let I i be a mutable institution and
I i+1 = 〈E i+1,F i+1,C i+1,G i+1,∆i+1〉 be the institution with unique name Ini+1 governing
I i where i ∈N. The compliance properties for I i is the set of constraints:
P = {:− occurred(viol(n),Ini+1,I),instant(I). : n ∈F i+1norm}
We can now instantiate an ILP theory revision task, as a compliance theory revision task
in a multi–tier institution according to the previous definitions:
Definition 32. Compliance Theory Revision Task. Let I i be a mutable institution in the
multi–tier institution M. An ILP theory revision task TR = 〈P,B ,T,M〉 is a compliance
theory revision task for I i iff: (a) P is a set of compliance properties for I i , (b) B is
the normal program comprising (i) a multi–tier reasoning program Πmtreas, (ii) the timeline
programΠtrace(k) and (iii) the institution representation programΠI j for each institution I j
in M apart from the mutable institution I i , (c) T is the institution representation program
ΠI i for the mutable institution I i , and (iv) M is the set of mode declarations for I i .
As outlined previously, we require solutions to theory revision to minimise the revision
cost in order to remain as close to an institution designer’s original intentions as possible.
More precisely, the requirement is that the changed, mutable, institution’s model for a com-
posite trace contains as many similarities between states compared to before the changes
were made (i.e. minimising the changes to consequences). We derive the cost of revi-
sion from the changes in consequences rather than the number of rule changes – as used
in [154] – since due to non–monotonicity, as the changes in consequences between two
versions of a mutable institution increases, the number of rule changes does not necessarily
monotonically increase. The changes in consequences are the number of added and deleted
fluents in the answer set for B ∪T compared to the answer–set B ∪T ′ for some revised
institution T ′ (i.e. the symmetric set difference between the answer–sets for B ∪T and for
B ∪T ′).
Definition 33. Theory Revision Cost Let TR= 〈P,B ,T,M〉 be a compliance theory revision
task for a mutable institution I with unique label In, T ′ be a solution to TR, ans be the
answer–set for B ∪T and ans′ be the answer–set for B ∪T ′ and ⊕ be the set symmetric
difference operation. The cost c(T,T ′) is defined as:
c(T,T ′)= ∣∣{ f = holdsat(p,In, i ) : i ∈N, f ∈ ans⊕ans′ }∣∣
Thus, a solution to an ILP theory revision task, instantiated as revision for compliance,
TR = 〈P,B ,T,M〉 is a search problem. The search space consists of all possible revised
versions of a mutable institution theory (normal program) and a solution T ′ to the theory
revision task is one which ensures the mutable institution is now compliant for a particular
trace (meets the properties in P) and minimal such that there is no revised theory S which
is ‘more minimal’ (c(T,S) ≥ c(T,T ′)). This requires searching all possible solutions and
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comparing them. In order to perform this search we need a way to try different changes
to T and find optimal solutions. In the next subsection we show how we can use ASP to
perform this search.
5.2.2. SOLVING ILP INSTITUTION REVISION IN ASP
Based on [154] we use inductive search in ASP to solve an ILP theory revision task TR =
〈P,B ,T,M〉 instantiated as institutional revision for compliance. The approach we take is
to transform the theory to be revised T (a mutable institution) into an ASP program where
different changes to the theory can be tried (body literal and rule addition and deletion) that
fit into the space of possibilities s(M). This is by redefining certain predicates in rules as
undefined, rather than being a necessary element of a rule. Such undefined predicates are
called abducibles.
We call this program, with previously fully–defined predicates now defined as ab-
ducibles, the revision program Πrev. The background theory B remains unchanged and
provides both the unchangeable parts of the multi–tier institution and multi–tier reason-
ing. The background theory allows the effects of different revisions to be determined. The
properties to be met, P , constrain any revisions found by the ASP program Πrev to result
in a compliant institution. The cost measure between a revisable T and revised theory
T ′, c(T,T ′) is encoded as an ASP optimisation statement. Computing the answer–sets for
these components as a single ASP program explores the search space, with each answer–
set representing an outcome (revised theory) that meets the properties P and with those that
minimise the difference (changes in consequences) ranked highest and presented to the user
for selection. The advantage of this approach is that the representation and reasoning for the
non–revisable portions of the multi–tier institution are encoded as the same ASP programs
for the computational and revision framework requiring no re–implementation.
In order to go from a revisable theory T representing a mutable institution to a revision
program Πrev, we need to alter T in some way such that adding new rules and changing
existing rules can be tried by the new program with each answer–set corresponding to dif-
ferent revised theories. The approach we take, as in [47, 154], is to introduce abducible
predicates which represent the different revision operations and are selected by the pro-
gram for inclusion in answer–sets. If an abducible is selected for answer–set inclusion then
the effect is to perform the revision operation the abducible represents. The abducibles have
the form rev(In,i,details(...)) conveying to the user the revision operation described in
details(...) (e.g. a rule deletion operation) is carried out on a rule with label i in institution
In. To give a simple example the rule l0 :− l1. cannot be selected for deletion by an ASP
program, but we can modify it to become l0 :−l1,not rev(In,i,details(rDel)). mean-
ing if the abducible rev(In, i ,details(rDel)) is included by the program in an answer–set
the effect is to delete the rule i by ensuring the body is never true. The selection of revision
tuples for inclusion in an answer–set is encoded in the ASP revision program using the ASP
choice construct of the form {rev(In,i,details(...))}.
Each type of revision operation (rule and body literal addition and deletion) requires
a different abducible and set of rules in the ASP revision program Πrev. In Table 5.6 we
describe the details of the different rules for trying revisions and the transformation from
a revisable theory T to a revision program Πrev using In to represent an institution’s name,
i to represent a rule identifier (e.g. an integer) and B+− (l ) to represent whether a literal l is
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Rules Describing Institution Changes Explanation
l0:− l1, ..., ln ,rev(In, i,details(rDel)).
{rev(In, i,details(rDel))}.
Rule deletion: Existing rules
are extended with an abducible
rev(In, i,details(rDel)), which
when included in an answer–set has the
effect of deleting the rule with index i .
l0:− l1, ..., l j−1,try(i , j ,B+− (l j ), l j ),
l j+1, ..., ln .
try(i , j ,B+− (l j ), l j ):− l j ,
not rev(In, i ,details(bDel, j )).
try(i , j ,B+− (l j ), l j ):−
rev(In, i ,details(bDel, j )).
{rev(In,i,details(bDel,j))}.
Body literal deletion: Each body literal
l j of an existing rule is replaced with
the literal try/4 for trying to delete the
body literal l j . When the abducible
rev(In, i ,details(bDel, j )) is included
in an answer–set the effect is to make
the try literal true and thus effectively
delete the literal l j , otherwise the try lit-
eral is only true when l j is true (effec-
tively keeping l j ).
l0:− rev(In, i,details(rAdd)), l1, ..., ln .
{rev(In, i,details(rAdd))}.
Rule addition: Including the abducible
rev(In, i,details(rAdd)) has the effect
of including the rule with index i in the
program.
l0:−l1, l2, ..., ln ,
extension(i , l0, ln+1,B+− (ln+1)).
extension(i , l0, ln+1,B+− (ln+1)):−
not rev(In, i ,details(bAdd,
B+− (ln+1), ln+1)).
extension(i , l0, ln+1,B+− (ln+1)):−
rev(In, i ,details(bAdd,
B+− (ln+1), l1), l1.
{rev(In, i ,details(bAdd,
B+− (ln+1), ln+1))}.
Body literal addition: Existing rules are
appended with extension/4 predicates
for each body mode literal a rule can
be extended with. Including the ab-
ducible rev(In, i ,details(bAdd, pos, l1)
in an answer–set has the effect of extend-
ing the rule with index i with the body
literal l1 (constraining the rule). That is,
adding the revision predicate to an an-
swer set makes the extension predicate
true only when the literal with the spec-
ified variable bindings are true, effec-
tively adding a constraint/body–literal to
the rule. Otherwise, the extension predi-
cate is always true (no constraint is tried
for addition).
Table 5.6: Explanation of how abducible revision predicates can (re–)define institutional rules for finding revisions
of the institution In
positive or negative.
Finally, the cost c(T,T ′) between two theories is encoded as an ASP optimisation con-
straint causing the ASP program to only present answer–sets that are minimal in the changes
to consequences between T ∪B and T ′∪B , which we also extend with a secondary prefer-
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ence for revisions that generalise the institution (deleting body literals and rules) rather than
specialising (adding new body literals and rules). The optimisation statement is given below
where X@n represents the priority n of minimising the numerical value X , difference/1
measures the difference between the states in the answer–set for the institution before and
after revision (in terms of added and removed fluents for each state), rAdd/1 counts the
rule additions, bAdd/1 the body additions, bDel/1 the body deletions and rDel/1 the rule
deletions.
1 #minimize {D@5: difference(D); RA@4: rAdd(RA); BA@3: bAdd(BA);
2 BD@2: bDel(BD); RD@1: rDel(RD)}.
5.2.3. IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS
A prototype system for revising a lower–tier institution to be compliant with a higher–tier is
implemented according to the description in the preceding sections.1 The implementation
is a compiler written in Java which, as depicted in Figure 5.3, takes as input the muta-
ble institution the institution designer has the power to effect change represented in ASP
(the mutable institution program ΠI i ) and outputs a revision program Πrev. The revision
program is then put together with compliance properties to be met by revisions, revision
cost minimisation optimisations and the background theory to remain unchanged (the non–
mutable institutions, the timeline program and the multi–tier institution reasoning). An
answer–set solver applied to the composition of these programs then produces minimal re-
vision suggestions for compliance (answer sets). The suggestions are passed to a user who
selects and applies a set of revisions, resulting in a compliant institution represented as an
ASP program.
In addition to the system presented in this chapter, the ASP compiler also addresses an
apparent lack of re–usability of institutions (e.g. using the same institution for different sets
of agents) due to their propositional nature. Rather than taking just propositional institu-
tions as input, the compiler also takes first–order institution theories containing variables
in the head and body of rules, together with bindings and monadic predicates to denote
types. To give an example, agent(ada) denotes ada is of type agent and agent(X) denotes
the variable X is any ground term of type agent. Thus, a designer does not need to write
a new propositional institution for the case where a new agent, Charles, joins the institu-
tionalised society with all the norms and domain fluents that are about Charles. Instead, a
fact agent(charles) can be added stating Charles is of type agent. In turn, the compiler
takes these more re–usable first–order institution theories as input and outputs a first–order
institution revision program that tries different variable bindings between head and body
literals’ variables of the same type.
For our case study, we have used our prototype compiler to produce a revision program
for sub–sets of the compliance problem. That is, dividing the program up into smaller parts
and resolving one case of non–compliance at a time for tractability, and testing all revision
suggestions together at the end to confirm they are consistent. Some of the minimal and
successful revisions found are given below (we keep to those we find most intuitive).
The first change suggested addresses the issue of non–compliance due to an obligation
1The prototype, multi–tier reasoning in ASP and the examples used in this chapter can be found at https:
//sourceforge.net/projects/multitierinstitutionlearning/files/.
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Revisable Theory:
Mutable Institution
Program - ΠI i
ASP to ASP Compiler
Revision Program
Compliance properties
+ cost minimisa-
tion optimisations
Answer Set Solver
Background Theory:
Non-mutable Institution Programs - ΠI j
Trace Program - Πtrace(k)
Multi-tier reasoning program - Πmtreas(k)
Revision Suggestions for
Compliance (Answer Sets)
Compliant Revised In-
stitution Program - ΠI i ′
Selects Revisions
Figure 5.3: Overview of using the implemented compiler and the multi–tier institution framework to resolve non–
compliance.
to pay a fine being imposed by the tier–1 soundsensing institution when an agent enters a
new area. Non–compliance occurs, because an agent entering a new area triggers a norm
violation event in the first tier institution regardless of whether a norm has been violated,
whilst the second tier obliges that a norm is genuinely violated before a fine is imposed. The
revision suggestion is to delete the rule in the first–tier soundsensing institution causing a
norm violation event to occur when an agent enters an area:
1 occurred(norm_violation(Agent0), soundsensing, I) :-
2 agent(Agent0), instant(I),
3 occurred(enter(Agent0, Location0), soundsensing, I),
4 location(Location0).
The second issue is that children (people under the age of 14) are obliged to share their
location when requested, but this is prohibited by the tier–2 governmental institution. The
following suggestion is one of several minimal changes found to ensure the non–compliant
obligation is not imposed on children. An additional constraint is placed that an agent,
Agent2, is not a child and the variable Agent2 is bound to the variable Agent0 denot-
ing the agent who would be obliged to share their location. This means that the obligation
can not be imposed on a child. The new variable Agent2 is introduced since the imple-
mentation relies on using unique variables for all literals and then systematically trying
different optional bindings between the variables (or no bindings). The new rule is:
1 initiated(obl(share_location(Agent0),
2 leave(Agent0, Location0)), soundsensing, I) :-
3 occurred(request_location(Agent1), soundsensing, I),
4 holdsat(at(Agent1, Location0), soundsensing, I),
5 not holdsat(child(Agent2), soundsensing, I), Agent0 = Agent1,
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6 Agent0 = Agent2, agent(Agent0), agent(Agent1), agent(Agent2),
7 location(Location0), instant(I).
Finally, the tier–2 governmental institution prohibits a prohibition on an agent to turn
their microphone off when they are in a private area. Yet, the tier–1 soundsensing institution
always prohibits turning a microphone off until the agent leaves the system (the prohibition
exists in the initial state). The revisions found are not to delete the rule initiating a pro-
hibition in the tier–1 soundsensing institution’s initial state, but instead, to terminate the
prohibition when an agent enters a private area and then initiate it again when they leave.
Although the revision adds two rules, it is minimal in the outcome of the tier–1 soundsens-
ing institution since there is still a prohibition on turning the microphone off in all other
cases where it is allowed by the tier–2 governmental institution:
1 terminated(pro(microphone_off(Agent0), leave_soundsensing(Agent0)),
2 soundsensing, I) :-
3 occurred(enter_private(Agent2), soundsensing, I),
4 agent(Agent2), agent(Agent0), Agent0=Agent2, instant(I).
5 initiated(pro(microphone_off(Agent0), leave_soundsensing(Agent0)),
6 soundsensing, I) :-
7 occurred(leave_private(Agent2), soundsensing, I), agent(Agent2),
8 agent(Agent0), Agent0=Agent2, instant(I).
5.3. RELATED WORK
There has been much work on norm change in normative systems, however, as far as we
are aware we are the first to propose a way to revise institutions to be compliant with other
institutions in a multi–tier institution.
The most closely related work is by Li et al. [154, 155] who also uses inductive search
in ASP to resolve an ILP theory revision task. Unlike us, their focus is on resolving norm
conflicts between multiple institutions governing a group of agents (e.g. when an agent
is prohibited to perform an action by one institution and obliged by another) and later the
general case of debugging ASP programs [157]. In comparison, we focus on revising non–
compliance between lower–tier and higher–tier institutions in a multi–tier institution. Our
proposal is based on Li et al. and extended to revising an i th–tier institution by adding new
rules or modifying/deleting pre–existing rules to impose i th–order norms. We also extend
the work to revising with minimal changes in the consequences of a revised institution (as
opposed to changed rules), finally we look at the creation and deletion of existing rules
which in our case study provides more minimal changes in the consequences compared to
rule modification.
Vasconcelos et al. [231] have proposed a technique for revising conflicting norms based
on first–order unification. Their proposal provides a fine–grained way to revise obliga-
tion/permission/prohibition predicates’ terms. For example, an obligation to be in an area
that overlaps with a prohibited area is revised by changing the obliged/prohibited areas for
an agent to be in. In contrast to our work, their focus is on modifying the obligation/per-
mission/prohibition predicates and not with adding/removing/modifying rules to meet a
particular property (compliance between institutions in our case).
Governatori and Rotolo [102] propose a way to use a defeasible logic to modify legal
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systems by introducing new norms which derogate, abrogate and annul norms using defea-
sible rules. Central to their proposal is the idea of a legal system being versioned and having
two timelines: the versioning timeline and the timeline of the legal system’s evolution (i.e.
which norms are imposed and when). We only consider the latter timeline, the evolution
of an institution (in our case during pre–runtime model checking) and focus on diagnosing
causes of non–compliance between institutions rather than assuming it is known what the
new information (rules) is.
Finally, on the more conceptual and theoretical side, Boella et al.[25] look at how to
classify different systems of norm change by investigating a set of rational norm change
postulates. Specifically, they look at normative system change to incorporate new condi-
tional norms in input/output logics and they investigate the set of consistent postulates for
different input/output logics. Again, this work also presupposes which conditional norms
should be added to the normative system/institution, thus any system meeting these postu-
lates is quite different from our proposal.
5.4. DISCUSSION
In this chapter we contributed an implemented automated system for revising a lower–tier
institution’s regulations to be compliant with the regulations of a higher–tier institution it is
governed by. The proposal addressed a problem created by pervasive legal artefacts in the
social world, where on the one hand institutions are used to govern other institutions in a
vertical governance structure we call multi–tier institutions, creating the potential for non–
compliant regulations. On the other hand, revising institutions’ regulations to be compliant
is non–trivial due to their inherent complexity.
Our proposal takes our previous formal and computational framework [144] for deter-
mining the compliance of institutions in multi–tier institutions. Then, viewing the problem
of revising an institution to be compliant as an instance of an ILP (Inductive Logic Pro-
gramming) theory revision task, we use inductive search in ASP based on [154] to solve the
ILP theory revision task for compliance. Inductive search in ASP is performed by trans-
lating, using an implemented compiler, from an ASP representation of an institution that
needs to be revised to be complaint where revisions cannot be tried and searched for, to
an ASP representation where revisions can be tried and thus revisions for compliance de-
termined. Then, our system goes about finding revisions that are successful in resolving
non–compliance and minimal in the changes to the institution’s consequences thus keeping
the changed institution as close as possible to the institution designer’s original intentions.
The system for revising institutions, for tractability, considers a fragment of the search
space of revisions: modifying and deleting existing rules and extending a single mutable in-
stitution with a limited number of rules. The successful and minimal revisions that do exist
(if any) within the space explored are guaranteed to be found. However, there may be more
minimal revisions that result in a well–formed institution (according to our representation
of institutions) outside of this space, but this space is bigger and takes longer to explore.
We consider this a problem that is important to address. Firstly with formal analysis
of the complexity of the full problem. Secondly, by studying the applicability of various
heuristics to the full search problem (e.g. genetic algorithms) that cannot guarantee a min-
imal solution is found (i.e. in the case of genetic algorithms instead converging on local
optima) but can help resolve tractability issues. As yet, it is unclear which heuristics are
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appropriate and how they can be incorporated into ILP revision as abducible search in ASP,
presenting an interesting challenge for future work.

6
FORMALISING INSTITUTIONAL
ENACTMENT VALIDITY
One of the major problems encountered in time travel is not that of becoming your own
father or mother. There is no problem in becoming your own father or mother that a
broad–minded and well–adjusted family can’t cope with. [...] The major problem is simply
one of grammar.
Douglas Adams, The Restaurant at the End of the Universe
This chapter is based on the following paper:
King, T. C., Dignum, V., & Jonker, C. M. (2016). When Do Rule Changes Count–as Legal Rule Changes?
In Proceedings of the 22nd European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI 2016). Frontiers in Artificial
Intelligence and Applications. Vol 285. (pp. 3 – 11). IOS Press. http://doi.org/10.3233/978–1–61499–672–9–3
[143]
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Previously, Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 covered soft constraints for institutional
design governance and how to comply with these soft constraints. In this chapter we look
at hard institutional constraints for institutional enactment governance, which make the
social actions of enacting institutional changes possible. This chapter makes the following
contributions:
• A novel representation of institutions for which changes can be enacted according
to secondary legal rules regulating rule change. In particular, secondary legal rules
represented as counts–as rule that make rule change possible and are conditional on
an extended notion of social context that includes conditions on past and present
states, institution versions and hypothetical effects of rule change.
• A novel semantics for reasoning about rule changes ascribed by rule–modifying
counts–as rules.
This chapter looks at institutional governance from the can perspective, in terms of
which rule changes can be enacted in which contexts and by whom. Specifically, we look at
the kinds of rules found in administrative law, which describes the procedures that must be
followed for rule change to take place and specifies what types of rule change are possible.
These are hard institutional constraints on rule enactment, in the sense that they make rule
changes (im)possible.
Whilst constitutive counts–as rules ascribe a social reality and how it changes over
time, they themselves are also subject to evolving over time when they are modified, such
as by a legislative body. Rule–modifying counts–as rules regulate changes to counts–as
rules themselves, “A counts–as modifying a rule in context C”, describing the legislative
procedure and the possible modification types. Rule–modifying counts–as rules are also
modifiable according to the rule modification regulations. In ([100, 102]) a defeasible logic
formalises legal rule change over time but not rule change regulation. In ([28]) counts–as
rules that regulate rule modifications are formalised, but not in a temporal setting. However,
thus far there has been no attention paid to formalising rule change regulated by counts–as
rules in a temporal setting.
This raises the question, in a temporal setting “how can we formalise practical reasoning
to determine when institutional rule changes count–as legally valid rule change enactments?
should we define when rule changes count–as legal and valid rule changes?” To give some
examples:
• Based on ([204, Art. 71]) parliament voting to enact a bill counts–as enacting it
within one month. Rule change affects institutional states (e.g. enacting a bill oblig-
ing fences to be painted white, or changing what counts–as parliament); rule changes
are conditional on the institutional state (e.g. whether a body constituting parliament
has voted).
• The UK government voted to retroactively require UK residents in a business part-
nership abroad to pay tax ([192, Sec. 58]), criminalising people in the past. Crim-
inalising retroactive modifications are not possible according to the European Con-
vention of Human Rights ([48, Art. 7]). Rule change affects institutional states (e.g.
criminalising people in the past); rule change is conditional on how it would change
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institutional states (e.g. if the change would criminalise people in the past then the
change is not possible).
• A monarch or parliament can enact and repeal laws. The monarch enacts a law oblig-
ing all fences are painted white. The parliament retroactively repeals the power for
the monarch to enact laws, reversing the fence–painting law enactment. Retroactive
rule change affects past rule–modifying counts–as rules; past rule modifications can
be unravelled due to a retroactive modification.
An interdependency exists between the counts–as rules that construct a social reality
and rule–modifying counts–as rules. Changing counts–as rules affects the past/present/fu-
ture institutional context and can change the modifications which happened in the past up
until the present; rule modifications are conditional on the past/present/future institutional
context and the hypothetical rule change effects. Whether a rule change counts–as a legal
rule change requires assessing the context in which the change takes place – comprising
both the present state of affairs and the potential rule change effects affecting whether a
rule change is legal in the first place.
In this chapter we address the question “how can we formally define when legally valid
institutional change enactments occur?”. The question is addressed by contributing the first
formalisation of rule change ascribed by counts–as rules accounting for the aforementioned
cases in a temporal setting. We introduce the notion of temporal rule–modifying counts–as
rules, “A counts–as modifying a rule in the past/present/future in context C”, which ascribe
rule changes. To account for institutions dually evolving from one social reality to the next
built by counts–as rules, as well as from on counts–as rule set to another, we adopt social
reality (state) and institution version timelines. We enhance context from referring to a built
social reality, to also a past social reality in different institution versions and the hypothet-
ical effects of rule change. Rule modifications can potentially affect past modifications by
changing the social context or contradicting previous modifications, we posit that the most
recent modifications are prioritised and can override past modifications.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. We begin by comparing what follows
with the InstAL framework which we use as a basis for our novel formalisation, and the
formalisation used in the previous chapters in 6.1. Then we present the formal represen-
tation 6.2. The novel formal semantics are given in 6.3. We apply our framework to real
case studies and examples used to test difficult edge cases in 6.4. Finally, we compare with
closely related work in 6.4.1 and conclude with wider implications and directions for future
work in 6.5.
6.1. COMPARISON WITH INSTAL
In this chapter we extend institutions first formalised in the InstAL (Institution Action Lan-
guage) framework ([42, 43]) where rules cannot be modified and rule change cannot be reg-
ulated, to be modifiable and modification–regulating. In InstAL an institution is a signature
comprising events, fluents and regulatory rules. An event is either institutional providing a
social interpretation (e.g. a person paying tax) of other institutional events and observable
events or is observable and exogenous to the institution corresponding to brute facts (e.g.
the event we call a person paying tax). Fluents describe/prescribe the domain (e.g. a person
138 6. FORMALISING INSTITUTIONAL ENACTMENT VALIDITY
is a business partner who is obliged to pay tax). We view all rules as “A counts–as B in
context C”, stating an event (the ‘A’) in a social context (‘C’) causes further institutional
events to occur or different fluents to hold in the next state (the ‘B’s’). An InstAL institu-
tion contains rules regulating its evolution from one social reality (state) to the next, but the
rules remain static.
We extend institutions comprising counts–as rules to counts–as rules which are mod-
ifiable and ascriptively regulate rule changes. Rule modifications activate and deactivate
rules in the past/present/future, analogous to enacting regulatory changes. Rule modifica-
tions are regulated with counts–as rules, “an event A counts–as a rule–modifying event B
in context C”, which ascribes the actions counting–as past/present/future rule modifications
in a particular context.
Importantly, unlike in InstAL, institutions with modifiable rules do not just evolve from
one state to the next according to their own counts–as rules. Rather, institutions evolve
along two timelines, from one version comprising rules to another version comprising dif-
ferent rules. Each version evolves over time from state to state according to its rules. When
a rule change occurs according to rule–modifying counts–as rules in one version, the insti-
tution evolves to the next version potentially comprising different (active) counts–as rules
at different times. For example, if in one institution version on Wednesday a rule is retroac-
tively added on the preceding Monday then that version’s past does not change. Instead,
the institution evolves to a new version where the rule is active from the Monday poten-
tially causing the version to evolve differently from then onwards. Institutions evolve from
version to version where one versions can evolve from one state to another differently ac-
cording to different rules.
Contexts in counts–as rules are also extended. Contexts can be conditional on the
present state but also past institution versions and states. This allows testing potential
retroactive rule modification effects. For example, a retroactive rule change is ascribed
by a government voting for the change in the context that it does not criminalise people in
the past compared to the previous version’s past. To summarise we extend institutions to
evolve along rule version and state timelines according to counts–as rules conditional on
contexts comprising past versions and states, and potential rule change effects.
In comparison to Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 we are only interested in insti-
tutions ascribing non–deontic social facts. For example, social actions such as voting in
parliament or enacting a rule change, and states of affairs such as someone being a tax
payer. In other words, we are interested in the hard institutional constraints that make so-
cial actions possible according to counts–as rules. We are not interested in obligations and
prohibitions which prescribe the ideal social actions and states of affairs. Consequently,
unlike in the previous chapters we provide no specific representation for deontic positions
nor a semantics to determine when they are violated. Moreover, we do not consider whether
the effects of regulatory rules (i.e. the obligations and prohibitions they impose) are good
or bad and hence we do not capture higher–order norms. We use counts–as rules, but unlike
in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 we do not capture links between concrete and abstract regula-
tions according to counts–as rules. Rather, we capture the notion of governance in terms of
counts–as rules making institutional change enactments regular and possible, hence deontic
elements are not necessary.
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6.2. REPRESENTATION
We begin with representing institutions which regulate their own temporal rule modifica-
tions.
Definition 34. Institution An institution is a tuple I = 〈E ,F ,C,G,∆〉. Institutions are
distinguished with a superscript (e.g. Iuk = 〈Euk,F uk,Cuk,Guk,∆uk〉). Σ = 2F denotes all
states for I .
Where:
1. E = Eobs∪Einst∪Emod is a finite set of events comprising:
• Observable events Eobs and institutional events Einst.
• Rule modification events Emod = {mod(op, id, t) | op ∈ {act,deact}, id ∈ ID, t ∈ N} – a
rule with the identifier id (the identifier set being ID) is activated/deactivated (op) at a
time t .
2. F =Fdom∪Fract is a finite set of fluents describing the:
• Domain Fdom.
• Active rules Fract = {active(id) | id ∈ ID} identified as id.
3. X is the set of all contexts ϕ expressible in the following grammar for fluents f ∈F :
ϕ ::= > | f | ¬ϕ | ϕ∧ϕ | ϕ∨ϕ | ϕ→ϕ | P |
PrS(ϕ) | PaS(ϕ) | PrV(φ) | PaV(φ)
φ ::= ϕ |NS(ϕ)
Each expression’s informal meaning is the usual for propositional logic symbols. The
operators bear truth in the following cases: (a) P if the context is retroactive (i.e. the
state in which P operates on is at a time before the version to which it belongs becomes
the current version), and (b) if ϕ is true in: the previous state (PrS(ϕ)), all past states
(PaS(ϕ)), the same state in the previous version (PrV(ϕ)), the same state in all past
versions (PaV(ϕ)), and the next state (NS(ϕ)).The next state operator is restricted to past
versions, meaning rules are never conditional on the actual future.
4. G :X ×2E → 2Einst – is the event generation function where G(X ,E) is an event set caused
by the events that occur (E) when the context X holds.
5. C :X ×E → 2Fdom ×2Fdom is the state consequence function where for a context X ∈X
and an event e ∈ E the consequence function’s result is notated C(X ,e)= 〈C↑(X ,e),C↓(X ,e)〉
s.t. the initiated fluent set is C↑(X ,e) and the terminated fluent set is C↓(X ,e)
6. ∆⊆F is the initial institution state
For example, the following rule states that if Ada is found guilty (g(ada)) then she
becomes a criminal (crim(ada)). That is, the fluent crim(ada) is initiated by the event of
being found guilty according to the consequence function (C↑).
C↑(>,g(ada)) 3 crim(ada)
140 6. FORMALISING INSTITUTIONAL ENACTMENT VALIDITY
A government rule change (gmod(act, id, t))) that does not retroactively criminalise people
counts–as a legal rule change. The condition is in all past retroactive states someone is not
a criminal (crim(ada)) if in the previous version (prior to rule change) they were not.
G(PaS(P→PrV(¬crim(ada))→¬crim(ada))),
{gmod(act, id, t)}) 3 act(id, t)
In order to reason about modifying specific institutional rules, we tie rule identifiers to the
institutional rules they represent. Specifically we map the inputs and single outputs of G
and C to identifiers (i.e. not the whole set of events or initiated/terminated fluents).
Definition 35. Rule Identifier Function A rule identifier function for an event generation
function G : X × 2E → 2Einst is ridG : X × 2E × Einst → ID. The rule identifier functions
for a consequence function C : X ×E → 2Fdom ×2Fdom are ridC↑ : X ×E ×Fdom → ID and
ridC↓ :X ×E ×Fdom → ID.
So, the previous rule criminalising Ada has the ID crim0 = rid↑(>,g(ada),crim(ada)).
Examples/case studies omit this function.
6.3. SEMANTICS
This section defines institution semantics, following InstAL’s method using just sets and
functions, with the following considerations.
Observable events cause an institution rule version to transition from state to state by
generating transitioning events according to the event generation function G and initiating
and terminating fluents according to the consequence function C. An institution transitions
from one version of rules to another when rule modifying events are generated by the event
generation function G.
An institutional interpretation represents this dual evolution as a tuple M = 〈R,V 〉where:
1. V = 〈V0, ...,V j 〉 is a tuple of versions each comprising a state and event set sequence
up to length k with typical element Vv = 〈Sv ,Ev 〉. The state sequence for v is Sv =
〈Sv :0, ...,Sv :k+1〉 with typical element Sv :i ∈Σ and the event set sequence (the events transi-
tioning between states) is Ev = 〈Ev :0, ...,Ev :k〉 with typical element Ev :i ⊆ E . States denoted
Sv :i and event sets Ev :t are denoted with the version v to which they belong and their time
instant i . 2. R : [0,k]→ [0, j ] is a function stating which institution version is the current
version for a given time.
R also represents when rule change events occurring in a version can change that ver-
sion’s rules. Rule modification events only change version rules if the institution has not
already evolved to a later version. For example, if on Monday a rule is added, then the insti-
tution evolves to a new current version where that rule is actually added on Monday. When
the version evolves, previous versions become obsolete from then onwards (e.g. Monday)
meaning their rules are not changeable. If R(i )≤ v then an event occurring in version v at
time i can modify rules in v since the version is not yet obsolete.
The semantics are defined with respect to the interpretation M = 〈R,V 〉, an institution
I = 〈E ,F ,C,G,∆〉, the set of all institutional interpretations I, and an observable event set
trace et= 〈O0, ...,Ok〉 with typical element Oi ⊆ Eobs.
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6.3.1. INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
Counts–as rules, causing institution state and version change, are conditional on a context
being modelled by the state in an interpretation.
Definition 36. Modelling Context For all X ∈X and f ∈F , context models 〈M ,Sv :t 〉 |= X
is defined for >, ∨ and → w.r.t. ¬ and ∧ as usual and for the other symbols as:
〈M ,Sv :t 〉 |= f ⇔ f ∈ Sv :t (36.1)
〈M ,Sv :t 〉 |=¬ψ ⇔ 〈M ,Sv :t 〉 6|=ψ (36.2)
〈M ,Sv :t 〉 |=ψ∧φ ⇔ 〈M ,Sv :t 〉 |=ψ and
〈M ,Sv :t 〉 |=φ (36.3)
〈M ,Sv :t 〉 |=P ⇔ R(t )< v (36.4)
〈M ,Sv :t 〉 |=PrS(ψ) ⇔ 〈M ,Sv :t−1〉 |=ψ (36.6)
〈M ,Sv :t 〉 |=PaS(ψ) ⇔ ∀t ′ ∈ [0, t −1] : 〈M ,Sv :t−1〉 |=ψ (36.7)
〈M ,Sv :t 〉 |=PrV(ψ) ⇔ 〈M ,Sv−1:t 〉 |=ψ (36.8)
〈M ,Sv :t 〉 |=PaV(ψ) ⇔ ∀v ′ ∈ [0,v −1] : 〈M ,Sv ′−1:t 〉 |=ψ (36.9)
〈M ,Sv :t 〉 |=NS(ψ) ⇔ 〈M ,Sv :t+1〉 |=ψ (36.10)
Semantics are as usual for modelling a fluent (36.1), weak negation (36.2) and conjunc-
tion (36.3). A state is retroactive if at that time the version is not the current version but
it will be in the future (36.4) – for example, if on a Wednesday the institution evolves to
a new version, then anything occurring on the Monday is retroactive to the new version
(i.e. occurring in the version’s past). States model formula as expected for a previous state
(36.6), all previous states (36.7), the previous version (36.8), all past versions (36.9) and
the next state (36.10).
An event ‘B’ occurs when transitioning to a new state in a version according to a rule
– “A counts–as B in context C” (G) – if an event ‘A’ occurs, the context ‘C’ is modelled
by the state and the counts–as rule itself is active in the version’s state. Events occurring in
response to observable events E are formalised as an event generation operation.
Definition 37. Event Generation Operation The event generation operation GR :Σ×2E ×
I→ 2E is defined such that GR(Sv :t ,E ,M)= E ′ iff E ′ only satisfies the following conditions:
E ⊆ E ′ (37.1)
∃X ∈X ,e ⊆ E ,e ′ ∈G(X ,e)∩Einst : id= ridG (X ,e,e ′),
〈M ,Sv :t 〉 |= X ∧active(id)⇒ e ′ ∈ E ′ (37.2)
∃X ∈X ,e ⊆ E ,e ′ ∈G(X ,e)∩Emod : id= ridG (X ,e,e ′),
〈M ,Sv :t 〉 |= X ∧active(id),R(t ) 6= v⇒ e ′ ∈ E ′ (37.3)
∃X ∈X ,e ⊆ E ,e ′ ∈G(X ,e)∩Emod : id= ridG (X ,e,e ′),
〈M ,Sv :t 〉 |= X ∧active(id),R(t )= v⇒ (e ′ ∈ E ′ or e ′ 6∈ E ′) (37.4)
Any fixed point reached after iterative applications of GR is denoted as GRω(Sv :t ,E ,M).
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Events that have occurred still occur (37.1). If an active rule states an event e causes an
event e ′ in a context modelled by the state, then e can cause e ′ to occur depending on e ′’s
type. Specifically, whether e ′ is a type that could cause an inconsistency (e.g. removing
rules that ascribe rule modifications, for more on the paradox of rule change see [220]).
An event e ′ always occurs if it is a non–rule–modifying institutional event (37.2) or occurs
when the version is obsolete and it cannot modify rules (37.3). Rule modifying events in
non–obsolete versions can cause rule changes and a potential paradox. So they optionally
occur in a non–obsolete version where they can cause rule change and/or a paradox (37.4).
Hence, GR is multi–valued.
Iterating the event generation operation until a fixed point is reached obtains all events
which occur. At least one fixed point is guaranteed.
Lemma 4. For any set of events E ⊆ E , interpretation M and state Sv :t ∈ Σ there exists a
fixed point GRω(Sv :t ,E ,M).
Proof. GR always has a monotonically increasing value (w.r.t. set inclusion) and a finite
domain.
An institution version transitions between states, driven by event occurrences, according
to a state transition operation.
Definition 38. State Transition Operation The state transition operation TR :Σ×2E × I→
2E is defined for a state Sv :t , a set of events Ev :t and an interpretation M as:
TR(Sv :t ,Ev :t ,M)=
{ f | f ∈ Sv :t ∩TERM(Sv :t ,Ev :t ,M) or (38.1)
f ∈ INIT(Sv :t ,Ev :t ,M)} (38.2)
where:
INIT(Sv :t ,Ev :t ,M)=
{ f |∃e ∈ Ev :t ,X ∈X : id= ridC↑ (X ,e, f ),
f ∈ C↑(X ,e)∩Fdom,〈M ,Sv :t 〉 |= X ∧active(id) or (38.3)
∃t ′ ∈ [0,k],Øt ′′ ∈ [t ′,k] : id= ridC↑ (X ,e, f ),
R(t ′)≤ v,R(t ′′)≤ v,mod(act, id, t) ∈ Ev :t ′ ,
mod(deact, id, t) ∈ Ev :t ′′ , f = active(id)} (38.4)
TERM(Sv :t ,Ev :t ,M)=
{ f |∃e ∈ Ev :t ,X ∈X : id= ridC↓ (X ,e, f ),
f ∈ C↓(X ,e)∩Fdom,〈M ,Sv :t 〉 |= X ∧active(id) or (38.5)
∃t ′ ∈ [0,k],Øt ′′ ∈ [t ′,k] : id= ridC↓ (X ,e, f )
R(t ′)≤ v,R(t ′′)≤ v,mod(deact, id, t) ∈ Ev :t ′ ,
mod(act, id, t) ∈ Ev :t ′′ , f = active(id)} (38.6)
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Transitioning from one state to the next follows common–sense inertia – a fluent holds
in a new state if it held in the previous state and was not terminated (38.1) or it was initiated
in the previous state (38.2). A domain fluent is initiated/terminated if an event causes it
to be according to a rule defined by the state consequence function C that is active in the
current state with a condition (context) that is modelled in the state (38.3 for initiation and
38.5 for termination). A fluent denoting an active rule is initiated/terminated in a state if
a rule activating/deactivating event occurs at a time when the version is not obsolete and
no contradictory deactivation/activation event occurs at a later time when the version is
not obsolete (38.4 for activating rules and 38.6 for deactivating rules). The most recent
modifications in a version take precedent if they occur when the version is a non–obsolete
version and simultaneous contradictory rule modifications are cancelled.
6.3.2. MODELS
Now we define when an interpretation is an institutional model for an observable event
set trace. An institutional interpretation is, broadly speaking, an institutional model for an
observable event set trace iff: 1. each version evolves according to the event generation
and state transition operations, and 2. the institution evolves from one version to another
when rules are modified. However, the event generation operation is multi–valued since
rule modifications are optional. Thus, there are potentially multiple candidate event sets for
transitioning between states and therefore multiple interpretations to select as models.
We want to maximise the rule modification events that are not self–contradicting (e.g.
not applying modifications that retroactively remove a rule making retroactive rule removal
possible). Interpretations are prioritised, denoted as <, based on maximising rule modifica-
tions. An interpretation has higher priority over another if at the earliest time in the earliest
version in which the interpretation differ it contains a superset of rule modifying events
compared to the ‘same’ set for the lower priority interpretation.
Definition 39. Prioritised Interpretation Let M0 = 〈R0,V 0〉 ∈ I and M1 = 〈R1,V 1〉 ∈ I be
two interpretations for institution I where: V 0 = 〈V 00 , ...,V 0i 〉 with typical element V 0v =
〈E0v ,S0v 〉 s.t. E0v = 〈E0v :0, ...,E0v :k〉, and V 1 = 〈V 10 , ...,V 1j 〉 with typical element V 1v = 〈E1v ,S1v 〉
s.t. E1v = 〈E1v :0, ...,E1v :k〉. The ordering < is a relation between interpretations M0 and M1
such that:
M0 <M1 ⇔ ∃t ∈ [0,k],Øt ′ ∈ [0, t-1] :
v =R0(t ),E0v :t ∩Emod ⊃ E1v :t ∩Emod
v ′ =R0(t ′),E0v ′:t ′ 6= E1v ′:t ′
We operationally characterise a model by constructing a ‘correct’ interpretation. That is,
constructing versions comprising correct state transitions and generated events. We could
construct each institution version by starting at an initial state and proceeding from one
state to the next according to the event generation and state transition operations. However,
this would require knowing which rule modification events happen in each version’s past,
present and future.
To give an example for an observable event set trace 〈O0, ...,Ok〉. An institution starts
at an initial state only comprising an active rule enabling a government to make retroactive
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modifications (∆= S0:0 = {active(gov0)}). First, a fence is observably built (O0 = {fb}, occur-
ring during the first state transition fb ∈ E0:0 =GRω(S0:0,O0,M)). But, there is no active rule
that causes the next state to be different (S0:1 = TR(S0:0,E0:0)= S0:0 = {active(gov0)}). Then,
the government votes to retroactively activate a rule in state zero, stating building a fence
initiates an obligation to paint it. Consequently, the second state which has already been de-
termined, S0:1, seems wrong since it lacks the fence painting rule and its effects. In fact, the
institution should transition to a new rule version V1. This new version should start at the
same initial state S1:0 = ∆. But, crucially, transition to the next state (S1:0 = TR(S1:0,E1:0))
with the knowledge that in the future of the new version the fence painting rule will be
retroactively added at state zero (S1:0) and become active in the second state (S1:1). State
transitions are defined with respect to an interpretation comprising past/present/future rule
modification events which might be unknown when each state and transitioning event set is
constructed.
We define an interpretation successor operation which addresses the problem of con-
structing a ‘correct’ interpretation without the knowledge of each version’s past/present/-
future. The successor operation takes as input a preceding interpretation which supplies
versions comprising a past/present/future on which each version in the new succeeding
interpretation can be constructed according to TR and GR. That is, a new interpretation
is produced using the version timelines of the previous interpretation, taking into account
past/present/future rule modifications from the preceding interpretation’s version timelines.
A succeeding interpretation might not be the same as the previous interpretation, since
the previous interpretation might have been built without knowledge of its own past/presen-
t/future. That is, the new interpretation might differ in its temporal evolution (comparable
version timelines in each interpretation being different). Consequently, the succeeding in-
terpretation might have new, previously unknown, rule modification events that also need
to be accounted for and thus another succeeding interpretation must be produced.
The idea is to iteratively apply the institution successor operation until a succeeding
interpretation is produced that is the same as the previous interpretation. That is, until the
operation reaches a fixed point, which is guaranteed according to lemma 6 we give later on.
Intuitively, the fixed point characterises an interpretation that is built taking into account its
own past/present/future modifications in each version (since it was built with respect to an
identical preceding interpretation). Formally, the successor interpretation operation is:
Definition 40. Successor Interpretation Operation Let et= 〈O0, ...,Ok〉 be an observable
event trace for I of length k. Let M ′ = 〈R ′,V ′〉 ∈ I be an interpretation such that V ′ =
〈V ′0, ...,V ′j ′〉 is a tuple of institution versions. The interpretation successor operation SUCC :
I×ET→ I is defined for the interpretation M w.r.t. I and et such that SUCC(M ,et)=M ′ iff
M ′ satisfies the following conditions:
∀v ∈ [0, j ′] : S′v :0 =∆ (40.1)
∀v ∈ [0, j ′], t ∈ [0,k] : E ′v :t =GRω(S′v :t ,Ot ,M) (40.2)
∀v ∈ [0, j ′], t ∈ [0,k] : S′v :t+1 = TR(S′v :t ,E ′v :t ,M) (40.3)
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R ′(t )=

0, t = 0,E ′0:t ∩Emod =;
1, t = 0,E ′0:t ∩Emod 6= ;
R ′(t-1), t > 0,E ′R(t-1):t ∩E ′mod =;
R ′(t-1)+1, t > 0,E ′R(t-1):t ∩E ′mod 6= ;
(40.4)
Given that V ′ = 〈V ′0, ...,V ′j ′〉,R ′(k)= j ′ (40.5)
Every institution version starts at the same initial state (40.1). Each state transition
(an event set) in a version is produced by the event generation operation applied to the
previous state and the observable events occurring at that time (40.2). The next state in
a version is the state produced by the state transition operation applied to the previous
state and the transitioning events occurring in that version with respect to the preceding
institutional interpretation (40.3). That is, transitioning from one state to the next takes
into account the rule modification events occurring in the past/present/future of the same
version in the preceding interpretation. Rule modifications in the latest version cause the
current version to evolve/increment to the next version. If no rule modification takes place
the version remains the same or the zeroeth version for the zeroeth time instant (40.4). If a
rule modification does take place in the latest version, then the current version at that time
incremented by one, or is the first version for the zeroeth time point (40.4). The version
sequence only goes up until the current version at the last time instant (40.5).
At least one fixed point for the successor interpretation operation, starting at any initial
interpretation, is always guaranteed. A fixed point is denoted as SUCCω(M ,et ). To see
why, the general idea is that there always exists a series of successive interpretations that
monotonically increase which versions and states they agree on.
The following lemma is used to prove that there always exists a series of such inter-
pretations and therefore that there always exists a fixed point. Informally, the lemma is
conditional on there being two successors M ′ and M ′′ to any interpretation that agree with
each other up until a particular time (h) in a version ( j ). The consequence is that the second
interpretation M ′′ has the same events at time h and state transition at time h+1 in version
j as if the event and state transitions were produced with respect to M ′′’s own past/presen-
t/future timeline.
Lemma 5. If I is an institution, M an interpretation and et an observable event trace of
length k for I and there exists interpretations M ′ = SUCC(M, et) and M ′′ = SUCC(M ′,et)
where ∃h ∈ [0,k], j ∈ [0,v ′],∀i ∈ [0,k] :
〈V ′0, ...,V ′j−1〉 = 〈V ′′0 , ...,V ′′j−1〉 (A5.1)
〈S′j :0, ...,S′j :h〉 = 〈S′′j :0, ...,S′′j :h〉 (A5.2)
mod(op, id, h) ∈ E ′v :i ,
R ′(i )≤ j ⇔
mod(op, id, h) ∈ E ′′j :i ,
R ′′(i )≤ j
(A5.3)
then E ′′j :h =GRω(S′′j :h ,Oh ,M ′′) and S′′j :h+1 = TR(S′′j :h ,E ′′j :h ,M ′′)
The previous lemma’s assumptions can always be met starting from any interpretation
M . Firstly, since in the worst case, from any interpretation we can obtain a successor start-
ing at the institution’s initial state – so both successors agree at least on the initial state.
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Secondly, by making the non–deterministic choice in the event generation operation to se-
lect the same rule modifications for both the successor and the successor to the successor
(in the worst case, no rule modifications). We can continue to incrementally produce suc-
cessive interpretations that monotonically increase the time point they agreed upon. Note
that, this may mean backtracking by changing preceding interpretations (e.g. selecting no
rule modifications).
Lemma 6. There exists a fixed point for the interpretation successor operation denoted
SUCCω(M ,et ) for any M and et.
In fact, there can be multiple fixed points, as exemplified:
Example 1. An institution I contains a legislative rule with the id leg0 ∈ ID stating that an
agent, Ada, voting to activate a rule (votea(act, id, t) ∈ Eobs) counts–as activating the rule:
G(>, {votea(act, id, t)}) 3 mod(act, id, t). In the initial state the legislative rule is active
∆= {active(leg0)}. In an observable event trace et= 〈O0〉 Ada votes to activate another rule
with the id leg1 ∈ ID in the initial state O0 = {votea(act, leg1, 0)}.
From an initial empty interpretation M we have the following successors and interpre-
tations for example 1(differences are in bold):
M2 = SUCC(M, et)= SUCCω(M, et) s.t. V 2 = 〈V 20 〉,R2(0)= 0,R2(1)= 0,
S20:0 = {active(leg0)},S20:1 = {active(leg0)},E20:0 = {votea (act, leg1, 0)}
M1 = SUCC(M, et)= SUCCω(M, et) s.t. V 1 = 〈V 10 ,V 11 〉,R1(0)= 1,R1(1)= 1,
S10:0 = {active(leg0)},S10:1 = {active(leg0)},
E10:0 = {votea (act, leg1, 0),mod(act, leg1 , 0)}
S11:0 = {active(leg0)},S11:1 = {active(leg0)},E11:0 = {votea (act, leg1, 0)}
M0 = SUCC(M, et)= SUCCω(M, et) s.t. V 0 = 〈V 00 ,V 01 〉,R0(0)= 1,R0(1)= 1,
S00:0 = {active(leg0)},S00:1 = {active(leg0)},
E00:0 = {votea (act, leg1, 0),mod(act, leg1 , 0)}
S01:0 = {active(leg0)},S01:1 = {active(leg0),active(leg1)},
E01:0 = {votea (act, leg1, 0),mod(act, leg1 , 0)}
Each fixed point has different rule modifications. M2 does not add the rule leg1. M1
contains an attempt to add the rule in the version zero but not in version one. Finally, M0
adds the rule in the version zero and version one, version one being the current version when
the rule is added meaning the rule addition is successful. In fact, the following prioritisation
holds M0 <M1 <M2 meaning that M0 maximises successful rule modifications.
Models are interpretations which maximise successful rule modifications. Thus we
characterise models by combining the successor interpretation fixed point and interpretation
prioritisation. Given an empty interpretation we find a fixed point successor interpretation
for a given event set trace (41.1). The fixed point is a model if there is no greater prioritised
successor fixed point interpretation (41.2).
Definition 41. Models Let M = 〈R,V 〉 be an empty interpretation such that V = 〈V0〉, V0 =
〈E0,S0〉, E0 = 〈〉 and S0 = 〈〉. The interpretation M ′ = 〈R ′,V ′〉 is a model for I w.r.t. an
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observable event set trace et= 〈O0, ...,Ok〉 iff:
M ′ = SUCCω(M ,et) and (41.1)
There does not exist an M ′′ <M ′ meeting 41.1. (41.2)
From lemma 6 and definition 41 we have the following property.
Lemma 7. There exists at least one model for any institution I w.r.t. an observable event
set trace et.
These semantics operationalise answering “when does a rule change count–as a legal
rule change?”. Generally, a physical or institutional actions counts–as the social action of
a legal rule change if and only if the rule change is ascribed by secondary legal counts–as
rules conditional on a social context, which can include hypothetical rule change effects,
that holds before and after the rule change takes place. Models always contain ‘legal’ rule
modifications, defined as fixed point interpretations which maximise rule modifications. So,
‘legal’ rule–changes occur in at least one model whilst illegal rule changes do not occur at
all (the non–deterministic choice for a rule modification to occur in 37.4) and the institution
continues to operate ‘as usual’, meeting our desiderata.
6.4. CASE STUDIES
Now we apply the framework to concrete case studies. For brevity we use variables to
denote: all rule identifiers (id ∈ ID), all rule change operations (op ∈ {act, deact}), and all
time instants (t ∈N). The first case concerns a simple rule change procedure.
Case 6.4.1. An institution Isgov describes a simple government comprising two agents,
Ada and Bertrand. Both Ada and Bertrand voting to activate or deactivate a rule in
the context that neither are criminals (crim(ada),crim(bert) ∈ F sgovdom ) counts–as activat-
ing/deactivating the rule. The rule modifying counts–as rules are identified with leg0 ∈
ID and formalised as Gsgov(¬crim(ada)∧¬crim(bert), {votea(op, id, t),voteb(op, id, t)}) 3
mod(act, id, t). At time point one Ada and Bertrand vote to add a rule with id crim0,
O1 = {votea(act, crim0, 1),voteb(act, crim0, 1)}. The rule identified as crim0 states that
if Ada or Bertrand are found guilty of a crime (g(ada),g(bert) ∈ E sgovobs ) then they become
criminals, formally – C↑(>,g(ada)) 3 crim(ada) and Csgov↑(>,g(bert)) 3 crim(bert). Next,
Bertrand is found guilty of a crime O2 = {g(bert)}. Finally, Bertrand and Ada vote to deac-
tivate the criminalising rule, O3 = {votea(act, crim0, 3),voteb(act, crim0, 3)}.
For clarity, models are represented graphically. The model for case 6.4.1 is shown in
Figure 6.1. Lines represent when domain and active rule fluents hold. We distinguish be-
tween whether a fluent holds in a state Sv :t : 1. retroactively in the version’s past and not
in the previous version, (i.e. R(t ) < v and 〈M ,Sv−1:t 〉 6|= f ), 2. when the version
is the current version, ) (i.e. R(t ) = v), and 3. when the version is obsolete,
(i.e. R(t ) > v). Time instants are marked if they have successful or non–successful rule
modification events in versions where modifications can have an effect (i.e. non–obsolete
versions): 1. denoting that all the rule modification events occurring in the previous ver-
sion occur again (i.e. Ev :t ∩ Emod = Ev−1:t ∩ Emod). Meaning, the conditions (contexts)
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for the rule modifying events to be ascribed are consistent with the version and there-
fore with applying the rule modifications (the non–deterministic choice to include a rule
modification in Ev :t according to 37.4 is always made) 2. denoting that at least one
rule modification event which occurred in the previous version does not occur again (i.e.
Ev :t ∩Emod 6= Ev−1:t ∩Emod). Meaning, the conditions (contexts) for rule modifying events
to be ascribed are inconsistent with the version they occur in and therefore with applying
the rule modifications (a non–deterministic choice according to 37.4 to not include a rule
modification is made when building Ev :t ).
Figure 6.1 shows case 6.4.1’s model. Throughout version zero the legislative rule (leg0)
is active, stating Ada and Bertrand voting to add a rule counts–as adding a rule. When at
time instant one Ada and Bertrand vote to add a new rule (crim0), stating people found
guilty become criminals, the model succeeds to version one where the new rule is success-
fully added. At time instant three Bertrand becomes a criminal. When they vote again to
modify a rule it is unsuccessful, since rule change is conditional on neither being criminals.
Adding a criminalising rule altered the built social reality in version one’s future, changing
what could be ascribed as a legal rule modification.
0 1 2 3 4
Fluent
crim(bert)
active(crim0)
active(leg0)
active(leg0)
Version
1
0
Time
Figure 6.1: Model for case 6.4.1 with two institution versions.
The next case presents an institution Iuk representing the UK’s legislation rules. The
cases are based on past changes to a court decision on UK tax laws ([1]), and past changes
to tax laws ([192]). The UK government can unconditionally enact any rules effective at any
time. Observable events where the government activates/deactivates a rule (gmod(op, id, t))
count–as modifying the rule (mod(op, id, t). Legislative rules identified as leg0 ∈ ID cause
rule activations Guk(>, {gmod(act, id, t)}) 3mod(act, id, t) and legislative rules identified as
leg1 ∈ ID cause rule deactivations Guk(>, {gmod(deact, id, t)}) 3mod(deact, id, t). A model
Muk = 〈Ruk,V uk〉 is produced for an observable event trace et= 〈O0,O1,O2,O3,O4〉 for Iuk.
The model comprises four versions V uk = 〈V uk0 ,V uk1 ,V uk2 ,V uk3 〉. We begin the case:
Case 6.4.2. A rule states that any UK resident (e.g. person a resides in the UK –r(a, uk))
in a business partnership in the UK (p(a, uk)) or elsewhere such as Jersey (p(a, jers)) in the
first tax year month is obliged to pay tax (oblt). We have for all locations L ∈ {uk, jers} a tax
rule Cuk↑(r(a, uk)∧p(a, L),mon1) 3 oblt identified as tax0 ∈ ID. Initially the legislative rules
leg0 and leg1, and the tax rule tax0 are active (∆uk = {active(leg0),active(leg1),active(tax0)}).
At time point one it is the first tax year month (O1 = {mon1}). Following a court chal-
lenge ([1]) the government retroactively replaces the tax rule with id tax0 with a new rule
with id tax1 (O2 = {gmod(deact, tax0, 0),gmod(act, tax1, 0)}). The new rule, tax1, states
that only people in a UK business partnership are obliged to pay tax – Cuk↑(r(a, uk)∧
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p(a, uk),mon1) 3 oblt.
Rule/ Fluent
leg2
leg3
Version
EUUK 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
tax0
oblt
leg0
leg1
tax2
oblt
leg0
leg1
tax1
leg0
leg1
tax0
oblt
leg0
leg1
UK 3
UK and
EUUK 2
UK and
EUUK 1
UK and
EUUK 0
Time
Figure 6.2: Model for case 6.4.2 with four institution versions for the institution Iuk (denoted UK) and a model
for case 6.4.3 with four versions for the institution Ieuuk (denote EUUK). Institutions Iuk and Ieuuk have
identical versions 0 to 2. Not shown, in all states person ‘a’ is in a Jersey–based business partnership (p(a,jersey))
and is a UK resident (r(a,uk)).
In Figure 6.2 version zero (V uk0 ) obliges person ‘a’ to pay tax in state two. In state
two (Suk0:2) the current institution version changes when the rule obliging UK residents to
pay tax (tax0) is replaced with the rule obliging UK business partners to pay tax (tax0)
(act(t1,0),deact(t0,0) ∈ Euk0:2) to version one (V uk1 s.t. Ruk(2) = 1). Due to this change, the
version one (V uk1 ), does not oblige tax to be paid in its third state (S
uk
1:2) since person a
resides in the UK but is in a Jersey–based business partnership.
Case 6.4.2 (continued). The government partially reverses the tax change at time point
three. This is by retroactively replacing the rule obliging people in a UK business partner-
ship to pay tax (tax1) with a new rule identified as tax2
(O3 = {gmod(deact, tax1, 0),gmod(act, tax2, 0)}). The new rule obliges UK residents in
a business partnership to pay tax if it does not criminalise them retroactively (i.e. in a
retroactive state an obligation to pay tax is initiated conditional on the obligation hold-
ing in the next state of the previous version). For all locations L ∈ {uk, jersey} the rule is
Cuk↑((r(a, uk)∧p(a, L))→ (P)→ PrV(NS(oblt))),mon1) 3 oblt. Next, it is the first tax year
month again (O4 = {mon1}).
In Figure 6.2 version two (V uk2 ), like version zero, does not oblige ‘a’ to pay tax in the
past. But, it does oblige them to pay tax after the second time the first tax year month occurs
(mon1 ∈ Euk2:4).
Case 6.4.2 (continued). The UK government decides to reverse the previous judgements
going back to the original rule set (O5 = {gmod(deact, tax2, 0),gmod(act, tax0, 0)}).
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In Figure 6.2, version three (V uk3 ) reverts to the original legislation. Thus we have
the same situation as if the legislation in version zero had not been modified. That is, an
obligation to pay tax after the first occurrence of the first tax year month (mon1 ∈ Euk3:1).
The next case is a variation on the previous describing an institution Ieuuk, incorporating
EU human rights law.
Case 6.4.3. The European Convention on Human Rights [48, Art. 7] (ECHR) blocks
retroactive legislative modifications that criminalise formerly innocent people. The institu-
tion Ieuuk contains the same rules as Iuk with the same identifiers minus the legislative rules
leg0 and leg1. Instead, legislative rules state that observable rule modifications count–as
rule modifications conditional on the changes not retroactively criminalising people. In all
states where rules are being applied retroactively, if there is not an obligation to pay tax in
the previous version then there must not be an obligation to pay tax in the current version.
We have rules with the identifier
l2: Geuuk(PaS(P→ PrV(¬oblt)→¬oblt)), {gmod(act, id, t)}) 3 act(id, t), and rules with the
identifier l3: Geuuk(PaS(P→ PrV(¬oblt)→¬oblt)), {gmod(deact, id, t)}) 3 deact(id, t). Ini-
tially, person ‘a’ is in a Jersey based business partnership (p(a,jersey)) and is a UK res-
ident (r(a,uk)), and the first tax rule and the legislative rules conditional on being non
retroactively criminalising are active such that ∆euuk = {p(a,uk),r(a,uk), tax0, l2, l3}. The
same events occur as in case 6.4.2, et = 〈;, {mon1}, {gmod(deact, t0, 0), gmod(act, t1, 0)},
{gmod(deact, t1, 0), gmod(act, t2, 0)}, {mon1}, {gmod(deact, t2, 0), gmod(act, t0, 0)}〉.
Figure 6.2 shows a model Meuuk for Ieuuk. The first three versions are identical to our
previous case 6.4.2 (where the UK’s legislature was not constrained by EU rules block-
ing retroactively criminalising modifications), since the first two rule modifications do not
criminalise people retroactively. Unlike in our previous case 6.4.2, the version two contains
no tax rules. The reason being that tax rule two – “obliging uk residents in a business part-
nership to pay tax but on the condition that if it is retroactive then those people were obliged
to pay tax in the previous version”, is deactivated since its deactivation does not criminalise
retroactively. On the other hand, tax rule zero – “any UK resident in a business partnership
in the first tax year month is obliged to pay tax” (Cuk↑(r(a, uk)∧p(a, L),mon1) 3 oblt) is not
reactivated, even though it was reactivated in our previous case 6.4.2. Its reactivation would
retroactively criminalise people if activated in version three, meaning its activation does not
occur since legislative rule – l2: Geuuk(PaS(P→ PrV(¬oblt)→¬oblt)), {gmod(act, id, t)}) 3
act(id, t) – has a condition that is not met.
The next cases look at modifying legislative rules themselves.
Case 6.4.4. An institution Ip describes a parliament that can retroactively modify rules
through a majority vote pvote(act, id, t) ∈ Eobs. The legislative rules are identified the id
parl0 ∈ ID for activating rules Gp(>, {pvote(act, id, t)}) 3 mod(act, id, t) and with the id
parl1 ∈ ID for deactivating rules Gp(>, {pvote(deact, id, t)}) 3mod(deact, id, t). In the ini-
tial state all rules are active such that active(id) ∈ ∆. In an observable event set trace
tr= 〈O0,O1〉 at time point one the parliament votes to retroactively remove the rule which
ascribes retroactive modifications (O1 = {pvote(deact, parl1, 0)}.
Depicted in Figure 6.3 a single model Mp = 〈Rp,V p〉 comprises two institution versions
V p = 〈V p0 ,V
p
1 〉. An event occurs in version zero at time instant one, where the parliament
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votes to retroactively modify a rule and the corresponding rule modification event occurs
(Ep0:1 = {pvote(deact, parl1, 0),mod(deact, parl1, 0)}). Consequently the institution transi-
tions to version one (Rp(1)= 1). Importantly, in version one, the same rule modifying event
does not occur. The reason being, if the modification event did occur then the rule parl1
ascribing the modification event – Gp(>, {pvote(deact, id, t)}) 3mod(deact, id, t) – would be
inactive in version one state one Sp1:1, and the deactivation could not occur in the first place
(contradiction). This exemplifies how the formalism always guarantees a model, paradoxi-
cal rule modifications do not occur if they make the rule modifying event impossible in the
first place.
0 1 2
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Fluent
active(parl0)
active(parl1)
active(parl0)
active(parl1)
Version
1
0
Figure 6.3: Model for case 6.4.4
The next case extends the previous case 6.4.4:
Case 6.4.5. This case describes an institution Imp where a monarch and a parliament
can retroactively modify rules, including all the rules from the previous case’s institution
Ip. Additionally, a rule identified as fence0 ∈ ID states that if a fence is built fb ∈ Empobs it
is obliged the fence is painted white oblpf ∈ Fmpinst – Cmp↑(>, fb) 3 oblpf. A rule identified
as mon0 states the monarch issuing a rule change decree mdecree(act, id, t) ∈ Empobs to ac-
tivate a rule counts–as activating the rule – Gmp(>, {mdecree(act, id, t)}) 3mod(act, id, t).
A rule identified as mon1 state the monarch issuing a decree to deactivate a rule counts–
as deactivating the rule Gmp(>, {mdecree(deact, id, t)}) 3 mod(deact, id, t). All legislative
rules are initially active, but the fence painting rule is not (s.t. active(fence0) 6∈ ∆mp). At
time point one the parliament votes for the fence–painting obligation rule to be activated,
(O1 = {pvote(act, fence0, 1)}), a fence is built (O2 = {fb}), the monarch issues by decree the
fence–building rule to be retroactively deactivated at the time it was activated, cancelling
its activation (O3 = {mdecree(deact, fence0, 1)}). Finally, the parliament votes to retroac-
tively dis–enable the monarch from deactivating rules (O4 = {pvote(deact, mon1, 0)}).
Depicted in Figure 6.4 the model Mmp = 〈Rmp,V mp〉 comprises four versions V mp =
〈V mp0 ,V
mp
1 ,V
mp
2 ,V
mp
3 〉. At version zero time instant zero the parliament votes to add the
rule obliging built fences to be painted white, causing a rule modification event (Emp0:1 =
{pvote(act, fence0, 1),mod(act, fence0, 1)}) and the institution to transition to the version
one (Rmp(1)= 1) where the same modification occurs
(Emp1:1 = {pvote(act, fence0, 1),mod(act, fence0, 1)}). In the version one time instant two
building a fence (fb ∈ Emp1:2) causes an obligation to paint the fence oblpf ∈ S
mp
1:3. At time
instant three the monarch retroactively deactivates the fence painting rule
(mdecree(deact, fence0, 1) ∈ Emp1:3) causing the institution to transition to the version two
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(Rmp(3) = 2) where the modification takes effect (mdecree(deact, fence0, 1) ∈ Emp). Con-
sequently, the fence painting obligation rule is deactivated and its effects (an obligation)
no longer hold. When the parliament retroactively removes the ability for the monarch to
deactivate rules the institution transitions to the final version three (Rmp(4) = 3) where the
parliament’s retroactive rule removal takes effect
(pvote(deact, mon1, 0),mod(deact, mon1, 0) ∈ Emp3:4) causing the monarch’s modifications to
be unravelled (note that at the final version’s third time instant the monarch’s rule modifica-
tion is unsuccessful even though it was successful in the previous version). Consequently,
the fence painting obligation rule and its effects (an obligation) is reinstated by retroactively
removing the ability to deactivate the fence painting rule.
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Figure 6.4: Model for case 6.4.5 with four institution versions.
6.4.1. RELATED WORK
In this chapter we contributed a framework for reasoning about the legality of rule changes.
Key to our contribution is the idea of rule–modifying constitutive rules, which express
things like “A counts–as modifying a rule in the past/present/future in context C”. The main
idea is to contribute a formal framework for reasoning about the legality of rule change
ascribed by constitutive rules. In particular, accounting for the fact that changing rules in
the past/present/future affects which rule changes are possible in the first place. Moreover,
reasoning about conditions on rule change that are dependent on the rule change effects,
such as not criminalising people in the past that were previously innocent (non–retroactively
criminalising). Broadly speaking, there are three competing formalisations which look at
the legality of rule change. We compare these as follows.
In ([100, 102]) a defeasible logic is proposed for temporal rule modification operations.
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Operations include, in ([102]), complete rule removal (annulment) and removing immedi-
ate rule effects (abrogation). Meta–rules are used to introduce rule changes, which bear
similarity to our rule–modifying counts–as rules. However, the meta–rules are only condi-
tional on the social context at a single point in time. For comparison, we formalise richer
conditions in rule–modifying constitutive rules. Specifically, rule change being conditional
on the social reality in previous institution versions with previous rule–sets, previous in-
stitutional states and hypothetical rule changes required to capture a number of important
examples we address (such as rule change being non–retroactively criminalising). The fo-
cus of these papers is on rule change operations found in the legal domain, rather than
the relation between ascribing a social reality using constitutive rules and ascribing rule
modifications with constitutive rules conditional on the social reality.
In ([159, 160]) electronic institutions are specified in the Z specification language where
legislation norms restrict legislative actions. The conditions for legislation norms are less
expressive than our proposal and the authors do not consider the interdependency between
changing rules in the past/present/future and the built social reality.
On the other hand, in [28] rule modifications ascribed by counts–as rules are formalised
where there is such a potential interdependency. The focus in [28] is on playing games in
a setting where agents can act on the environment and also the rules which govern their
actions. Most significantly, the main difference is that in [28] a static setting is formalised
where institutions do not evolve over time from state to state or one set of rules to another.
In our framework we explicitly look at these aspects not examined in [28].
Slightly further afield, the MOISE+ organisational framework has been used to con-
struct organisations that act to enact organisational changes, in this case applied to a football
team case study [123]. The focus is on the structural organisational elements required to
re–organise an organisation. For example, the organisational roles required to assess when
a re–organisation is required and what direction the organisational design should take. In
contrast to this chapter, the focus is not on constraints making the social actions of norm
change possible (or in their case, organisational change). Nor is the meta–level, the change
of the rules making rule change possible. Instead, the claim is that they propose an organ-
isational architecture required to make organisational change effective, and their claim is
supported with an empirical simulation using a Markov Decision Process to select appro-
priate organisational changes.
More generally, other work looks at the problem of normative system change. This body
of research includes: 1. norm change postulates ([28]), 2. detecting and/or resolving norm
inconsistencies ([46, 130, 133, 149, 154, 232]) and 3. temporal norm updates ([7, 148]).
However, these frameworks do not look at rule change legality ascribed by constitutive
rules over time.
6.5. DISCUSSION
This chapter answers the question “how should we define when rule changes count–as le-
gal and valid rule changes?” with a novel formal framework. Our framework supports
reasoning about institutional rule change over time, where rule changes are ascriptively
regulated by counts–as rules. We presented a novel semantics defining how an institution
evolves from one social reality to the next and from one version of rules to another. Un-
der the proposed semantics counts–as rules define the past/present/future social reality. In
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turn, rule modifications change counts–as rules in the past/present/future and therefore the
constructed social reality. Rule modifications are in turn conditional on the built social
reality and their potential effects. To summarise the general answer to the question “how
should we define when rule changes count–as legal and valid rule changes?”, according to
our formalisation a legal rule change occurs 1. if the rule change is ascribed by counts–as
rules, conditional on a context taking into account the potential changes to the context the
rule modification would make 2. taking into account past/present/future rule modifications
effect on counts–as rules and thus the context in which rule changes are conditional on.
In chapters 3, 4 and 5 our Searlian notion of an institution is a social language that
ascribes institutional facts, such as obligations and various social notions such as murder.
If an institutional fact is ascribed by a brute fact that is an agentive observable event (i.e.
an agent doing something) then we say the agent that performed the action had the legal
power in the Hohfeldian sense to cause the institutional fact to occur or hold. That is, in
previous chapters 3, 4 and 5 we were dealing with the legal power for agents to bring about
institutional facts, including obligations when we are dealing with norms. In comparison,
in this chapter it is the norms and other counts-as rules themselves that are ascribed from
brute facts, or brought about by agents with sufficient legal power. Thus, unlike in previous
chapters, this chapter goes beyond merely the notion of legal power to ascribe institutional
facts in a limited sense. This chapter, when it talks about legality, is really talking about
the legal power to ascribe norms and other counts-as rules themselves, which in turn give
agents legal power to bring about further institutional facts and rules.
In terms of future work, there are two important formal and application–orientated av-
enues. From a formal perspective, we considered rule changes conditional on their potential
effects in the past/present/future, but not whether affecting the past/present/future in gen-
eral. Yet, some administrative laws explicitly block retroactive modifications (e.g. [221,
Art. 1 Sec. 9 Cl. 3] “No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed”). In
our framework a weak notion of preventing retroactive modifications can be expressed as a
lack of retroactive rule–modifying counts–as rules. A stronger notion cannot be expressed
blocking rules that allow modifications in the past from being introduced. A natural repre-
sentation is higher–priority rule modifying counts–as rules (e.g. from a higher authority),
but requires a defeasible logic left for further investigation.
In principle, the framework’s fixed–point institution model characterisation can be im-
plemented in any adequately expressive language. Future work should investigate if there
is a suitable representation in declarative languages, well suited to rule–based reasoning.
One candidate is Answer–Set Programming (ASP) [91, 93] as used in the InstAL frame-
work [43]. The main obstacles are finding an adequate representation of the institutions
presented in this chapter (i.e. rules that can be modified) and optimising for answer–sets
that contain a superset of rule modifications over other answer–sets (thus corresponding to
our notion of a model).
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APPLICATION
If you find that you’re spending almost all your time on theory, start turning some
attention to practical things; it will improve your theories. If you find that you’re spending
almost all your time on practice, start turning some attention to theoretical things; it will
improve your practice.
Donald Knuth
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In this dissertation each formal contribution has been developed and assessed against
case studies. In this chapter, we describe an application and implementation in the context
of the SHINE project under which this research was conducted. The SHINE project aims to
provide suitable mechanisms that help obtaining detailed environmental data through user
participation. The idea is to get users to participate in providing data by contributing the
sensors they own together with any actions the user needs to take such as taking a photo-
graph or ensuring a microphone is turned on. In return for donating their time, taking useful
actions and contributing their resources, users are able to receive the valuable information
provided by the participation of other users. In this scenario, institutions in the form of
contracts require users to contribute their cellphone sensors, via cellphone apps, in order to
collect and aggregate spatio–temporal weather data. Not all users will wish to accept these
contracts if they are considered to be ‘bad’ in terms of how, when and for whom their cell-
phone sensors are used. Moreover, a contract might take away liberties the user wishes to
maintain or not uphold highly–valued rights. Hence, we apply a version of the multi–level
governance compliance checking framework (chapter 4 and 5) in order to automatically
check whether these contracts are ‘good’ from the perspective of the user’s wishes over
how, when and for whom their cellphone sensors are used.
The rest of this chapter begins by describing the application domain in section 7.1. Then
we provide an example in section 7.1.1. An architectural overview is given in section 7.2
of how the reasoning framework is used in the context of crowdsensing and describe the
implementation. We finish with discussion on benefits and limitations of the application in
section 7.3.
7.1. CONTRACTUALLY CROWDSENSING RAIN DATA
The SHINE (Sensing Heterogeneous Information Network Environment) project brings the
perspective that there are many existing unused sensors owned by various stakeholders. At
the same time, detailed environmental data is required to support governments and citizens
in making decisions affected by environmental conditions. Such decisions include deter-
mining where to go to avoid flooded areas or deciding how city water infrastructure can
be improved based on its current effectiveness. One possibility to provide detailed data is
to buy sensors, deploy them and then collect data for a single purpose. But this is costly.
SHINE aims to overcome a costly single–minded buy–deploy–sense cycle by re–purposing
the existing, unused, sensors owned by independent stakeholders.
SHINE views the sensors as being heterogeneous and the stakeholders who own the
sensors as being autonomous. Sensor heterogeneity means that the sensors’ stakeholders
own operate differently. For example, even if we only consider cellphone microphone
sensors, one stakeholder might own a cellphone which runs a different operating system
and therefore needs to be configured differently (e.g. ensuring data transfer is enabled or
recording a video with a cellphone camera) to another stakeholder’s cellphone. One way
to address the heterogeneity of sensors is to ask stakeholders to ensure their sensors are
configured correctly. Stakeholder autonomy means that we cannot force a stakeholder to
donate the use of their sensors or to configure them in the correct way.
In SHINE stakeholder autonomy is addressed by contractually obliging stakeholders
through bilateral agreement to ensure that they donate and configure their sensors to provide
detailed data (e.g. rainfall locations). Specifically, in the context of this dissertation, SHINE
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aims to enact contracts between stakeholders and sensor networks to crowdsource the use of
the cellphone sensors stakeholders already own, also known as crowdsensing [87]. Crowd-
sensing involves crowdsourcing existing sensing devices as a means to cost–effectively ac-
quire detailed data in a variety of domains. For example, crowdsourcing people’s cellphone
battery sensors in order to obtain detailed temporal–spatial urban air temperatures [190],
using microwave links in cellular networks to obtain detailed rainfall data [189] or using
the cellphones in an area to form the wireless network to aggregate and transport the data
[158]. The SHINE project uses contractual crowdsensing to acquire people’s cellphone
sensors as a means to cost–effectively acquire detailed data in a variety of domains.
We look at crowdsensing people’s cellphones to obtain rain data with an implementation
in a simulated prototype. In our case, rain data is obtained using a hypothetical cellphone
app which uses the cellphone’s audio sensors or communications links between devices to
determine rainfall. The hypothetical owner of a cellphone is a human user and as such
they have autonomy to join the crowdsensing system, ensure the cellphone sensors are on
(i.e. the microphone, GPS and communications links) and that cellphone apps are able
to transmit mobile data. The crowdsensing system binds users with contracts (a type of
legal institution [208]) for use of their cellphone devices and sensors by imposing various
regulations on those users and their cellphones. For example, “a cellphone is obliged to
collect rain data when at a specific location and the user is prohibited from turning the
sensor off until the data is collected”. In return, a user might be promised access to the rain
data obtained by the crowdsensing system. By requesting a large number of users to agree
to such contracts and enough users agreeing to those contracts detailed data can be gathered
through the crowdsourcing of sensors.
However, if there are many contracts offered for the use of a user’s resource, it is un-
manageable for a user to assess the details of each and every one. On the one hand, if a user
agrees to a contract without reading the fine print, they are liable to engage in a ‘bad’ (e.g.
unfair) contract. For example, a contract which requires the owner to keep audio sensors
and data communications on even if the cellphone battery is depleted (i.e. below 10%). On
the other hand, if contracts are rejected by default the user might miss out on the oppor-
tunity to obtain useful information (rain data). In the second case, the system is likely to
not meet its aims if too many users reject contracts on the basis of not having the time to
assess them. Consequently, feasibility demands the automation of contract acceptance and
rejection. Yet, the automation must respect an owner’s desire to maintain autonomy over
how, when and for whom their cellphone contributes data. Unfortunately, existing crowd-
sensing systems (e.g. [64, 126]) do not let users control how their resources are used. In
other words, the user needs a way to specify a policy stating regulations a contract should
and should not impose for using the user’s resource. We call such a policy a use policy.
Conceptually, fitting with our earlier theoretical work, a contract is a first–level institution
governing users in an MAS (the crowdsensing system), whilst the use policy specified by
users is a second–level institution governing offered contracts. Hence, a contract sets the
space of compliant behaviour required to ensure the collection of crowdsensed data. In
comparison, a user’s use policy effectively states how, when and for whom their cellphone
may be used, or what obligations and prohibitions a contract may impose.
Taking a formalised use policy and contract offered to a user as input, software should
automatically accept or reject the contract. Acceptance or rejection should be based on
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whether the contract places obligations and prohibitions on a user and their device that the
user does not like in certain contexts (e.g. the context that the battery is depleted). We use a
version of our computational framework from chapter 4 for checking compliance of lower–
level institutions. We implemented an automated reasoner for contract acceptance/rejection
based on compliance in a simulated crowdsensing prototype.
7.1.1. EXAMPLE
In the implemented contract reasoner contracts and use policies are specified in a high–
level language. In principle, there are many possible contracts and use policies that can
be specified. In order to exemplify the application we will present one contract and one
use policy adapted from [147]. For simplicity of explanation, all institutions operate at the
same level of abstraction and thus the norm abstraction reasoning from chapters 4 and 5 is
not employed. In reality, the crowdsensing system owners can specify their own contracts
to offer to users and users can specify their own use policies on the basis of which contracts
are accepted or rejected.
The following contract and use policy is formalised using the institution syntax from
chapter 4. The contract is a first–level institution Ic offered by the owner of the crowd-
sensing system, Ada, to a cellphone stakeholder called Bertrand for collecting data. The
contract abstracts away from how the data is collected and sent, since this is dependent on
the sensor. Data collection may or may not require user input, for example. The contract is
formalised in table 7.1 and comprises the following rules:
• Ada is interested in collecting rain data for a specific location, a square, and therefore
the contract obliges Bertrand’s cellphone to gather rainfall data when he enters the
square before leaving the square (rule Contr.1).
• Once Bertrand’s cellphone has collected rain data he is obliged to send it within one
minute (rule Contr.2).
• If Bertrand enters the square then the contract states that he is forbidden to turn the
cellphone’s sensors off until the data is collected (rule Contr.3).
Bertrand has specified a use policy, the institution Iup, formalised in table 7.2. It defines
the following second–order norms:
• Bertrand wishes to be paid for the use of his resource. Every time Bertrand discharges
an obligation to send data, it is obliged that the counter–party, Ada, is obliged to pay
Bertrand within two minutes where this obligation must be imposed immediately
(rule UsePol.1).
• When Bertrand’s cellphone battery is depleted (i.e. drops below 10%), he wishes to
conserve it for more important tasks other than collecting rainfall data. Hence, when
the battery becomes depleted it is forbidden to oblige Bertrand to keep the cellphone
sensors on, until the battery is replenished sufficiently (rule UsePol.2).
• Bertrand wishes to maintain the liberty to move freely, hence it is always forbidden
to oblige Bertrand to collect data before leaving his location (initial state fluent Use-
Pol.3).
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Table 7.1: A Contract for Crowdsensing Cellphone Sensors to Gather Rain Data
Cc(;,enter(bertrand, square)) 3
obl(collectData(bertrand, rain), leave(bertrand, square))
(Contr.1)
Cc(;,collectData(bertrand, rain)) 3 obl(sendData(bertrand, rain), m1) (Contr.2)
Cc(;,enter(bertrand, square)) 3
pro(turnSensorsOff(bertrand), collectData(bertrand, rain))
(Contr.3)
Table 7.2: A contract for Crowdsensing Cellphone Sensors to Gather Rain Data
Cup(;,disch(obl(sendData(bertrand, rain), leave(bertrand, square)))) 3
obl(obl(pay(ada, bertrand), m5), now)
(UsePol.1)
Cup(;,batteryDepleted(bertrand)) 3
pro(pro(turnSensorsOff(bertrand), collectData(bertrand, rain)),
batteryReplenished(bertrand))
(UsePol.2)
∆up 3 pro(obl(collectData(bertrand, rain), leave(bertrand, square)), never) (UsePol.3)
Intuitively, we can see that Ada’s contract violates Bertrand’s use policy. Firstly, Bertrand
demands payment for providing data, but Ada’s contract does not offer payment. Secondly,
Bertrand wishes to be able to turn his cellphone sensors off when the cellphone battery
is depleted, but Ada’s contract requires the sensors to be kept on when collecting data.
Thirdly, Ada wants Bertrand to collect data before leaving his location, however, Betrand
has stated that he wants the liberty of free movement. Hence, the automated reasoner in this
case would reject Ada’s contract on the basis of violating the terms of Bertrand’s sensor use
policy.
7.2. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
Reasoning about contracts and use policies, as exemplified previously, was implemented as
a part of a simulated crowdsensing prototype. In the prototype a simulated cellphone app is
instantiated for each simulated user. Each cellphone app combines reasoning for resource
governance and data collection. The cellphone app’s architecture is depicted in figure 7.1
and described as follows in terms of interaction with the crowdsensing system as a whole
and other user’s individual cellphone apps:
1. Before a user’s cellphone is crowdsourced in providing sensing information, a con-
tract is offered to the cellphone to provide rainfall sensing data. The contract is on-
going in the sense that it is not for a single data point but rather multiple data points
requested on–demand by the system.
2. A resource governance component, the multi–level governance compliance reason-
ing, accepts or rejects the contract based on whether it is compliant with a user’s
use policy. Each user has a different use policy and different users may be engaged
in different contracts, hence cellphones do not necessarily uniformly accept/reject a
contract. If the contract is accepted, then the cellphone joins the crowdsensing sys-
tem.
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Figure 7.1: A cellphone app is modelled in the simulated prototype comprising two layers, an application layer
for the governance of the user’s resource (the cellphone and its sensors) and a network layer for using the resource
(collecting, aggregating and sending data).
3. A cellphone which has accepted a contract is requested for data. When data is re-
quested, the cellphone forms a cluster with nearby users that have also accepted a
contract for crowdsourcing rain data in the vicinity. The cluster collectively decides
how many and which users collect data, based on the granularity of data required
according to the algorithms described by the authors of [158].
4. Once the data is collected, it is sent using one of two methods. If data delivery speed
is unimportant, the cellphone communicates with other cellphones that have accepted
a contract to form an ad–hoc network to transmit the data whilst conserving energy
(compared to using a traditional cellular network). In this case, users’ cellphones are
also crowdsourced in helping to transport the data, where one cellphone receives data
from other cellphones, (aggregates) packages it together and forwards it to the next
cellphone in the ad–hoc network. If speed is more important, cellphones communi-
cate using the cellular network.
5. In either case, other users’ devices that are contracted in providing data also receive
rain data as a part of the contractual agreement.
The prototype crowdsensing system is implemented in the NetLogo1 simulation envi-
ronment. In our prototype simulation, the population of use policies assigned to each user is
1http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/
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Figure 7.2: Visualisation of data aggregation. Lines between users (not to scale) indicate data aggregation, adjacent
users with the same colour indicate a cluster where only one in that cluster is providing data. Rainclouds are
indicated with blue and black squares. The map is taken from ©OpenStreetMap.
configurable. Moreover, the contractual rules are also configurable. This is true both before
and during runtime. Consequently, use policies can be edited dynamically to demonstrate
their representation and how changing various second–order norms affects the acceptance
and rejection of contracts. This supports policy makers (i.e. the owners of the crowdsensing
system) in assessing the acceptability of contracts and the level of users likely to join the
crowdsensing system before run time. However, the main point of the system is as a proof
of concept rather than to conduct empirical research.
The visualisation of the prototype is shown in figure 7.2, where each cellphone owner
that has accepted a contract and joined the crowdsensing system is depicted as a figure, a
map represents the geographical area and rain clouds are represented with blocks in shades
of black to light blue. Adjacent contracted sensing devices that have formed a cluster in
order to select a single cellphone to collect data for a geographical area, share the same
colour. Users that are crowdsourced into forming an ad–hoc network for delivering the data
are linked with lines (a central station to which the data is eventually sent is denoted as a
circle with alternating black and red inner circles).
7.3. DISCUSSION
In this chapter we have described a proof of concept for the application of the compli-
ance checking system, contributed by chapters 3 and 4, to the contracted crowdsourcing of
cellphone sensors for detecting rain levels. In principle, the same system can be used to
automatically govern contracts for crowdsourcing other types of data, such as temperature,
crowd levels or photographic weather reports. However, although this chapter illustrates
the proof of concept, it does not assess the usability of the PARAGon framework and hence
its applicability is in principle only. Future work should investigate whether users can ade-
quately describe governance of socio–technical systems and the accuracy of the framework
in correctly governing resources to meet user’s expectations. Consequently, this chapter
only argued the case for multi–level governance automation’s applicability, in one case and
a limited form, to SHINE–like systems.
To re–iterate, the main advantage of using the multi–level governance compliance check-
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ing components of the PARAGon framework is that it supports users in specifying how,
when and for whom their devices are used. Users are able to state in which contexts specific
obligations and prohibitions should (not) be placed on themselves and any counter–party.
Moreover, a use policy, by containing temporal second–order norms, is able to declare tem-
poral requirements for a contract to be accepted. For example, a user can specify that they
should be paid in advance of being obliged to provide data, keep sensors turned on, etc.
Moreover, the abstraction reasoning presented in chapter 3 and 4 was not implemented for
this prototype, but in principle would support a user in defining a use policy using abstract
terminology they understand. Hence, the PARAGon framework supports users in specify-
ing use policies and automatically accepting or rejecting contracts governed by such use
policies.
The main limitation of this approach is that a single occurrence of non–compliance
in a certain social context is aggregated to the contract being non–compliant as a whole.
In reality, contracts are neither always accepted nor rejected outright due to a single flaw
from the perspective of one party nor are contracts binarily good or bad. Rather, to an
individual there are many levels of preference in how good or bad (compliant) a contract is.
Consequently, contracts are often negotiated in order to reach a compromise between two
parties. The reasoning implemented does not support negotiating in terms of preferences for
contracts for the main reason that use policies do not elicit a preference relation between
offered contracts. Consequently, the formalism for compliance checking in multi–level
governance would need to be extended to reasoning about different levels of ideality in order
to form a partial–ordering between contracts. One way would be to adopt the approach in
[230] where contrary–to–duty norms are used to represent different levels of ideality (e.g.
you ought not murder, if you murder you ought to do so gently [83]). This approach is in
a strictly non–temporal setting and so would need extending to reasoning about temporal
norms. Another approach is to combine a temporal logic with a preference logic as in
[21], describing preferences over temporal states of affairs (in our case, the obligations
and prohibitions imposed by a contract) and do away with higher–order norms altogether.
Adopting one of these approaches when combined with the norm abstraction reasoning
presented earlier, would enable users to specify abstract temporal preferences over contracts
as a use policy.
8
CONCLUSIONS
Of course, errors are not good for a chess game, but errors are unavoidable and in any
case, a game without errors, or as they say ‘flawless game’ is colourless.
Mikhail Tal
When you see a good move, look for a better one.
Emanuel Lasker
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This dissertation contributed formal accounts of institutions involved in the governing
of governance, which collectively comprise the PARAGon framework. The formalisations
focussed on two governance types involved in the governing of governance. Namely, in-
stitutional design governance and institutional enactment governance. These governance
types are found in the social world, where institution designers are governed in how in-
stitutions should be designed and when institutional changes can be enacted. Concerning
how institutions should be designed, this dissertation formalised compliance in multi–level
governance. Moreover, this dissertation contributed reasoning for diagnosing and rectifying
the underlying causes of non–compliant institution designs. Concerning when institutional
changes can be enacted, this dissertation formalised secondary legal rules defining the space
of possible institutional change enactments. The primary objective, namely formalisation,
was complemented with two practical objectives. Firstly, reasoning about realistic insti-
tution designs. Secondly, a practical means to reason about governance, which means a
computational implementation or an obvious way to build a logical model. Whilst this
dissertation contributed prescriptive research, it is nevertheless important to interrogate the
intuitions involved. To this end, PARAGon was assessed against a number of real world
and imagined institution designs. Together, these contributions aimed to extend the knowl-
edge in the area of institutional reasoning by formalising a new aspect of institutions, in a
practical way, and assessing the formalisation intuitions by way of case study.
Central to this dissertation’s results was a shift in perspective and a new view on the
constitutive rules that comprise institutions. This dissertation’s perspective shifted from in-
stitutions guiding agent behaviour typically focussed on in the field, to institutions guiding
and governing institutional design and enactment. This dissertation’s formalisations of in-
stitutions seen from this new perspective resulted in a new view of constitutive rules’ roles
in institutions. Whilst much of the literature viewed the role of constitutive rules as mak-
ing abstract social actions and other institutional facts possible, this dissertation enlarged
the responsibility of constitutive rules. For institutional design governance, this disser-
tation expanded constitutive rules’ responsibility from defining abstract concepts to also
indirectly defining the abstract meaning of concrete norms in multi–level governance. For
institutional enactment governance, this dissertation expanded constitutive rules’ responsi-
bility from making social actions and facts possible to making social actions of institutional
change enactment possible. These two new views of constitutive rules are central to this
dissertation, as we will discuss further in this chapter.
The rest of this chapter continues by concluding the dissertation with a discussion of
results in Section 8.1, we discuss how the results can be applied to the SHINE project
under which this research was conducted in Section 8.2, then we discuss future work in
Section 8.3 and finally we reflect on the dissertation as a whole in Section 8.4.
8.1. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
Whilst it might have appeared that much of governance already had strong logical founda-
tions, in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 we saw that governing governance was, until now, mostly
formless in the literature. Hence, this dissertation aimed to provide precise definitions for
institutional governing of governance in terms of institutional design and enactment gover-
nance. This lead to the following overarching research question:
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How can institutional design and enactment governance be supported with for-
mal reasoning?
The overarching research question formed the basis for the sub–research questions pre-
sented in Chapter 1, which are listed as follows:
• Sub research question 1: What is a suitable representation to specify institutional
design and enactment governance?
• Sub research question 2: How can we formalise compliance in multi–level gover-
nance?
• Sub research question 3: How can institutional design compliance in multi–level
governance be computationally verified?
• Sub research question 4: How can non–compliant institution designs be explained
in order to rectify non–compliance according to the institution designer’s objectives?
• Sub research question 5: How can we formally define when legally valid institu-
tional change enactments occur?
In the remainder of this section we discuss what we did to answer these research ques-
tions.
WHAT IS A SUITABLE REPRESENTATION TO SPECIFY INSTITUTIONAL
DESIGN AND ENACTMENT GOVERNANCE?
In order to answer this question, we wanted a natural way to capture the representation for
temporal institutions operating in the following two governance types identified in Chap-
ter 1:
• Institutional design governance: multi–level governance where abstract temporal
regulations contained within higher–level institutions govern the regulatory effects of
lower–level institutions comprising concrete temporal regulations.
• Institutional enactment governance: the legality of institutional rule change ac-
cording to secondary legal rules in a temporal setting.
The question was answered for both of these governance types by contributing a high–
level representation for institutional design governance in Chapter 3 and in a limited form
in Chapter 5, and for institutional enactment governance in Chapter 6. The notion of insti-
tution used in this dissertation was founded on Searle’s counts–as rules [215] of the form
“A counts–as B in context C”. In our case, counts–as rules were used to represent an in-
stitution’s temporal dynamics and played a central role for both institutional design and
enactment governance. In order to provide a uniform representation for counts–as rules,
we based our institution representations on those first proposed by the InstAL framework
[42, 43].
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A representation specific to institutional design governance was contributed in Chap-
ter 3 for multi–level governance, where counts–as rules both define which concrete con-
cepts constitute abstract concepts and modal norms. The requirement for a natural repre-
sentation specific to multi–level governance was met in three ways. Firstly, by offering the
option to define explicit or implicit abstract norms governing concrete normative effects.
Secondly, by adopting modal norms, which as we discussed in Chapter 3, provide a natu-
ral generalisation to higher–order norms for the explicit governance of concrete normative
effects. Thirdly, by not requiring any explicitly represented links between concrete and
abstract regulations and instead pushing the burden of determining relations between con-
crete and abstract regulations to a semantics. The temporal requirement was addressed by
adopting temporal, immediate and indefinite norms. We showed how institutions defined
according to our representation for multi–level governance have an, arguable, natural cor-
respondence to the written law in Chapter 3. In some cases explicit, but controversial, rule
formalisation choices were necessary in the case studies examined. Specifically, in order to
collapse obligations/prohibitions to non normative social facts, which although we provided
argumentation for in Chapter 3, due to having a controversial meaning is a representation
choice.
A representation specific to institutional enactment governance was contributed in Chap-
ter 6. The central representation construct was counts–as rules used to represent Hart’s [117,
p.96] secondary legal rules. As we discussed in Chapter 2, following the conceptualisation
of Biagoli [20], secondary rules make the social action of changing rules possible in the
same way counts–as rules make social actions in general possible. In our representation,
we contributed rule–modifying counts–as rules, which ascribe rule modifications in the
past, present or future conditional on a social context. The requirement for a natural repre-
sentation was addressed in two ways. Firstly, by defining a richer social context to represent
rule–modifying counts–as rules for real legal case studies. For example, to represent a con-
dition, such as found in EU law [48, Art. 7], on past rule modifications only being possible
if they would not, hypothetically, cause an innocent person to become criminalised in the
past. Secondly, by not assuming any special representation to define secondary rules which
modify other secondary rules, since there is no evidence supporting a special representation
being required in the legal case studies we looked at. A number of real–world case studies
in Chapter 6 were looked at to show an, arguable, natural morphism between the written
law’s secondary rules and our formalisation of those rules in the representation we propose.
In summary, PARAGon contributed a representation which limits assumptions for the
governance types looked at, by providing a representation which conforms to written or
mental institution’s representation and court interpretations. Where necessary we offered a
representation choice rather than making strong representation assumptions. There may be
other ways to answer this research question with different representations. However, our
requirement was for a natural representation for temporal institutions and hence a suitable
representation without requiring any unnecessary constructs was contributed. That is, as far
as we are able to tell for the case studies we looked at in Chapter 3, Chapter 4, Chapter 5 and
Chapter 6, our representation requires no further simplification in order to be natural nor
any further complication in order to represent real–world institutional design and enactment
governance.
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HOW CAN WE FORMALISE COMPLIANCE IN MULTI–LEVEL GOVERNANCE?
In order to answer this question, PARAGon contributed a semantics for operationalising
multi–level governance compliance in Chapter 3. The semantics defined when a lower–
level governance institution imposing relatively concrete regulations has regulatory effects
that are non–compliant with higher–level institutions’ abstract regulations.
Generally, the semantics assesses collective regulatory effects of lower–level institu-
tions in different social contexts for whether they violate abstract regulations in higher–
level institutions. Our semantics adopts the advice of David Makinson [164], “no logic of
norms without attention to a system of which they form part”. That is, norms are under-
stood in terms of the other constitutive rules contained in the same system. Constitutive
norms are used to re–interpret the concrete regulatory effects in lower–level institutions for
whether they have abstract meanings in higher–level institutions. The abstract meaning of a
lower–level institution’s concrete normative effects (caused by its concrete norms), accord-
ing to constitutive rules, determines if those concrete norms violate abstract obligations and
prohibitions in higher–level institutions.
The abstract meaning of a lower–level institution’s concrete normative effects is heav-
ily dependent on the social context lower–level institutions’ obligations and prohibitions
are imposed in from the perspective of higher–level institutions. To return to a previous
example, an obligation imposed by the UK’s Data Retention Regulations to store commu-
nications metadata is abstractly interpreted by the Charter of Fundamental Rights’ as unfair
data processing in the context that the person who the data concerns has not consented. In
turn, unfair data processing is prohibited by the Charter of Fundamental Rights, hence the
UK’s Data Retention Regulations institution violates a prohibition on unfair data process-
ing when it imposes an obligation to store communications metadata in the context that
the person who the data concerns has not consented. Consequently, not only is the ab-
stract meaning of a lower–level institutions normative effects context sensitive, but so is the
compliance of a lower–level institution’s norms.
Since social contexts are important, we chose to take into account their dynamics. That
ism we chose to interpret institutions operating in multi–level governance as state–event
transition systems where an institution evolves from one state to another, meaning social
contexts also evolves over time. Consequently, our notion of compliance rejects a naïve
static comparison between different regulations which would focus on individual rules, in
favour of focusing on the combination of regulatory effects and social contexts they are
applied in.
We contributed one definitional answer to the aforementioned research question, but
there may be many more. Alternative definitions may vary significantly due to representa-
tion choices. For example, in our representation we adopted modal norms for the simplicity
of representing higher–order norms. An alternative norm form, evaluative norms as dis-
cussed in Chapter 2, does not have explicit deontic modalities and hence in this case a no-
tion of compliance in multi–level governance might be defined differently. Moreover, there
may be regulations found in multi–level governance that are not captured by our formalism.
To summarise, we answered this research question by defining compliance in multi–
level governance as follows. An institutional design is compliant in multi–level governance
if and only if its concrete regulatory effects in different social contexts have compliant
abstract meanings in higher–level institutions according to those higher–level institutions’
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interpretive counts–as rules. This notion of compliance accounts for the different concrete
and abstract ontological views between governance levels and the dynamic meaning of
lower–level regulatory effects from the perspective of higher–levels.
HOW CAN INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN COMPLIANCE IN MULTI–LEVEL GOV-
ERNANCE BE COMPUTATIONALLY VERIFIED?
In order to answer this research question, PARAGon contributed a computational frame-
work for determining compliance in multi–level governance, presented in Chapter 4. The
computational framework provided a mapping from the formal representation of institu-
tions in a multi–level governance relationship and their semantics to a corresponding ex-
ecutable ASP program. Institutions were represented in the computational framework as
rules in a similar fashion to their formal counterparts. The multi–level governance seman-
tics were represented as general ASP rules to capture the temporal dynamics of institutions
and specific ASP rules to represent the semantics for the abstraction of norms. Effectively,
the ASP rules representing norm abstraction semantics flattened the deontological counts–
as function, which defines how concrete normative effects are interpreted more abstractly,
presented previously in the formal component of the framework for multi–level governance
compliance (Chapter 3). Whist a non–flattened and more general form might have been
preferable, we found it was not possible due to current limitations of ASP. Naturally, we
contributed theorems and their proofs demonstrating that the computational framework is
sound and complete with respect to the formal framework for multi–level governance com-
pliance checking.
The computational framework was complemented with an implemented compiler. The
compiler built on the InstAL framework’s [42, 43] implementation, which allows institu-
tions in a multi–level governance relationship to be specified in a high–level non–procedural
language and compliance to be automatically checked. As we saw, compliance in multi–
level governance is highly dependent on social context. Consequently, keeping with the aim
of practicality, this means through our implementation we can reveal to institution design-
ers in which social contexts their regulations are non–compliant. If certain social contexts
are unreachable in reality and therefore compliance for these contexts is irrelevant, a user
can decide based on the presented contextual information whether to ignore these contexts.
Since we used ASP, it is possible domain knowledge can be incorporated into the resulting
ASP programs in order to constrain compliance checks to only reachable social contexts.
Consequently, the practical benefits were realised with an implemented and correspond-
ing computational framework, which provides automated and contextualised compliance
checks to users.
We only contributed one answer to this research question. Other corresponding compu-
tational frameworks may be possible. For example, using a higher–order logic as a meta–
language to provide an axiomatisation of our formal semantics and a higher–order logic
theorem prover to act as the computational implementation. Such an approach has been
used to embed other logics, such as modal logic [18]. Speculatively, this approach could
yield greater benefits by potentially enabling a computational framework comprising gen-
eral rules/axioms rather than a flattening of the deontological counts–as function, which
requires re–compilation every time institutional rules are changed. An entirely different
answer to the research question could be to not provide a computational implementation,
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but to instead investigate the computational aspects of the formal framework. For exam-
ple, decidability and complexity. In effect, our implementation shows our formal semantics
is decidable, since ASP is decidable for finite Herbrand universes [92] and we proved a
correspondence between the ASP implementation and the formal framework. However, an
alternative approach could have been to contribute a decision procedure, which would have
removed the need for elaborate and recursive transformations between the formal represen-
tation and ASP–based implementation. Hence, there may be alternative and perhaps more
elegant solutions to this research question.
By contributing a computational framework, we were able to formalise and execute a
substantial portion of two related real–world multi–level governance legal cases. Specif-
ically, the first case where the EU Data Retention Directive was enacted in 2006 [71] to
coordinate EU member state legislation in requiring communications metadata was stored
and where the UK’s implementation, its Data Retention Regulations [226] were enacted and
found to be compliantly implement the directive in 2009. Moreover, the second case where
in 2014 the Data Retention Directive was found to be non–compliant by the European Court
of Justice [70] with the European Charter of Fundamental Rights [72].
By executing the case study, using interpretations provided by court judgements where
possible, we were able to evaluate both our formal and computational multi–level gover-
nance compliance checking frameworks. One caveat is that the results for executing a case
study can be highly dependent on how institutions are represented. Hence, we opted for a
formalisation that arguably has a clear correspondence to the written law and court judge-
ments. Bearing this in mind, we were able to see that we gained the same results as the
real–world judgements of the European Court of Justice, using what we argue is a natural
corresponding representation. Consequently, we contributed a computational implementa-
tion that demonstrates the formal definitions of compliance in multi–level governance are
arguably ‘correct’ and provides practical benefits with automated compliance checking.
HOW CAN NON–COMPLIANT INSTITUTION DESIGNS BE EXPLAINED IN
ORDER TO RECTIFY NON–COMPLIANCE ACCORDING TO THE INSTITU-
TION DESIGNER’S OBJECTIVES?
In order to answer this research question PARAGon contributed a formal definition of expla-
nations for non–compliant institutional designs and a computational mechanism to induce
those explanations in Chapter 5. That is, by generating explanations, treating those ex-
planations as hypotheses for rectifying non–compliance and then testing those hypotheses
for support over a trace of events and therefore multiple social contexts. The contribution
means non–compliance can be automatically rectified by adopting the explanatory rectifi-
cations for non–compliance as institutional design changes.
The search for explanatory non–compliance rectifications was formalised as an Induc-
tive Logic Programming (ILP) problem. We addressed the inconvenient idea that an institu-
tion designer prefers explanatory rectifications for non–compliance that keep an institution
design as close to their original intentions, in order to ensure the proposal is of practical ben-
efit. The idea being that our formal notion of explanatory rectifications for non–compliance
are those that minimise changes to an institution’s constructed social realities. Thereby,
explanations for non–compliance offer rectifications that keep as closely as possible to the
designer’s original intentions, assuming those intentions were correctly captured by the
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original institutional design. Moreover, we formalised the notion of explanations as also
optimizing, to a secondary degree, institutional design change simplicity. This means ex-
planations are preferred if they are more compact, in the sense of optimising fewer rule
changes explaining greater instances of non–compliance. Overall we formalised explana-
tions as comprising four types of rule change which can be combined: adding rules, re-
moving rules, adding rule constraints and removing rule constraints. Hence, we formalised
explanatory rectifications for non–compliance as changes to rules that adhere to an institu-
tion designer’s intentions, and are the simplest and most compact explanatory hypotheses.
We addressed explaining non–compliance from a practical perspective. That is, by im-
plementing the search for the hypotheses that provide possible explanations and rectifica-
tions for non–compliance, as an ILP problem in ASP using existing embedding techniques.
The implementation alleviates an otherwise arduous task of an institution designer in try-
ing different institutional re–designs for the one which rectifies non–compliance in the best
way according to our own optimisation criteria (closeness to the original design and sim-
plicity). The general idea of the implementation is to take an ASP program defining a
non–compliant institution and compile that program into another ASP program where hy-
potheses for rectifying non–compliance can be generated and tested for support. For an
institution designer, the implementation provides flexibility in specifying for which social
contexts rectifying non–compliance should be found and hence guide the process of finding
explanatory rectifications.
In order to see how our formalisation of explanatory non–compliance rectifications be-
haved, we formalised a case study based on a fictional institution for a socio–technical
system which in turn was governed by real–world and fictional laws. The system discov-
ered a number of simple explanations for why the socio–technical system institution was
non–compliant. These included the discovery of general design faults, which might poten-
tially explain further issues the designer does not desire, removal of problematic rules and
changes to existing rule constraints, and explanations comprising rule additions to ensure
regulatory effects before rectification would still exist after rectification if they do not cause
non–compliance.
We only contributed one possible answer to the aforementioned question based on the
idea of inducing hypotheses for non–compliance. There may be other possible answers,
such as by defining what constitutes an explanation differently. For example, rather than
defining explanation as hypotheses comprising institutional rule changes, one possibility is
to combine argumentation and abduction to provide explanations as causal stories (e.g. as
proposed for legal cases [19]). In this approach, an explanation is a chain of inferences
showing how abduced probable causes of a true proposition provide an explanation of that
proposition. Hence, a narrative causal chain could instead be used in this way to provide ex-
planations for non–compliance. We do not attempt to exhaust all the feasible ways to define
explanations for non–compliance, but note formal argumentation could provide alternative
answers.
Together, the formal notion of explanations for non–compliance and the implementation
for finding such explanations complement each other. The formal aspect can be tested by the
implementation with various case studies to determine if the formal notions give intuitive
results. The practical aspect is supported by addressing the need to find those solutions
for non–compliance which minimise design change and offer the simplest explanations for
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understandability. We tested both of these aspects using a case study combining fictional
and real–world rules.
HOW CAN WE FORMALLY DEFINE WHEN LEGALLY VALID INSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE ENACTMENTS OCCUR?
In order to answer this research question PARAGon contributed a semantics that defined
when institutional change enactments are valid in Chapter 6. In this context, by institutional
change enactment we mean changes to an institution’s rules over time. An institutional rule
change is valid if it is ascribed by an institution’s secondary rules. These secondary rules
were represented as a special type of counts–as rule of the form “A counts–as modifying
a rule in the past/present/future in context C”, which ascribe modifications to counts–as
rules including other secondary rules. The semantics defined when social actions of institu-
tional counts–as rule changes are ascribed, including to other secondary rules, and how the
institution transitions from one version to another when rule changes are validly enacted.
The formalisation gave meaning to secondary (counts–as) rules. The secondary counts–
as rules we formalised include a condition on a richer social context not given any formali-
sation, as far as we are aware, previously. In particular, social contexts acting as conditions
on past institutional states, past institution versions and hypothetical rule change effects.
These conditions were used to represent cases such as institutional rule changes occurring
conditional on those changes not criminalising formerly innocent people in the past. In
order to deal with such expressivity we proposed a semantics that defines a rule change as
occurring if the necessary conditions are met and all of the effects of the rule change are
consistent with those necessary conditions.
We acknowledged that in reality secondary rules can make it possible for past, present
and/or future rule changes to be made including to other secondary rules. Consequently,
our semantics dealt with difficult cases where changes to secondary rules potentially cause
other, previously established, rule changes at various points in time to be unravelled or po-
tentially further rule changes to be made. Moreover, our semantics handled cases where
complex interactions between rule changes would, in a classical setting, cause inconsis-
tency. For example, the case where the only rule ascribing rule modifications ascribes its
own removal. In our case, we took the perspective that if a rule change causes inconsistency
with the conditions for its own ascription then the rule change is not legally ascribed (i.e. is
invalid) and thus does not occur in the first place.
We tested our definition against a number of case studies based on EU and UK law, as
well as edge cases where we would expect there to be issues with an incorrect definition.
The real world case studies demonstrated that through a simple representation we were able
to reason about difficult kinds of rule change governance. For example, hard constraints on
there being no changes to criminalising laws in the past, requiring a form of hypotheti-
cal reasoning to classify rule change effects. From the edge cases we saw that complex
cases where rule changes interact, which are conceivably difficult to reason about without
a mechanical process, are arguably handled intuitively by our formal account.
We did not attempt to exhaustively answer the research question. Instead, we offered a
single formalisation of when institutional rule changes occur according to secondary rules.
Other formalisations may be possible and, indeed, they exist for rule modifications in non–
temporal settings [28] and rule modifications in temporal settings [100, 102] but with less
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expressive secondary rules. Moreover, an equivalent definitional answer could be given to
this research question using a different formalisation. It’s possible our semantics could be
defined on top of an existing logic, either at the meta–level or object level. For example,
we could try to adopt or modify default logic [203] by viewing conditions on rule change
being ascribed as defaults that must hold before and after rule change. In our case, we
chose to contribute a formal definition with a semantics that stands on its own, requiring
no understanding of pre–existing logics aside from some rudimentary notions of sets and
functions.
To summarise, we contributed a formal definition to answer this research question. In-
formally, a rule change occurs if and only if it is ascribed by secondary legal counts–as
rules conditional on a social context, which can include hypothetical rule change effects,
that holds before and after the rule change takes place. Our account was assessed against a
number of case studies, including edge cases to assess the intuitiveness of results.
8.2. APPLYING THE RESEARCH TO THE SHINE PROJECT
The research conducted in this dissertation was supported by the SHINE project of TU
Delft. The project aimed to develop techniques for acquiring and coordinating large num-
bers of heterogeneous data resources that already exist in the environment (e.g. cellphone
sensors, radars and people) in order to collect environmental data. This dissertation con-
tributes techniques for formalising governing governance, which is arguably suitable for
governance and coordination of ‘SHINE–like’ sensor systems.
An implemented application of the research was presented in Chapter 7 for a simulated
prototype as a proof–of–concept. In this application automated compliance checking in
multi–level governance was used to determine if contracts offered to individuals to crowd-
source their cellphone sensors should be accepted on the basis of being compliant with use
policies. These use policies would be, conceivably, specified by cellphone owners stating
how, when and for whom their cellphone sensors may be used. In this setting, the research
was applied to giving people control over how their sensors are contributed to crowdsourc-
ing systems without requiring sensor owners to arduously read the fine–print of the offered
contracts.
The research in Chapter 5 was also applied to a fictional institution used to govern a
crowdsourcing system as a whole, which in turn was governed by external laws partially
inspired by real–world legislation. In this application we demonstrated an automated sys-
tem to find explanations for why the crowdsourcing system institution design was non–
compliant with external laws.
The research on compliance in multi–level governance in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 was
applied to a real–world multi–level governance case study. In this case we showed how
the PARAGon framework was able to represent and reason about the EU Data Retention
Directive [71] and its non–compliance [70] with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights
[72] due to requiring the storage of people’s communications metadata without their con-
sent, which took away the right to respect for private and family life. In this case, the
relevance was showing how we can check the compliance of laws concerning the collection
of data, in much the same way a SHINE institution, which aims to guide MAS participants
in contributing data, might be found non–compliant with similar external human rights and
liberties laws. Hence, we applied the framework to a simulated prototype and case studies
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concerning SHINE–systems and data collection.
Outside of these realised applications, the multi–level governance compliance reason-
ing presented in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 offers a potential way to contribute automated
reasoning for an architecture applied to governing heterogeneous sociotechnical systems.
SHINE is concerned with heterogeneous sensor systems, which comprise different types of
sensors. Rather than attempting to apply a single institution to govern heterogeneous sen-
sors, which due to different behaviours might be unsuitable, multi–level governance offers a
way to treat heterogeneous groups of sensors (e.g. crowdsourced cellphone sensors, a group
of weather radars, etc.) as separate homogeneous self–governing sensor sub–systems. The
idea is that each sensor sub–system has its own institutional governance designed by the
stakeholders of that sub–system (e.g. sensor owners). Then, a SHINE institution is de-
signed to govern institutions governing each sensor sub–system towards over–arching aims
with abstract regulations. Thereby, multi–level governance delegates the design of sensor
sub–system institution designs, removes problems of a single ‘one–size–fits–all’ institution
design and coordinates separate sub–system institution designs towards overarching data
collection objectives. In this scenario, this dissertation supports governance of sensor sub–
system institution designs with automated multi–level governance compliance checking,
but further investigation is needed to determine if automating such governance can work
for heterogeneous sensor ‘systems of sub–systems’ in practice.
The institutional enactment governance presented in Chapter 6 provides a potential way
for stakeholders in SHINE sensor systems to specify flexible and automated governance of
sensor systems’ institutional change enactment. This means, system stakeholders are able
to use the formal reasoning to determine how institutional changes can be enacted accord-
ing to an institution’s secondary rules when changing sensor aims require changed regu-
lations. Moreover, stakeholders have flexibility in defining the rule change process for a
given governed sensor system. The main benefit being, owing to heterogeneity between
different sensor systems, alternative rule change processes for each sensor sub–system can
be defined and reasoned about. For example, one system’s rule change process can be de-
fined as a direct democratic vote with certain constraints (e.g. not removing the right to a
democratic vote from participants in the past) and another as requiring elected technocrats
to make a collective decision. Hence, although untested, our secondary rule formalisation
potentially allows automated operationalisation for a diverse range of governance and reg-
ulatory change enactment styles to be defined for different sensor systems, in a way that
enables those system’s regulations to adapt, as deemed appropriate, to new aims and needs.
None of this is to say that this dissertation contributes an exhaustive application to the
governance of SHINE–like sensor systems. However, what has been shown is that in at
least one area, the governance of contracts for crowdsourcing, the framework was applied
in a prototype. Moreover, the framework has been applied to case studies relevant to sensor
systems such as those envisaged by the SHINE project. Finally, there are potential avenues
for future applications to SHINE–like systems.
8.3. FUTURE WORK
Future work is split into analysis of the formal frameworks contributed by this dissertation,
improvements to this dissertation’s contributions and new research lines influenced by this
dissertation’s contributions.
174 8. CONCLUSIONS
8.3.1. ANALYSIS
The formalisms developed in this dissertation have been shown to meet various proper-
ties, such as there existing a sound and complete logic-programming implementation. Such
properties were provided in order to demonstrate the expectations, set out in the introduc-
tions of the relevant chapters, have been met. However, there still remains work to be done
on general properties that give a better understanding of how institutions behave under the
defined semantics.
The formalism defining compliance in multi-level governance, in Chapter 3 could be
analysed for properties relating to inconsistency, (non-)compliance and redundancy. Incon-
sistency can occur in two senses. The first type of inconsistency that should be investigated
is, what we can call, non-deontic inconsistency where due to the operations defining the
semantics being undefined in some cases (e.g. the event generation operation) there is con-
sequently no model for those cases. The second type of inconsistency is what we call deon-
tic inconsistency, where it is impossible to discharge all obligations/prohibitions, or worse
that some obligations/prohibitions are necessarily violated no matter what event occurs.
Properties that coincide with the dischargement and violation of abstract and higher-order
norms should also be investigated. For example, if an abstract norm is violated then what
concrete norms, if any, must also necessarily be violated and vice versa? Finally, an impor-
tant aspect of an institution or normative system addressed in the literature is redundancy
[22, 54] – when would removing a counts-as rule have no effect whatsoever on how the
institution evolves over time (for all traces of observable events)? Whilst norm redundancy
has already been formalised and investigated, it would be interesting to investigate given
the novel semantics of the multi-level governance compliance formalisation if there are
general properties that coincide with a rule being redundant. Investigating properties relat-
ing to inconsistency, (non-)compliance and redundancy for the formalisation of compliance
in multi-level governance would give a better understanding of how the formalisation be-
haves, in particular given the novel abstraction semantics, and some useful properties for
understanding how to improve an institution operating under those semantics.
The formalism defining the legality of rule change, in Chapter 6, could be analysed
concerning (il)legal rule change, temporal dynamics and rationality. To recap the infor-
mal notion, a rule change is legal “1. if the rule change is ascribed by counts–as rules,
conditional on a context taking into account the potential changes to the context the rule
modification would make 2. taking into account past/present/future rule modifications ef-
fect on counts–as rules and thus the context in which rule changes are conditional on.”
However, such informality still leaves future investigation of formal properties that coin-
cide with (il)legal rule change. Moreover, in terms of temporal dynamics, it is important
to analyse under which conditions changes occurring in the future can affect the past, in-
cluding past states and also the legality of past rule changes. In particular, concerning both
temporal dimensions of the formalism. On the one hand we showed future rule changes can
make past changes in the same version become (il)legal and therefore potentially no longer
occur. On the other hand we did not ascertain under which fragments of the language fu-
ture rule changes are guaranteed to not affect the legality of rule changes in past versions.
Further properties should be analysed concerning rationality. Famously, the AGM belief
revision postulates [3] define a notion of rationality for belief revision operators and a re-
lated set of postulates has been proposed for norm revision [25]. It is important to analyse
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whether our formalisation of ascriptive legal rule change meets these postulates. However,
since we are dealing with rules that ascribe the legality of changing other legal rules and
not just ‘straightforward’ norm change, it is possible that the postulates are not met and
moreover that a slightly different set of postulates may be more appropriate that do hold for
our formalisation. Investigating properties relating to the legality of rule change, temporal
dynamics and rationality would give a better understanding of what our formal definitions
really mean at a deeper level.
In addition to analysing the behaviour of each individual formalisation, it is also impor-
tant to formally compare with other formalisations. One possible way to do this would be
to abstract the semantics. For example, by using Tosatto et al’s [223, 224] graph-based for-
malism where obligations, permissions and institutional facts are nodes and rules are edges
between those nodes. The idea would be to take existing abstractions of formalisms using
Tosatto et al’s abstraction and compare them to an abstraction of the formal semantics con-
tributed by this dissertation. The benefit would be not just a formal comparison between the
PARAGon framework and other frameworks, but also a comparison where patterns of rea-
soning and differences between them are visualised. However, this type of analysis requires
further investigation since there, to the best of our knowledge, appears to be no work on ab-
stracting systems of the ‘type’ we formalise. In particular in Chapter 6 where an institution
evolves over two timelines and there can be complex interactions between past, present and
future institutional facts. In order to analyse differences between our formalism and others,
a means to abstract our semantics should be found, which is a significant undertaking and
left for future work.
8.3.2. IMPROVEMENTS
PUTTING AUTOMATED MULTI–LEVEL GOVERNANCE INTO PRACTICE
In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 we looked at reasoning about compliance in multi–level gover-
nance. A focus was placed on reasoning about abstraction at different levels of governance.
This aspect of the PARAGon framework was assessed against a real–world case–study for
the governance of human societies and governments.
An avenue for future work is to determine if the same framework can be applied to
artificial societies. This would result in an formalised and automated operationalisation of
two proposals. First, the proposal of what Pitt et al. [197] call polycentric governance for
socio–technical systems. Here, they argue that in complex artificial MAS a single one–size–
fits–all institution is inadequate, since different localised parts of the MAS may need differ-
ent regulations. Therefore, in our own wording, separate lower level institutions should be
designed appealing to subsidiarity. These institutions should be compliant with overarch-
ing institutions abstractly prescribing what regulations should be implemented. Secondly,
Dignum et al. propose the OMNI design methodology framework for institutions/organi-
zations governing artificial MASs [62]. Here, the design methodology is focussed on a
regulation abstraction hierarchy where at the most abstract level statutes comprising val-
ues, objectives and contexts should be designed. Then, abstract norms implementing these
statutes. Implementing the abstract norms are concrete norms. In this methodology an as-
sumed function that concretises abstract norms is used. PARAgon offers a semantics for
reasoning about abstract norms that could potentially be used to weaken or remove the as-
sumption of a concretising function. Future work should extend and apply the PARAGon
176 8. CONCLUSIONS
framework to further operationalise and develop the ideas presented in these papers.
ENHANCING INSTITUTION ABSTRACTION REASONING
Another important future development is extending the semantics for abstract regulation
reasoning presented theoretically in Chapter 3 to support ontological alignment of institu-
tions. In our proposal lower–level institutions’ regulatory effects were re–interpreted at the
abstract level defined by higher–level institutions. For example, obliging storing communi-
cations metadata in a lower level institution is abstracted to obliging storing personal data
in a higher–level institution. In one sense, this means lower level institutions’ regulations
were aligned with the abstractions defined by higher–level institutions.
However, we assumed that the concrete terminology shared by lower and higher–level
institutions have the same meaning and are already ontologically aligned. For example,
storing metadata in the lower–level institution coincides with storing metadata in the higher–
level institution. Thus, if the lower–level obliges storing metadata, and the higher–level
views storing metadata as storing personal data, then from the higher–level institution’s
perspective the lower–level is obliging that personal data is stored. In general, ontolog-
ically aligning institutions is an important problem that needs addressing for comparing
regulations between institutions.
Aside from alignment, abstraction reasoning should also be improved to address further
deontic concepts. We focussed on how to abstract obligations and prohibitions, based on
counts–as rules describing the abstraction of events and fluents. However, there are many
other deontic concepts, as described by Hohfeld [120], that play an important role in institu-
tions. They include accounting for the concepts of right and liberty. For example, a right to
life correlates with a prohibition on others to take life away. The liberty to choose who you
love depends on there being no prohibition on choosing who you love. Each of these might
be involved in multi–level governance in the form of obliged/prohibited rights and liberties,
or rights and liberties represented in constitutions which require obligations/prohibitions to
(not) be imposed in lower–level institutions. Such Hohfeldian notions of rights and liberties
should be investigated for abstracting and governing.
Likewise, concepts of legal power should also be accounted for. Legal power, is the
ability to (legally) affect an institution according to ascriptions provided by constitutive
rules [136, 163]. To give an example in a multi–level governance context, a higher–level
institution governing a marriage institution could state that “it is obliged that newly weds
have the power to annul their marriage”. From the perspective of this dissertation, an in-
teresting aspect is determining from a relatively concrete lower–level institution (such as
a marriage institution) whether concrete rules and regulations constitute an abstract power
such as newly weds having the legal power to annul their marriage. Moreover, concepts
related to power should also be accounted for. Namely, disability (the opposite of power),
liability (you are only legally liable if you have legal power) and immunity (without liability
you are immune from not fulfilling norms you have no legal power to do so).
One possibility to incorporate all of these concepts is to build on the logics of Hohfel-
dian rights and liberties [137–140], and institutional power [136]. That is, we could try
to combine these formalisations of Hohfeldian legal concepts with multi–level governance
formalisation in order to govern instances of Hohfeldian concepts.
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PUTTING THE ASCRIPTION OF LEGAL RULE CHANGES INTO PRACTICE
The formalisation in Chapter 6 provides a fixed point characterisation for ascribing legal
and valid rule change. The fixed point characterisation provides the mechanism to find
models, which can be implemented in any sufficiently expressive language. Yet, there
remain practical concerns for the formalism to be usable in a real–world setting.
An obvious improvement is to address the lack of implementation and complexity anal-
ysis. Many of the constructs in the formalism are similar to Event Calculus constructs [150]
(e.g. a fluent holds if it is initiated until it is terminated). An axiomatisation for an Event
Calculus (version) exists in ASP [141]. Hence, one way to implement the formalism would
be to provide an Event Calculus–like axiomatisation in ASP. A benefit of this approach is
that there are already existing complexity results for ASP [66, 74] which can be used to
assess the complexity of an axiomatisation.
Another problem that needs addressing is the assumption that, in the formal framework,
all rules which can and/or will be added/removed from an institution are fully characterised
by an institution’s event generation and state consequence functions. It makes more sense
in practical terms to allow the functions describing rules or a database of rules to be update-
able with new rules. Then, with new rules added to the database, rule enactment actions can
be undertaken by agents to ensure the rules become a valid and recognised part of the insti-
tution. If an ASP approach is taken to implementing the formalism, then a logic program
would need to be updateable with new rules during run–time. One possibility for updat-
ing a rule database is to build on recent advances in answer–set programming for dynamic
domains [90].
LEGAL INTERPRETATION
In this dissertation we looked at the legality of institution designs and rule change but we
did not investigate legal interpretation, which is closely related to the topics we did inves-
tigate as we will discuss. Legal interpretation is the act of courts deciding what various
concepts mean, such as to determine the applicability of a rule or whether actions of an
agent constitute legally obliged behaviour, even if the written law does not make explicit
recommendations for such cases. Legal interpretation is important, since it allows legal
norms to be adapted to unforeseen circumstances and changes to the understanding of var-
ious concepts by society not represented in the written law. For example, a categorical
prohibition on storing private data might have previously meant preventing the storage of
communications content between people, but as time went on it became clear that storing
communications meta–data is also an infringement on privacy – hence a court would then
update the notion of private data to include meta-data.
As Boella et al. show [23, 24] legal interpretation is, formally, a case of rule change.
Specifically, whilst legislators have the legal power to change ontological and regulative
rules at “design–time”, courts have the legal power to change only ontological rules at “run–
time” (i.e. as cases are brought before the court). Boella et al. provide a formal mechanism
for re–interpreting the ontological meaning of literals in the antecedent of regulations (the
applicability of the rule) and the consequent (the obliged actions or state of affairs) based
on interpreting the original goal of the legislator (i.e. the intention behind the law). Hence,
legal interpretation is an important aspect of rule change that ensures laws, at run-time, can
be correctly applied and understood according to the goals behind enacting those laws at
design–time.
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Relating to these aspects, in this dissertation we contributed formalisms that can be used
to reason about the effects of legal interpretation. In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 we looked at
interpreting the abstract meaning of detached deontological statements based on ontological
interpretations provided by courts. But, the ontological interpretations were formalised a–
priori as counts–as rules (e.g. meta–data count-as personal data) in the case study on EU
multi-level governance.
We did, on the other hand, investigate the generation of hypotheses, using ILP, for
explaining and rectifying non–compliant institution designs in Chapter 5. Effectively, ILP
synthesised changes to ontological and deontological rules in order to ensure the regulatory
effects of an institution do not violate the regulations of other institutions. Courts synthesise
interpretations, which are effectively changes to the existing set of ontological rules. But,
suitable legal interpretation ensures the law is applied and interpreted correctly with respect
to its intention, which is different from our purpose of resolving non-compliant institution
designs.
Later, we investigated rule change legality and its effects on how an institution evolves
in the past/present/future in Chapter 6. Since legal interpretation is a case of rule change,
the formalisation of when rule changes are legal could be used, with some enhancements,
to reason about when legal interpretations are legal. For example, if we want to reason
about a statement such as “a court can introduce a new counts-as rule so long as it is not
regulatory and by introducing that rule the goal of the law being interpreted is promoted”.
By combining the work on interpreting the abstract meaning of regulations in Chapter 3
and Chapter 4 and the work on legal rule change in Chapter 6 we can potentially capture
the effects of legally-valid legal interpretation, which is the addition of ontological rules
ascribed by rule change regulating counts-as rules, on the abstract meanings of regulatory
effects. Our work is related to reasoning about legal interpretation in terms of its effects
and its legality when viewed as a type of rule change.
However, this dissertation did not investigate how legal interpretations could be gener-
ated in order to support the original goal of a law when it is unsupported according to the
run–time interpretation of legal concepts. Potentially, existing approaches by Boella et al.
[23, 24], which use defeasible logic to interpret the law, could be adopted to provide a more
complete system for reasoning about institutions, their interpretation and governance.
8.3.3. NEW RESEARCH LINES
SOCIAL COMMITMENTS
Whilst this dissertation looks at prescriptions from the perspective of when institutional
rule enactment and institution designs are legal, a similar type of prescription is social
commitments. Social commitments, such as promises, emerge between agents. Social
commitments establish relationships between parties and counter–parties and expectations
between agents. In a social commitment, when one agent, called the debtor, commits to
bring about X for the benefit of another agent, called the creditor, then the creditor has the
expectation that X will be brought about for their benefit and the debtor knows that the
creditor has such an expectation [36, 37]. The creditor, has flexibility and autonomy to
bring about X in any way they choose including through delegation to another agent. To
give an example from [243], a social protocol states whereupon a potential buyer requests a
quote for electronic goods, the potential seller is committed to providing the quote and the
8.3. FUTURE WORK 179
buyer expects to receive a quote.
Social commitments should be formalised since they provide a powerful and ubiquitous
means for agents to cooperate in a flexible way on the basis of mutual understanding, which
supports social interaction planning whilst preserving participants’ autonomy. Furthermore,
social commitments allow social endeavours’ progress to be assessed with in–built key per-
formance indicators (KPIs), such as ‘fulfilled’ and ‘violated’. Hence, social commitments
have seen formal work in the normative reasoning sphere for creating new social protocols
from existing commitment–based protocols [16, 94], planning the fulfilment of commit-
ments on the basis of expectations and mutually held beliefs [243], addressing conflicting
commitments [2], and converging on a mutual understanding of commitments and expecta-
tions [39], to name a few.
In this dissertation we looked at how to synthesise institution changes to rectify non–
compliance and how to determine when rule changes are valid, such as to support planning
valid legal rule changes. As we saw in Chapter 6, creating and altering rules makes it
(im)possible to create and alter rules. This is just as true for social commitments. To give
one example, in order to plan a larger project a project manager needs to get various project
participants to commit to giving estimated work hours required for deliverables. When par-
ticipants fulfil commitments, a project manager is able to plan further commitments. Or, to
give another example, by creating a social commitment for the trading of goods and services
it is possible for each participant to assess the trust they should place in the counter–party
after the commitment is fulfilled or violated. Consequently, creating and fulfilling/violating
social commitments makes it possible to determine whether further commitments should
be created on the basis of new information or increased trust. However, whilst commit-
ment creation and fulfilment is entwined with further commitment creation and planning,
planning the synthesis of commitments has not been addressed taking into account this
interdependence as far as we can see.
This dissertation offers ideas which can be built on to create such plans. Chapter 6’s
formalism shows that rule creation (e.g. commitments) is non–trivial given pre–existing
rules which ascribe rule changes, where rule changes enable/disable further rule changes.
An ASP axiomatisation of Chapter 6’s formalism as outlined previously would potentially
support planning rule changes. ILP applied to rule synthesis for compliant institution de-
signs contributed by Chapter 5 can potentially be used as a basis for synthesising the right
commitments for a given problem. But, the difficulty is determining how to synthesise
commitments given that setting up expectations and/or agents fulfilling those expectations
is necessary to build trust and meet sub–goals for further commitments to be planned for
meeting an overarching social goal.
FORMALISING THE SUBSIDIARITY PRINCIPLE IN MULTI–LEVEL GOVERNANCE
This dissertation looked at formalising compliance in multi–level governance. Subsidiarity,
the principle that what can be legislated at the local level should be left up to the local
level, is also an aspect of multi–level governance. This dissertation contributes reasoning
for abstract regulations which are used to realise subsidiarity, but this dissertation does not
investigate subsidiarity itself.
Yet, subsidiarity is an important principle. Ostrom [185, p.90] argues that regulations
must be based on local conditions. Whilst regulations should be coordinated across group-
s/jurisdictions (e.g. carbon emission targets), Wilson argues [238] implementation should
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be left to the lowest–level jurisdiction where implementation is effective. By involving lo-
cal lay knowledge, as opposed to a one–size–fits–all approach, policies are more effective
by being enhanced with learning from past policy decisions [181, 193, 242]. In general,
a one–size–fits–all approach is argued as resulting in failure [187], which the subsidiarity
principle aims to address.
The same arguments in favour of subsidiarity for human society governance are made
for the governance and design of sociotechnical systems, such as smart grids. Frey et al.
[85] and Pitt et al. [198], propose a design/governance framework for socio–technical sys-
tems, where higher–levels provide over–arching aims but, adhering to the principle of sub-
sidiarity, delegate to lower–levels for implementation or further delegation to even lower–
levels. For example, Pitt et al. [198] talk about decentralised community energy systems.
These are small residential communities comprising residences which both produce energy
(e.g. with wind turbines) and consume energy, and supply energy to one another. Institu-
tions regulate the communities to manage the appropriation of common energy resources.
Scaling involves composing a system of decentralised community energy sub–systems,
each sub–system demanding and supplying energy from one another. In order to govern
a system of systems, hierarchical governance is proposed, where sub–system’s institutions
are coordinated (e.g. to ensure energy is shared between sub–systems) but appealing to the
principle of subsidiarity different sub–system institutions comprise different regulations as
deemed appropriate for the community being governed (e.g. one operates a market econ-
omy and another operates a communal economy). Subsidiarity uses local lay knowledge to
govern disparate societies or socio–technical systems towards a common aim.
In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 we looked at the abstraction aspect of subsidiarity, where
abstract regulations leave some institutional design decisions up to the local level. However,
subsidiarity itself has not been formalised in terms of determining what should be left up
to the local level. Nor does subsidiarity appear to have been given a precise measure. The
question remains, subsidiarity is the principle that what can be done at the local level should
be left up to the local level through delegation, but how far down should the delegation
go and how much freedom should be given to lower–levels of institution designers? In
particular, what level of subsidiarity is suitable taking into account a cross–institutional
objective, and lower–level institution designer’s capabilities and local lay knowledge?
Arguably, the lack of formalisation is problematic since subsidiarity is a structural opti-
misation principle and therefore if not measured multi–level governance is not optimisable.
We can conceive that if subsidiarity is not realised through over–delegation and overly–
abstract regulations at higher–levels, then designers of lower–level institutions have too
much room to design compliant institutions. Therefore, coordination between individual
sub–systems/societies to meet a global aim is not guaranteed. Moreover, if subsidiarity is
not realised due to too little delegation and too concrete regulations in higher–level institu-
tions then lower–level institution designers have too little room to optimise regulations for
local lay knowledge to meet global aims. Consequently, subsidiarity needs to be formalised,
according to these assumed problems, in order to promote measurement, optimisation, com-
pliance and therefore meeting global goals, and automation.
There are many aspects to address when formalising subsidiarity. A metric should be
defined for the abstractness level a particular institution possesses at a certain governance
level. In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 we saw how abstract regulations can be complied with but
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did not define how abstract each level is in a qualitative or quantitative sense. Abstraction
in this context is viewed as providing many ways with which to comply, the shortcoming
of this measure is that compliance and therefore ‘abstractness’ is highly dependent on the
ontology used. Consequently, a novel measure of abstractness is required that does not
depend on the number of ways abstract concepts are ascribed.
A metric should be defined to measure how disparate lower–level systems are and
whether they should be viewed as separate systems in the first place, or whether there is
a ‘one–size–fits–all’ institution for a particular goal and multiple jurisdictions. That is,
we need a system disparity metric to calculate the level of abstractness each regulation
and each governance level should be issued at. There already exist metrics for differences
(inconsistencies) between propositions [151], knowledge bases [104] and separate agents’
beliefs [127]. But it is unclear whether techniques used for such metrics can be extended to
assessing system disparity.
Finally, it should be possible to determine what capability local levels have to regulate
more appropriately than higher–levels using local lay knowledge for a particular objec-
tive. One possibility is to define reasoning about whether there is appropriate local–level
knowledge such that lower–levels are more capable than higher–levels in regulating to-
wards global aims. Such reasoning should be from the perspective of higher–levels that do
not necessarily know exactly what the local knowledge is. However, how to extract infor-
mation for whether local–level institution designers have appropriate knowledge is unclear.
Abstractness, system disparity and local capabilities to self–govern appropriately should be
measurable and combined to formalise a subsidiarity metric for a given objective, yet as we
have speculated, each measurement is non–trivial to define.
8.4. CLOSING REMARKS
We finish with a few closing remarks regarding the aspects of governing governance this
dissertation focuses on. This dissertation contributes formal and practical reasoning for
governing institutional design and change with the PARAGon framework. The contribution
is split into formalising institution design and enactment governance. Chapter 3, Chapter 4
and Chapter 5 contributed reasoning for how institutions should be designed. Chapter 6
contributed reasoning for how institutional change can be enacted. This raises the question,
does institutional design and enactment governance involve deontic shoulds or alethic cans?
From the should perspective, higher–level institutional rules prescribe the design of
lower–level institutions in multi–level governance and are formalised as soft constraints
in Chapters 3, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. In our case, higher–level institutions comprise
primary rules that abstractly prescribe lower–level institutional designs. Such primary rules
preserve the autonomy of lower–level institution designers since they can be violated by
designing a non–compliant institution.
From the can perspective, institutional change enactment is governed by Hart’s sec-
ondary legal rules [117, p.81]. These secondary rules define how institutional rules are
created and changed, formalised as hard institutional constraints, making (im)possible rule
changes in an institution, in Chapter 6. Specifically, secondary rules were formalised as
Searle’s constitutive rules. As discussed in the background section, constitutive rules con-
stitute an institution. According to our conceptualisation an institution’s secondary rules
constitute the ways in which the institutional rule changes can be enacted. The formalism
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in Chapter 6 ensures only valid rule changes recognised by the institution can be made
representing the actual state of an institution’s rules according to the its own secondary
rules.
Parallels can be drawn between institutions governing social behaviour, such as for-
malised in the literature, and the notions of institutions that govern governance defined by
this dissertation’s formalisations. In the institution of chess, according to Ricciardi [206],
the rules constitute the game. Moves can be physically made outside of chess’ rules, but
then the game of chess is not being played. In other words, you cannot cheat at chess. An
institution comprising prescriptions (ought statements), such as the law, may be considered
as ‘cheatable’ if cheating is defined as the act of violating those prescriptions. An instance
of an institution formalised in this dissertation, focussing on institutions involved in gov-
erning governance, comprises rules that constitute that institution. Institution designers
governed by instances of our institutions can ‘cheat’ with respect to the institutions govern-
ing them in one sense and not in another. In our formalisation, you can cheat at institution
design in the sense of designing a non–compliant institution (Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and 5),
but you cannot cheat at institution design in the sense of enacting rule changes invalidly
(Chapter 6). This dissertation formalises both of these kinds of governance. This disserta-
tion argues that it has formalised institutional governing of governance, where regulations
regulate how institutions should be designed and how institutional change enactments can
be made.
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Appendices are available online at http://www.thomascking.com/
dissertation/ThomasKingPhDAppendices.pdf (accessed at time of writ-
ing on 14-09-2016).
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